

Forum

*Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding:
Natural Resource Management
and Conflict Prevention*

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*The **Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID)** was established in April 1990. FASID and its affiliate, International Development Research Institute (IDRI), conduct research, facilitate interaction among researchers and practitioners, and offer training programs to development specialists. These activities are aimed for improvement in the quality of development programs and policies.*

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Preface

The Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID), in association with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, and the United Nations University (UNU), convened a forum entitled “Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding: Natural Resource Management and Conflict Prevention” on July 12, 2001 at the UNU in Tokyo.

In the 1990s, the number of countries that experienced violent conflicts exceeds 70. These countries are now confronting the challenges of preventing the recurrence of conflict by promoting reconciliation and confidence building among conflicting parties.

In the meantime, even in countries where large-scale conflicts have not broken out in the past, there is an increasing number of disputes over the management of natural resources such as water, forest and mineral resources, which could potentially develop into actual conflicts. In addition, natural resources have often been used in power struggles and therefore aggravated ongoing conflicts.

In this context, ‘natural resource management and conflict prevention’ and ‘prevention of conflict resurgence’ are themes of critical importance, and at the same time constitute major challenges to development cooperation against the background of the dynamics of globalization. The forum aimed at promoting discussion on these themes, inviting experts from various sectors such as non-profit, academic, government and international organizations.

This report is the outcome of the forum, consisting of papers presented at the Forum as well as comments and discussion summaries. I hope that it will contribute to stimulating further discussions on the issue of natural resource management as a potential source of conflict and of prevention of recurrence of violent conflict.

Lastly, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to the panellists and commentators for providing the audience with broad perspectives and for their valuable contributions to our efforts to draw greater public attention to these issues. I am also deeply grateful to the FASID staff, particularly Mr. Y. Fuwa and Ms. H. Yoshida, for their dedication to organizing the forum.

September 2001

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Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development

Forum

Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding: Natural Resource Management and Conflict Prevention

July 12, 2001

United Nations University, Tokyo

Session 1: Conflict Prevention in Natural Resource Management



Session 2: Prevention of Conflict Resurgence



General Discussion



Forum

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Session 1

Conflict Prevention in Natural Resource Management

1

Natural Resource Project/Conflict Management: Stakeholders Doing “Class” Analysis

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Beyond the Technological Fix

Though poorly developed from a methodological standpoint, stakeholder analysis (SA) now belongs to the long list of virtues and catchwords reigning over the field of development. Much to its credit, the method travels well across disciplinary and theoretical boundaries. It is so eclectic as to stretch across the political spectrum and fit in with most of what it encounters, not unlike participatory methods for that matter (Burgoyne 1994: 205; Grimble and Wellard 1997: 182; Selener 1997: 272-73). SA is currently used in fields ranging from political science to policy development and international relations. The concept and related methodology have made significant inroads into poverty reduction studies and applied research pertaining to issues of sustainable livelihood, as well as community-based natural resource and conflict management (Ramírez 1999). It has also been part of World Bank thinking on participation methodology since about 1993 (MacArthur 1997a: 5).

The origins of SA, however, belong to the history of business and managerial science. This is reflected in the term “stakeholder” itself, apparently first recorded in 1708, to mean a bet or a deposit. The word now refers to *anyone significantly affecting or affected by someone else’s decision-making activity*. Economic theory centered on notions of stakeholder relations goes back to the beginnings of industrialism and is embedded in ideals of the 19th century cooperative movement and mutuality (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 295).

Stakeholder theory reappears in business and management discussions of the 1930s (cf. Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000: 239–40). The approach was then designed and continues to be used nowadays by firms and organizations to factor in stakeholder interests in order to enhance the enterprise's relationship with society and secure better prospects of financial success. With the help of SA firm decisions can profit from views that go beyond the narrow interests of stockholders and shareholders investing in a business.

But there is more to SA than new wine emerging from old bottles. In recent decades SA has been significantly transformed by developments principally in political economy, decision theory, environmental studies, and also RRA-PRA-PAR methods of project design (rapid rural appraisal, participatory rural appraisal, participatory action research). Dispute resolution practices and the social actor perspective in the social sciences are also kindred spirits of SA (Grimble and Wellard 1997: 185; Oudman et al. 1998).

The idea of SA is catching on for several reasons. For one thing the methodology involves recognition of the fact that obstacles to peace, equity, sustainability or growth cannot be dealt with through technological means alone. When tackling issues of poverty and environmental degradation, power relations and conflicting interests must be addressed. **Social relations** involving all “interested parties” must be examined and alternative practices explored if blueprints for technological change are to be grounded in reality and add up to more than pie in the sky.

