

「カブール再考」



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Where are we ?



2009年1月17日午前9時45分



2009年1月17日午前9時45分（2）



2009年1月17日午前9時45分（3）



What are we looking at ?

The 1st layer: Global context

- Global War on Terror (GWOT) etc. ?

The 2nd layer: Country specific

- International Assistance Regime ?

The 3rd layer: Community

- Human Security ?

The 1st layer: Global context

1. Origin: There are still multiple theories on the reason why the "Coalition of the Willing" nations decided to topple the Taliban regime, and continued the military operations to date. It is, however, no doubt that this military operations can be placed in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), which is termed OEF-A for Afghanistan.
2. Measure: Therefore, in this context the success/failure of post-9/11 Afghanistan is measured by the degree of achievement and progress of GWOT.
3. Current Status: On the one hand it is not evident to what extent OEF-A has made a positive impact on GWOT, on the other hand it is evidenced that the security situation in Afghanistan has worsened recently.

The 2nd layer: Country specific

1. UNAMA–Origin: Starting from the Security Council Resolution 1368 of 12 Sep 2001, the international community, represented by UN, based its decision to intervene the Afghan affairs on “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”. SCR 1386 of 20 Dec 01 authorized the deployment of Peace Keepers (ISAF), and SCR 1401 of 28 Mar 2008 authorized to establish a PKO mission (UNAMA).
2. ISAF–Origin: ISAF authorized by UN SC is different from OEF–A in its nature in that it aims to maintain the security, not to combat a particular group as OEF–A does.
3. ISAF–current status: However, the distinction between the two military operations has been difficult, if possible, for ordinary Afghans from the outset and become increasingly vague, particularly after NATO took over the whole ISAF.

UN Security Council Resolutions

1368 (12 Sep 01):
Threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts

1373 (28 Sep 01):
Threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts

1390 (16 Jan 02):
Threats to international peace
and security caused by terrorist acts

1453 (24 Dec 02):
Neighbor Relations

1659 (15 Feb 06):
Afghanistan Compact

1378 (14 Nov 01):
Transitional Administration

1383 (6 Dec 01):
Provisional Arrangement

1401 (28 Mar 02):
UNAMA Authorization

1419 (26 Jun 02):
Loya Jirga

1471 (28 Mar 03):
UNAMA extension

1536 (26 Mar 04):
UNAMA extension

1589 (24 Mar 05):
UNAMA extension

1662 (23 Mar 06):
UNAMA extension

1746 (23 Mar 07):
UNAMA extension

1806 (20 Mar 08):
UNAMA extension

1386 (20 Dec 01):
ISAF Authorization

1413 (23 May 02):
ISAF extension

1444 (27 Nov 02):
ISAF extension

1510 (13 Oct 03):
ISAF expansion

1563 (17 Sep 04):
ISAF extension

1623 (13 Sep 05):
ISAF extension

1707 (12 Sep 06):
ISAF extension

1776 (19 Sep 07):
ISAF extension

1833 (22 Sep 08):
ISAF extension

The 2nd layer: Country specific (2)

4. UNAMA–Mandate: The mandate of UNAMA is vast; virtually including all sectors, menu and/or buzz-words; Humanitarian / Post-conflict / Reconstruction / Development Assistance; political / economic / military / Peace-building / Human Security; Education, Health, Agriculture, Returnee, Infrastructure, Mine Action, Security Sector Reform (national army, police, DDR, counter-narcotics, justice), Rule of Law, Democratisation, Election, Governance etc...

As the international assistance is modelled in the modern western state/system with rare exceptions, virtually UNAMA is mandated to build a modern state from a scratch, or is destined to engage in a huge enterprise that might well be called “external modernization” of Afghanistan.

The 2nd layer: Country specific (3)

5. Coordination: There existed a coordination mechanism for Afghanistan in the pre-911 period, which was a leading case of UN coordination as part of UN Reform of Kofi Annan. After a few months vacuum period, a PKO mission, which is UNAMA, was established and was to take over the coordinator's role.

But it took UNAMA prolonged time to build the functional capacity, particularly of Pillar II (Assistance), and at the same time Afghans started to question the UN's role of coordinator.