SA also has the advantage of being a flexible, **context-specific paradigm** that helps focus attention on specific problems, actors and opportunities for change. This is particularly helpful in the context of NRM (natural resource management) issues where complex and interdependent relationships of groups relying on common resources such as land, water and forests typically prevail. Agro-export producers, small-scale farmers or fishers, government agents, conservation groups and ethnic minorities may all have a stake, and conflicting interests, in the management of particular resources. Multistakeholder analysis and involvement is all the more needed where resources crosscut different administrative, social, economic and political systems operating at micro and macro levels. Social assessment is almost always a must where management practices generate negative externalities, i.e., production costs not borne entirely by the producer and not factored into resource management decisions. A detailed and realistic understanding of these multistakeholder relationships is critical

to developing equitable and sustainable management practices in situations of actual or latent conflict and competing interests. Other widespread problems calling for SA include stakeholder under-representation, disputes generated by unclear access and property rights, or problems of incompatible stakeholder uses and agendas. Stakeholder considerations are equally relevant in situations of opportunity costs and tradeoffs that must be addressed at the policy level — e.g., choosing between short-term and long-term horizons, or balancing conflicting objectives such as conservation, development, equity and peace (Chevalier and Buckles 1999; Grimble et al. 1995: 11-16; Ravnborg and del Pilar Guerrero 1999).

It should be stressed that NRM systems featuring some combination of these characteristics tend to be the rule rather than the exception. It is doubtful therefore that the indices listed above can be used as “the basis for early screening of projects, policies and situations, to be followed by a full SA where necessary” (Grimble and Wellard 1997: 179).

Another attractive feature of SA lies in its **postmodern, pluralist and constructivist** leanings (Burgoyne 1994: 188-89; Calton and Kurland 1996: 154; Ravnborg et al. 1999). The approach constitutes a middle-range “social actor” alternative to the **positivist** methodologies often prevailing in studies of resource management practices (Pretty 1994; Röling 1994; Rubiano). Given its focus on people’s intentions and self-identified interests or stakes, the method emphasizes processes of social construction; biophysical properties and economic interests are assigned not to objective systems but rather to agents and socially positioned perspectives on social and natural reality. SA also goes beyond **participatory methods** and practices that emphasize popular involvement and that pay little attention to inherent structural problems and multilevel conflicts plaguing “local peoples.” By the same token SA represents a challenge to **conventional economic analysis**, an approach that “does not adequately consider the distribution of costs and benefits among different stakeholders: the winners and losers. It ignores the fact that different stakeholders do not perceive environmental problems in exactly the same way and will therefore seek different solutions and use different criteria to assess the desirability or worth of an intervention. Ways for better anticipating and dealing with stakeholder opposition and conflict, and better incorporating various interests, especially those of weaker groups in society, are therefore crucial for improving policy design and project implementation” (ILEIA 1999;

see also Grimble and Wellard 1997: 183).

At the same time stakeholder theory is a response to conventional research methods in the social sciences such as **stratification theory or political economy**, class-centered perspectives that are still widely used in research on the social aspects of NRM issues (with recent concessions to gender and ethnicity). Given their emphasis on macro-level studies of deep-seated power structures that social scientists alone can apprehend and rethink, there is a widespread dissatisfaction with the use of these methods alone. Class analyses often fail to capture the specificity of agent-constructed problems and foundations of local NRM conflicts and stakeholder-driven options for resolving them. They also require ready-made definitions of class membership and dynamics fashioning the course of history. By contrast, SA performed through participatory methods (not always the case) precludes *a priori* conceptions of stakeholder categories and relations applicable to an area or population as a whole.

In short, SA brings something new to participatory methods, formal economics and political economy. It highlights local actor perspectives on conflicting interests and alternative strategies aimed at promoting equity and sustainability in NRM systems.

But what is a stakeholder and what does SA actually do when applied to NRM problems or conflicts? Briefly, stakeholders are groups, constituencies, social actors or institutions of any size or aggregation that act at various levels (domestic, local, regional, national, international, private and public), have a significant and specific stake in a given set of resources, and can affect or be affected by resource management problems or interventions. When applied to NRM issues, SA thus serves to identify:

- 1) the **stakeholders** involved in a competition or conflict over natural resources;
- 2) stakeholder **values and views** on NRM problems and conflict-management strategies;
- 3) the multiple **interests and objectives** of stakeholders in relation to particular NRM systems;
- 4) the actual **resources, influence, authority or power** that stakeholders can bring to bear on particular NRM initiatives;
- 5) the **networks** that stakeholders belong to and patterns and contexts of

- interaction between them, be they collaborative or conflictive;
- 6) the **distributional and social impacts** of NRM policies and projects (winners and losers, potential trade-offs and conflicts), and hence the risks and **long-term viability** associated with particular NRM interventions;
 - 7) the appropriate **type or degree of participation** by primary and secondary stakeholders (internal, external), at successive stages of a project cycle (cf. MacArthur 1997a: 6-7; MacArthur 1997b: 255);
 - 8) **feasible coalitions** of project sponsorship and ownership aimed at efficient, equitable and sustainable livelihood strategies (based on compromises between public goals and divergent stakeholder interests).

SA is thus an invitation to examine the power relations among groups and individuals and their respective interests in a resource or situation. The method helps identify key differences among groups and areas of potential common ground and feasible interventions aimed at better management of natural resources and related conflicts. What is at stake here is a commitment to stakeholder participation in the realm of political economy and NRM science, towards a critical social research agenda. Stakeholder theory and practice hold great promise in the sense of promoting systematic actor involvement and a pragmatic focus on problems to solve.

A Method Rough and Not-so-ready

Participatory methods in the social sciences have taught us the virtues of the rough-and-ready. They substitute knowledgeable actors for non-analytical informants, producing worthwhile results without being scientifically pretentious or technically spurious. SA aspires to achieve comparable goals but is not entirely successful at it. On the whole it tends to be rough and not-so-ready. As argued below, many refinements have yet to be brought to the method before it can actually deliver the goods.

A rudimentary tool

One problem with SA carried out in a participatory manner is that it is often confused with techniques to facilitate **stakeholder involvement or input** in managing NR projects or conflicts. SA may be part of the “stakeholder

approach to management” (Roy 1999) but is not synonymous with it. While one is a contribution to the other, caution must be taken not to lose sight of the precise goals of SA: the method is an exercise in what might be called “ethnopolitics,” a participatory analysis that seeks an actor-driven assessment of the power structure affecting NRM systems. Many organizations acknowledge the importance of including stakeholders in their policy development (e.g., Harrison and Burgess 2000) but only a few have done so on the basis of a stakeholder-driven analysis of social obstacles to change and strategies to overcome them. Office-based stakeholder snapshots aimed at a better *management of stakeholders* are often done with sensitivity shown to actor representations but without a commitment to active stakeholder representation—enhanced participation and empowerment in NRM systems (e.g., Burgoyne 1994; Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000; Kogo 2000; Dick 1997; REC 1996; cf. Grimble and Chan 1995; Grimble and Wellard 1997: 185-87).

Some **training materials** have been developed to enhance skills in stakeholder analysis among non-government organizations and others working with local communities (DFID 1995; Engel and Salomon 1997; FAO; Grimble and Wellard 1997; Grimble et al. 1995; Herweg et al.; Horelli et al. 2000; IADB; IIRR 1998; MacArthur 1997a, 1997b; ODA 1995; SEAGA 1999; Selener et al. 1996; Team Technologies Inc 1994; World Bank Group PRS). These tools emphasize the facilitation of discussion among local groups who are in one way or another involved or affected by a particular set of resources or management initiatives. By and large, however, booklets, guidelines or checklists designed for fieldworkers generally focus on gathering *social information that is strictly necessary* for managing active or potential conflicts over natural resources. Few if any offer more advanced analytic tools towards a better understanding of the interests and power differentials affecting NRM practices in site-specific contexts. If SA happens to be carried out at some length, case studies will emphasize results and findings as opposed to explaining how researchers went about doing participatory SA and drawing lessons from the exercise (including merits and weaknesses of the method).

SA is still a new kid on the block, “one of the main ideas in development thinking that have been introduced in recent years” (MacArthur 1997b: 251). It has not yet become a standard procedure and draws on concepts and methods that vary considerably in rigor, ranging from a few methodological instructions to qualitative matrices of stakeholder interests, relations, impact potential and

levels of desired participation (see MacArthur 1997a). On the whole SA is a pragmatic tool used at the beginning of a process geared essentially to the actual business of managing a project or a conflict. As a result, SA procedures are not always spelled out, methodological guidelines tend to be sketchy, and detailed accounts of explicit uses of SA are very few. Save perhaps for a manual on participatory conflict management techniques about to be published by FAO, instructions needed to convert SA techniques into a methodology that does justice to the complexity of social factors and obstacles to change are generally lacking.

SA methodology can be improved in at least three ways. First, SA tools should permit adjustments to contextual assumptions, circumstances and points of entry. The method should take into consideration not only the sectoral and cultural **context** of the analysis but also the time limits and resources that can be reasonably allocated to this activity. It should also take into account the actual **purpose of the exercise**, i.e., whether it is done for NR area, project, policy, problem or conflict management purposes. In some cases the analysis may be designed to explore how pre-established projects or policies will impact on target beneficiaries and other actors possibly affected by the proposed activities, including those who have the power to influence or determine their outcome. SA can thus feed into a conservation program (e.g., Borrini-Feyerabend and Brown), a health care policy (Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000: 244), a poverty reduction strategy (MacArthur 1997b), a food security project (World Food Programme 2001) or any aid-related activity (Foell et al.; ODA 1995; REC 1996). In other cases, a manageable area is first selected and SA is then used to secure stakeholder input into problem identification and project design and management activities (Ravnborg et al. 1999; see Grimble and Wellard 1997: 177, 186; Grimble et al. 1995: 6; MacArthur 1997b: 253). While these various strategies are an integral part of the development scene, the context in which SA is undertaken will have a direct bearing on how the analysis is to be designed and carried out.

Second, SA should be a permanent feature of NR projects or conflict management processes. SA tends to be used at the beginning of a cycle, as in a project Concept Note, an *ex ante* appraisal of a project or policy proposal, or the initial identification of stakeholders involved in a conflict or problem domain (Grimble and Chan 1995). The technique then serves as a strategic entry point for a development or conflict management process, not a critical methodology

that supports the process throughout its entire duration (Ramírez 1999). If anything SA should be an **iterative, action-oriented** exercise in social analysis (Foell et al.). If not revised during the project or conflict management cycle, a SA matrix may become obsolete; i.e., stakeholders and their interests and views may evolve, new actors may appear on the scene, or central issues and stakes may shift over time (Brugha and Varvasovszky 2000: 244-45; Burgoyne 1994: 196; Frost 1995: 657; Grimble and Chan 1995; MacArthur 1997b: 253). More importantly, assessments of stakeholder relations should feed into plans of immediate action, thereby generating activities that will require stakeholder relations to be monitored through ongoing analysis. The notion that SA is a one-shot, quick-and-dirty exercise to be followed immediately by alternative social and NRM management activities constitutes a disservice to the field as a whole.