The 2nd layer: Country specific (4)

6. Ownership: With the incapacitated function of UN coordination on the one hand, and the bilateralization and/or competition of flagging the contribution among donor countries on the other, Afghan had the limited opportunity of gaining sense of ownership of the whole endeavour of reconstructing their own country.
7. Beneficiaries: While the discussion on the structure of assistance regime and its menu was rampant, the international community as a whole suffered the limited supply of indigenous knowledge of Afghanistan to make its intervention more effective. It can be hardly free from the fault of application of templates.


The 3rd layer: Community

1. Symbolism: Images and anecdotes of Afghan people in plight are extensively used as resources to media, which in effect helped build an impression of Afghan as passive receivers of aid rather than active players of state builders.
2. Short of understanding: The security restriction of geographical movement of aid workers prevented aid workers from understanding and learning Afghans in the rural areas, which are majority of Afghans.
3. Template?: Lack of understanding or biased understanding of ordinary Afghans in the rural areas was compensated with the ideal types of community, on which the assistance projects was largely based.

The 3rd layer: Community (2)

4. Gap: Convenience of aid organizations rather than needs of Afghans worked as the criteria for assistance provision, which lead to enlarge the development gap between urban dwellers and Afghans in the traditional community.
5. Insufficient humanitarian assistance: As the OEF is mostly fought out of sight of large cities and out of reach of aid organizations, Afghan communities in those areas caught in the battle can hardly have access to any relief.
6. Security: Disillusion on the part of Afghans in the remote rural areas prepared the room for tolerance of Afghan communities toward the insurgents from outside, which worsened the overall security.

Local Structure of Governance or Villages



Broken Promises?



Undermine Afghan government ?

1. Restrictions on delivery of aid caused by worsened security
2. Limited aid channelled through Afghan government
3. Afghan government huge reliance on foreign assistance
4. Guided by donors' own priorities
5. Direct security expenditures – one third of aid flows
6. Aid per capita – poor compared with other post-conflict nations

Unable to deliver ?



After decades of conflict, millions of Afghans are destitute

Unable to deliver ?



Starving child in a refugee camp, Kandahar province



Urgent need for more food and water: A chronically malnourished child in a refugee camp, Kandahar province

Unable to deliver ?



Abandoned by the international community?



Governance Crisis - Legitimacy and Capacity

In the eyes of many Afghans, Afghan Government is

1. unable to provide for the basic needs of its population,
2. to fulfil the international community's idealistic need for a democracy in Afghanistan rather than their own,
3. unable to prevent the side effects of the international military forces in the country,

Hard Choices

Restore the Legitimacy... and security.



1. Afghan Government Ownership vs Accountability – corruption and limited capacity
2. Reach the poor majority vs Security
3. Rely on the local structure vs Democracy Agenda



Departure from Nation-building ?

1. Lost local support for international community's security efforts
2. Decreased legitimacy of the central government
3. International military forces are considered "invaders"
4. Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-ISAF are now taking sides in a civil war situation
5. Counter-narcotics "Eradication" is damaging Operation Enduring Freedom and NATO-ISAF missions


Two Military Operations in Afghanistan

	Operation Enduring Freedom	International Security Assistance Force
		
<i>Date of Establishment</i>	7 October 2001	5 December 2001
<i>Current Location</i>	Southern and eastern Afghanistan (border regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan)	Kabul, north-eastern, western and southern Afghanistan (taking over from Operation Enduring Freedom in four phases)
<i>Legal Basis</i>	Having categorised the attacks of 9/11 as an "act of war", the US and the UK claim Operation Enduring Freedom is grounded in the Collective Self Defence provisions of the NATO treaty and article 51 of the UN charter.	Chapter VII of the UN Charter UN Security Resolutions 1386, 1413, and 1444
<i>Command Structure</i>	US Central Command in liaison with NATO-ISAF	Command of NATO-ISAF rotates among NATO countries. As of May 2006 the UK has commanded NATO-ISAF. Canada currently commands the NATO-ISAF multi-national taskforce in southern Afghanistan
<i>Current Resources</i>	Coalition of forces from 27 countries	36 contributing nations Soldiers, sailors and airmen

Two Military Operations in Afghanistan (2)