Third, SA should not be pitted against scientific approaches to social reality; otherwise, misinformation and superficiality may result. While remaining accessible to non-experts, a full-fledged SA methodology should indicate how tools can be organized in sequence and with some cumulative effect, moving beyond the rapid snapshots of social reality frequently advocated in the SA literature. Also, organizing SA tools on a **sliding scale of complexity** should provide users with various methodological options that can adjust to variable NRM circumstances. Another strategy consists in exploring complementarities between expert and non-expert analyses of stakeholder relationships, an option to which we now turn.

Synergies of knowledge systems

By and large there is some confusion and no standard view in the SA literature as to how much weight should be granted to “**emic**” stakeholder views obtained through participatory methods compared to “**etic**” analyses of NRM systems obtained from office-based studies performed by project teams or social scientists (e.g., Frost 1995; MacArthur 1997b: 261; Warner 2000). One striking tendency, however, is for both strategies to generally ignore one another. While social scientists have a long tradition of seeking truth through disciplinary means alone, advocates of participatory methods (emphasizing the insider look at reality) tend to view their research strategy as a radical challenge to scientific expertise. Synergies between knowledge systems are rarely considered.

Eliciting local perspectives on the social and power relations governing NRM systems is vital to understanding obstacles to change and promoting dialogue on alternative practices. At the same time it is important to recognize that some answers to important SA questions—e.g., how will the market or the environment impact on different stakeholders following particular NRM interventions—may not be readily available to stakeholders. This is so true that *it is not uncommon for stakeholders themselves to recognize gaps in their own knowledge base and to seek means to secure more information*. Practitioners of SA should thus avoid populist assumptions built into some participatory methods (and studies of indigenous knowledge systems as well): the notion that knowledge is *equally distributed and freely accessible* to all parties involved and that much of it can be captured through rough-and-ready methods such as RRA, PRA or PAR. Social and natural analyses must avoid habits of spurious precision and exclusionary access. But this is not to say that technique, rigor and theory should be dismissed altogether.

When carried out through participatory methods, SA may require critical information and analysis obtained through methods developed in the natural and social sciences. While this need for multiple sources and methods of analysis is recognized in practice, concrete guidelines regarding methodological synergies should be further explored. Advanced tools should suggest ways in which **SA can inform and be informed by other useful methodologies**, including natural (biological, agronomic, etc.) and social scientific perspectives (market studies, policy analyses, legal expertise, etc.) on the NRM problems or conflicts at hand. These synergies can take one of two forms: exchanges of information and findings between knowledge systems, or adaptations of methods used and tested on both sides of the epistemic divide.

Participatory methods applied to SA would stand to gain from appropriately-scaled adaptations of some of the methodologies currently used by social scientists to make sense of stakeholder relations (e.g., Mitchell et al. 1997, discussed below). As it now stands participatory SA is confined to a few power-structure matrices using **prefabricated binarisms** (influence/importance, direct/indirect impact, positive/negative relations, strong/weak connections, etc.) that can hardly do justice to the social knowledge possessed by stakeholders, let alone the social reality they live in. While easy to use, general distinctions such as between primary (targeted), secondary (intermediary) and external stakeholders (people and groups not formally involved but who may

have an impact or be impacted by an activity) may be an invitation to gloss over the complexity, dynamics and self-constructions of social reality (cf. Clayton et al. 1998; MacArthur 1997a: 3, 7-9; MacArthur 1997b).

Empowerment and participatory action research

One frequently stated purpose of participatory SA is to highlight the interests of marginalized groups, giving them voice and representation in situations of high power imbalance. SA is particularly important in situations where **stakeholders lack agency** in the sense of being unorganized constituencies with limited awareness of their interest in a given NRM system (see Borrini-Feyerabend 2000). By itself, however, SA is not necessarily designed to guarantee these groups stronger representation or empowerment during the SA research process let alone after (through full involvement in project decision-making or conflict management activities). This is especially the case where stakeholders are ranked according to influence and importance, a strategy that can lead to stakeholder information playing into the hands of the more powerful groups and an even greater under-representation of lower-ranked groups (Calton and Kurland 1996: 159, Grimble and Chan 1995, MacArthur 1997a: 14). Rather than eliciting the participation of the most visible and powerful and pursuing project or policy effectiveness above all (see Foell et al.), a fully-developed SA methodology should be clearly committed to principles of **empowerment** and related measures aimed at “leveling the playing field”—giving equal voice to the perspectives and the priorities of less powerful groups.

The question of empowerment brings us back to the issue of **participatory methodology**. SA is usually committed to enhancing stakeholder involvement in NR management processes. Yet not all stakeholder analyses are carried out through participatory methods. As in much of the management literature devoted to this topic (with some exceptions, see Oudman et al. 1998), SA is frequently done independently from the actors, prior to their actual involvement in decision-making activities. No stakeholder participation is sought when answering a critical question—i.e., “who decides on the purpose of the analysis and who counts most?” (Ramírez 1999). Since stakeholder identification is a consequential matter, analyses done without participation are likely to reflect the interests and agenda of the agency directing the exercise in social assessment.

In point of fact, SA’s commitment to using participatory methodology and “leveling the playing field” varies considerably. Even when done in a

participatory fashion, SA may be used primarily as a tool to extract information to be processed by “independent” stakeholder analysts (as in REC 1996; see Schmink 1999). SA is thus “a particularly good example of a tool that can be used in a participatory way, or in a top-down way that only pays lip service to participation” (World Bank Group statement on “Stakeholder Analysis”). Actually the same can be said of participatory methodologies in general; they can take different forms that vary greatly in quality and levels of empowerment (Karl 2000).

This is not to say that SA requires neutrality on the part of those initiating or carrying out the exercise. Rather the issue is one of transparency through **self-analysis** and disclosure. SA practitioners committed to principles of empowerment must not omit incorporation of the starting-up team into the SA exercise. They should put those initiating the analysis (sometimes bent on feigning neutrality) in the picture of power relations and related interests from the start (Burgoyne 1994: 192).

Issues of power and social complexity

Actors doing SA should not be so naïve as to think that their analysis will be immune to the social problems they are attempting to address, those of power differentials and conflicts of interests. As with any research activity, SA is subject to variable agendas, some of which may prefer concealment to transparency. Participatory views expressed on the interests and assets ascribed to stakeholders are a case in point. They may be understated or overstated and may have to be checked through independent means if transparency and reliability are to be achieved. Not that full truth and nothing but the truth is always desirable. Putting everyone’s cards on the table may be neither possible nor advisable and individual interviews collected and analyzed by independent stakeholder analysts may be the best option, to be disclosed to all parties involved with diplomacy and circumspection (Brocklesby et al.; ODI 1996; Ravnborg et al. 1999). “Stakeholder analysis often involves sensitive and undiplomatic information. Many interests are covert, and agendas are partially hidden. In many situations there will be few benefits in trying to uncover such agendas in public” (ODA 1995). SA enthusiasts should bear in mind that **undiplomatic analyses** may exacerbate or generate conflict. In cases of serious conflicts of interest and drastic power differentials, shuttle diplomacy or bilateral negotiations may be more appropriate than roundtable analyses and

negotiations. Better guidelines regarding diplomatic adaptations and related issues of information disclosure (cf. Sinclair-Desgagné and Gozlan 2001 and Pelle-Culpin 1998) are thus in order.

SA methods should also pay attention to levels of social and cultural complexity. For one thing, participatory SA must be careful not to assume “clear definitions” of problem domains. Nor should **group interests and boundaries** and related mechanisms of representation be taken for granted. These assumptions impose excessive rigidity where flexibility is sought. Also, they are constantly contradicted by muddles in the models—e.g., the multiple hats that stakeholders wear and the complex networks they belong to (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000; Foell et al.; Grimble and Chan 1995; MacArthur 1997a: 261–62, 1997b: 258; Ramírez 1999). The issue of group boundaries is especially tricky, which means that all exercises in SA should raise two questions: when to disaggregate a particular group into various stakeholders, and when to lump various actors into one stakeholder group (MacArthur 1997b: 262). Other advances in SA include better guidelines as to what should be done in situations of greater **cultural complexity**. For instance, what happens in situations where “stakeholder” concepts and related semantics are antithetical to local conflict-management values and practices? Participatory techniques designed to unravel the cultural semantics of actor identification, rules of communications and engagement, natural resource management practices, conflict resolution activities, accounts of power relations and conflicts, and so on, would be particularly critical in this regard (see Mäkelä 1999; Beckley et al. 1999).

While committed to using participatory methods and resolving “manageable” problems, SA should not shy away from addressing **broader power structures** and inherent structural and institutional problems affecting most NRM situations (Grimble and Chan 1995; Hatzius 1997). In the end, the usefulness of SA will hinge on its ability to factor in the complexity of social forces and related factors (economic, political, cultural) governing NRM systems. SA is by no means a product of comprehensive world-system or political-ecology thinking (see Schmink 1999). But this is no excuse for the method to succumb to the naïveté of “**stakeholder neocorporatism**”—trading off expedient studies and settlements for critical analyses and radical challenges to local or global structures governing NRM activities.

Given the inevitable tension between the requirements of pragmatism and those of critical thinking, one basic question for any multistakeholder

management strategy is thus the following: to what extent should compromises be sought between the interests of dominant and subordinate groups? That is, under what circumstances will consensus building work against principles of equity and sustainability? Should concessions be made to stakeholders whose interests cannot be reconciled with end-goals of redistribution and empowerment (MacArthur 1997a: 12)?

On these issues, a quick reading of the SA literature gives the impression that the deeper the problem is and the larger its scale, the less useful the methodology is. As a result **macro-level adaptations** of SA are few and far between. This may reflect the issue of the optimum group size or number normally required for SA (see MacArthur 1997b: 258). While SA should not be carried out with so few groups as to leave out some key players, the method can also present problems if undertaken with so many groups as to exceed participation levels deemed feasible, sensible and cost effective. As Burgoyne (1994: 194) remarks, “stakeholder situations have no natural outer boundaries,” with the implication that methodological choices must be made. Stakeholder participation may be easier to achieve in micro-level NR project/conflict management activities (local or regional) compared to meso- and macro-level situations involving complex information systems and policy interventions. This question of flexible macro-level adaptation needs to be closely examined for SA to maximize its full methodological potential. For SA and participatory processes at the macro-policy level, see Foell et al.; PRECOD; REC 1996; SEAGA 1999; Whyte 2000; and the World Bank Group (PRS).