	19,000 US troops Special forces from Canada, Denmark, France, and the UK	
<i>Mission Objectives</i>	Search and destroy Counter-terrorism operations to eliminate Taliban forces and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan	Stabilise, secure and protect Supporting the Afghan Government in expanding its authority throughout the country and establishing security Providing a safe and secure environment conducive to the spread of the rule of law and the reconstruction of the country
<i>Recent Developments</i>	During the January 2006 London Conference, Operation Enduring Freedom was extended until 2010** In late 2006 US troops will be reduced by 2500. Mission focus shifts to eastern Afghanistan's border with Pakistan	In July 2006 NATO-ISAF assumed control of southern Afghanistan with the total number of NATO-ISAF troops to reach approximately 17,000

Peace Process and Military Operations




NATO-ISAF: From stabilisation to war

The changing scope of NATO-ISAF's mission since 2001



Operation Enduring Freedom: From a counter-terrorism mission to a counter-guerrilla warfare


The changing scope of the mission of Operation Enduring Freedom



Mission confusion:

the international community heads into a trap

The scope of NATO-ISAF and US-led Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001



Who are insurgents ?

1. Al Qaeda-affiliated Jihadists
2. Autonomous groups (formed by factions, politically and militarily organised, benefiting from local support, and answering to warlords.)
3. Taliban / Neo-Taliban – who are they ?
 1. Local commanders
 2. Fundraiser and military trainers from Pakistan and Arab countries
 3. Nationalist-Islamist Pashtuns
 4. Opium Smugglers and traffickers
 5. People resenting international forces or the central government
 6. Religious conservatives
 7. People forced into combat
 8. Poor people and those affected by eradication

Warlords in Afghanistan



Psychological War – “we cannot stand back and watch as foreigners touch our women. Something must be done.



A page from a recent Taliban publication. Text reads “we cannot stand back and watch as foreigners touch our women. Something must be done.”


Core Aims of PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)

1. Improve security
2. Extend authority and legitimacy of the Afghan Government
3. Initiate and facilitate reconstruction

PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Teams)



Total military spending vs. total development spending in Afghanistan, 2002–2006



The Cost of Weapons in Afghanistan (US\$)


Type of Weapon	Lashkar Gah	Kabul	Kandahar City
AK47	166 > 498	300	249 > 665
Rpd	299 > 332	600	249 > 665
7.62	0.30 each	230 a box of 700	230 a box of 700
Tokerev	83 > 581	500	600
Macarov	83 > 665	700	800
Rpk	498 > 1,662	1,400	498 > 1,995
RPG 2+7 Launcher	300 > 700	800	400 > 1,000
Rockets	25 each	40	50
Boosters	25 each	70	80
Krinkov 5.54	1,000 > 3,500	1,500 > 5,000	2,000 > 6,000
Krinkov 7.62	300 > 500	300 > 600	300 > 700
Tank Mine TV/3.6	Not known	100	Not known
Mortar 82mm	Not known	20-50	30-60
Artillery Shell	Not known	60-100	80-100

Source: *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War*, Graduate Institute of International Studies, page 272, Geneva 2005.

Human Development Index


	Literacy Rate	Enrolment Rate	Life Expectancy	GDP per capita	HDI	HDI Ranking
Sierra Leone	36	45	34.3	238	0.272	177
Burkina Faso	12.8	22	45.8	435	0.302	175
Afghanistan	28.7	44.93	44.5	228	0.346	173
India	61	60	63.3	714	0.602	127
Pakistan	48.7	35	63	769	0.527	135
Iran	77	69	70.4	2,825	0.736	99
Trukmenistan	98.8	75	62.4	3,516	0.738	97
UK	99.8	123	78.4	36,599	0.939	16
US	99.8	93	77.4	42,101	0.944	10

Average annual aid per capita for post-conflict reconstruction (three years post conflict, US\$)



Afghan women' experience of domestic violence

Afghan women's experiences of domestic violence



Four Economies in Afghanistan

- **Smuggle Economy**
 - Threat to neighboring countries
- **Drug Economy**
 - 90% of world production
 - 40 to 60 % of GNP
- **War Economy**
 - Soviet Invasion, Civil war, War on Terror
- **UN Economy**
 - Huge expansion post-9/11

統計資料等の出典：

“Afghanistan Five Years Later:
The Return of the Taliban - Taliban
Frontline now cuts half-way through
Afghanistan”, September 2006, The
International Council on Security and
Development

(<http://www.icosgroup.net/home>)

Opinion ?

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Thank you.