Adaptations to situations of **intense conflict** or extreme power imbalances are also in order. Most practitioners of SA are of the view that SA should not be contemplated when stakeholders are embroiled in highly reactive conflict situations. Nor is the exercise feasible where key actors have few assets (e.g., time, money, authority, knowledge, skills) that they are able or willing to invest in roundtable problem assessment activities and related management alternatives (Ramírez 1999). For that matter SA will not appeal to dominant groups incurring limited costs from a given NRM system or conflict. These stakeholders may have little to gain from ADR and NRM strategies based on principles of stakeholder empowerment and negotiation.

When the latter conditions prevail, a distinction should perhaps be drawn between two forms of SA: the general and the restricted. The **general form** mobilizes all relevant parties and excludes none. Note that this general

stakeholder involvement does not presuppose equality between actors. Nor does it require an infusion of “good will” that is so massive as to override all considerations based on crass stakeholder interest. Rather the general form of stakeholder engagement, which includes SA among other activities, presupposes two things: (a) a decision on the part of all concerned parties to reduce the costs incurred in maintaining a given NR conflict or mismanagement situation; and (b) a general “interest” in exploring multistakeholder negotiation strategies in order to achieve individual ends. Admittedly not all NRM problems will lend themselves to this form of SA. But some will and may be conducive to activities aimed at reconciling the four strategic E’s: efficiency, environmental sustainability, equity and empowerment (Grimble and Wellard 1997: 174).


The **restricted form of SA** is critical to our enterprise and is universally overlooked in the literature. It is premised on a simple observation: all stakeholders are in the habit of assessing the social conditions under which they operate and will do so through interactive means. Over and beyond the methodology it aspires to be, SA based on exchanges of information is a permanent feature of social life and interaction. Action-oriented SA built into NRM Realpolitik, however, is often *restricted to those stakeholders that one actually interacts with*. Problem assessment performed under these conditions excludes the active engagement of those who are too distant or whose interests are simply deemed irreconcilable with one’s own. The exclusion may also reflect the fact that the exercise is part of a zero-sum game that cannot be avoided; SA is then performed with the aim of reducing the influence of powerful groups and countering their plans (MacArthur 1997a: 12). Indigenous subsistence farmers battling against an international pulp and paper company trying to buy off their lands (in pursuit of a eucalyptus plantation project supported by state politicians) may have nothing to gain from sitting at the same table as the company and trying to settle their differences. Instead they may prefer to explore and develop alliances with other local stakeholders (merchants, cattle ranchers, municipal authorities) and external actors as well (NGOs, some provincial and federal government representatives, etc.), with a view to blocking company plans. *Methods to enhance SA performed under such conditions are part and parcel of what SA has to offer and should not be ignored for the sake of a blind commitment to multistakeholder dialogue achieved at all costs.*

Stakeholder Class Analysis

The restricted form of SA implies that the stakeholder concept and related “social management” strategies must be used critically, without naïve assumptions regarding mechanisms of universal inclusion. By implication, the stakeholder concept cannot be so inclusive as to coincide with the set of all citizens, as Clarke and Clegg (1998: 347) correctly remark. Nor can it be so descriptive as to simply list all relevant stakeholders involved in a particular NRM system, be they contractual or community stakeholders (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 335). The analysis must rather explore stakeholder relations organized into types or classes. The usual binarisms proposed in much of the SA literature go some way in sorting out different kinds of relevant stakeholders and corresponding relations. Analyses based on these binary matrices may determine the potential for strategic alliances and the nature of rights and obligations to be assigned to actors and groups sharing a problem or project. As already pointed out, however, these tools tend to be poorly developed and make little use of knowledge and methodologies developed in the social sciences. Also they tend to impose prefabricated concepts and grids on users, as opposed to eliciting stakeholder constructs and views pertaining to these issues. The end result is often disappointing and of limited use to NR conflict/project management activities.

Means to overcome these limitations have yet to be explored. In this regard the work of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) is promising. Briefly, they argue that much of the management literature on stakeholder theory fails to address the issue of **salience**, the degree to which one stakeholder can succeed in getting its claims or interests ranked high in other stakeholders’ agendas. In their view stakeholder management theory as developed by R. E. Freeman (1984) and others is unable to answer this question for a simple reason: too much emphasis is placed on the issue of **legitimacy** or normative appropriateness. Theorists grant disproportionate weight to the contractual or moral rightness or wrongness of a stakeholder’s claims and relationship to the firm. While legitimacy is an important variable, two other factors must be considered when mapping out stakeholder class relationships. One factor consists of **power**, defined as the ability to influence the actions of other stakeholders and to bring out the desired outcomes. This is done through the use of coercive-physical, material-financial or normative-symbolic resources at one’s disposal. The other factor is that of

urgency or attention-getting capacity. This is the ability to impress the critical and pressing character of one’s claims or interests, goals that are time-sensitive and will be costly if delayed. These three “other-directed” attributes (legitimacy, power, urgency) are highly variable; they are socially constructed; and they can be possessed with or without consciousness and willful exercise. They can also intersect or be combined in multiple ways, such that stakeholder salience will be positively related to the cumulative number of attributes effectively possessed (Mitchell et al. 1997: 865, 868-70, 873).



Stakeholder Class Typology (Mitchell et al. 1997: 874)

All three factors must be considered simultaneously in that “power gains authority through legitimacy, and it gains exercise through urgency” (Mitchell et al. 1997: 869). The argument is all the more useful as it lends itself to an eightfold stakeholder class typology reflecting variable degrees of salience and types of relationship. “Definitive” stakeholders are those who possess all three attributes and will therefore receive the greatest attention. Three other classes come next in rank: the “dominant” who possess power and are perceived as having legitimate claims; the “dependent” whose claims are deemed legitimate and urgent; and the “dangerous” who possess power and have claims

that are urgent though not legitimate. The least salient stakeholders comprise the “dormant” (powerful but with claims that are deemed neither urgent nor legitimate), the “discretionary” (legitimacy without power and urgency), and the “demanding” (urgency without power or legitimacy). Lastly, the analysis lumps all those who possess none of these attributes into a residual “nonstakeholder” category.

Admittedly, this model has been developed in a purely **managerial perspective**. The firm occupies the center of every stakeholder nexus and a high degree of salience is automatically granted to managers. The latter act as general moderators or mediators and they are responsible for carrying out the analysis. Interestingly, they are never preoccupied with the “attention” they deserve or require; the only question they ask is who they should pay attention to (Mitchell et al. 1997: 870-71). This is so because “managers must know about entities in their environment that hold power and have the intent to impose their will upon the firm. Power and urgency must be attended to if managers are to serve the legal and moral interests of legitimate stakeholders” (Mitchell et al. 1997: 882). Another problem lies in the concepts of legitimacy, power and urgency, notions that are socially constructed at the concrete level but not problematized at the level of general theory. Constructivism is good at the ground level but goes out the window when doing theory. The interests of theorists are preserved against threats of radical decentering.

All the same, the model is a potentially valuable contribution to SA, provided that it be adapted to NR conflict/project management objectives, actor-centered perspectives and principles of empowerment as well.

Somewhere between Pragmatics and Utopia

The preceding discussion suggests that SA is an integral part of all social activity and cannot be reduced to mere technique. MacArthur’s notion that SA is not essential to all development projects should therefore be qualified: the packaged methodology may not be indispensable, but **social assessment tactics** can never be dispensed with. MacArthur (1997b: 263) goes on to say that “in many kinds of projects, who the stakeholders are, and the nature of their stakes, will be readily evident to experienced people in a planning or appraisal team,” which means that not too much should be expected from the exercise. This

caveat makes sense in a situation where the exercise is carried out by members of a relatively homogeneous group, such as a planning or appraisal team. It is less true of a SA that allows various stakeholders to negotiate amongst themselves an assessment of players and interests involved in a given situation. If performed on the basis of a multistakeholder approach, i.e., for and by all concerned parties, SA is bound to raise critical issues and should be an essential part of all NRM processes.

Still, the fact that SA can be put to radically different usages, from manipulative stakeholder relationship management in a business context to stakeholder enabling and empowerment in NRM systems, cautions us against using this methodology as a magic bullet aimed at resolving all problems of inequity and unsustainability. Some observers of “stakeholder capitalism” are too optimistic in this regard. Calton and Kurland (1996: 156) thus suggest that stakeholder enabling practices can resolve the dilemma between social morality and economic rationality, or the paradox that pits ethics without business against business without ethics. In their view the stakeholder approach to doing business is the alternative to management-centered organizations and related hierarchical decision-making structures. It introduces into profit-oriented activities a Habermasian lifeworld of communities of conversation and webs of cooperative, mutually beneficial, trust-based relationships. It brings out pluralistic politics into the open and promotes flexible, adaptive, networklike organizations aimed at solving problems rather than preserving bureaucratic structures for their own sake. Stakeholder capitalism fosters an affirmative “ethic of care,” an “institutional capacity for intimacy” that allows stakeholders to share their concerns through decentered voice mechanisms and pluralistic discursive practices. Stakeholders thus become co-authors of their destiny, ends rather than means of development and growth (Calton and Kurland 1996: 160-61, 164-70).

Clarke and Clegg (1998) are equally optimistic. Stakeholder management practices developing mostly in Europe and Asia (especially in Germany and Japan) represent a paradigm shift towards the inclusive company model. The trend is towards stable relationships based on stakeholder accountability rather than a series of fluctuating transactions aimed at reaping short-term profits (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 295-97, 348-49). In this model managers adopt an inclusive concern for the long-term interests of all stakeholders, towards a sense of corporate citizenship and an emphasis on intangible assets (values

embodied in human and social capital, including trust, knowledge and skills). **Stakeholder capitalism** is thus a radical departure from the Anglo-Saxon approach that grants priority to shareholders and value in property and tangible assets. The underlying principles of stakeholder capitalism are so promising as to be echoed in a 1996 UN document entitled *Engaging Stakeholders*, a statement promoting the systematic and active engagement with stakeholders on the full range of environmental, social and economic questions (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 361).

Stakeholder theory will do all the great things it is supposed to, provided we accept the notion that all conflicting interests can be negotiated and that the well-being of companies and economies hinges on the active participation of all citizens, actors whose material interests ultimately coincide with those of capital. Radical critiques of existing property regimes, managerial systems, market forces and business mechanisms ruling over the economy must be bracketed in the same breath. Critiques founded on class or managerial hegemony theories are rendered obsolete. Management should be granted a leading role in promoting people-centered dialogue across stakeholder boundaries. Last but not least, we are asked to be realistic enough to recognize that multistakeholder conversations and consensus building are merely non-financial means to business ends, those of the company facilitating the operational dialogue (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 367).

If applying SA to stakeholder theory of the latter kind, one might suspect the theory of being an exercise in tactical optimism instigated by business with a view to maintaining “public confidence in the legitimacy of its operations and business conduct; in other words, to maintain a *licence to operate*” (Clarke and Clegg 1998: 353). It may be in the interest of those powerful groups doing much of the counting, social and managerial, to argue that those who “count the most” should be considered first and foremost. Stakeholder theory would then be recognized for what it is, a thick cloak of bright-eyed “affirmative postmodernism” covering strategies of organizational seduction and manufactured consent (Calton and Kurland 1996: 164, 167, 171). But why now? What are the current stakes that make stakeholder management (and rhetoric) so attractive to so many? Could it be that the stakeholder concept is becoming a commercial necessity, a public relations or social marketing exercise in a world featuring the “arrival of the professional investor, the sophisticated customer, the empowered employee, the information revolution, a

knowledgeable public and government regulation,” as Clarke and Clegg wonder (1998: 356, 367; see also Altman 1994)? Could it be that development agencies are also a primary stakeholder in these new social assessment activities—cognizant as they are that too many conflict/poverty reduction investments are wasted on technical innovations and people-centered projects that ignore issues of power structure and material interests?

There is no automatic answer to these critical questions other than the proverbial “only history will tell.” In the end much will depend on how SA is actually developed and used, by whom and for what purpose. If stakeholder theory is to serve multiple interests and permit dialogue across class boundaries, as perhaps it should, caution will nonetheless have to be taken not to forego longer-term challenges to power structures embedded in problems of chronic poverty, inequity and unsustainability.

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2

Evolving Approaches to Environmental Decision Making: Science, Policy, and Public Involvement in Forest and Conservation Management

Lessons from Forest Management Programs
in the United States and Indonesia

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You would think that natural resource managers would be familiar with complexity, uncertainty, change, and adaptation—after all, these are essential features of the natural systems they study and work with. But many of our colleagues vested with decisions over environmental management are reeling from changes both within their institutions and in the public at large. Many are uncomfortable with the growing complexity and uncertainty involved in management decisions they have traditionally made on the basis of their disciplinary training, the needs of their local communities, or their agency’s mandate. Many feel threatened with the conflicts they face in dealing with a divided and more activist public; they are also unprepared for the challenges of working in more open, collaborative ways. Very simply, our natural resource managers are finding it hard to make the transition “from decision-maker to...decision-facilitator” (Beck 1997).

This paper discusses briefly the evolving nature of natural resource management decision making, drawing on contrasting cases in the United States and in Southeast Asia. While the cases represent very different contexts, the analysis illustrates the very common challenges resource managers are facing

as they attempt to find a balance between good science, their institutional mandates, and increasingly complex interpretations of “the public good.” To be fair, they are being tasked with achieving a highly noble, but virtually unattainable goal—the sustainable stewardship of our natural resources within a rapidly shifting public policy and social setting.

The simple thesis of this paper is that natural resource managers and public policy leaders must learn new tools and attitudes for reaching decisions over environmental management. These decisions will be based on a complex, and shifting, formula that involves sound science, clear and responsive public policies, and active public involvement. Our resource managers—public or private, regional or community-based—must seek to balance their professional insights and scientific judgement with the increasingly diverse voices and perspectives entering the public policy process. To be effective, they must embrace both conflict and collaboration as inherent and necessary elements of the management equation.

Program Context

For this discussion of evolving approaches to environmental decision making, I will look primarily at two quite disparate, but not dissimilar, settings: an eco-regional forest conservation planning initiative in southeastern Indonesia, and four national forests in the northeastern United States. Both program areas represent a portion of current activities sponsored by the Program on Environment and Community (PEC), a unit within Cornell University’s Center for the Environment.¹

PEC’s principal mandate is to foster more effective management of community, environmental, and public policy conflicts. PEC works both with pro-active, collaborative approaches to community and environmental problem-solving, and also designs and facilitates efforts to resolve more acute conflicts. Since its establishment in 1994, PEC has worked primarily in the northeastern United States, Central America, and Southeast Asia. PEC activities include agriculture and land use planning efforts, as well as forest, protected area, and watershed management programs.

¹ The Center for the Environment’s web site can be found at: <http://www.cfe.cornell.edu>. PEC’s web site is: <http://www.cfe.cornell.edu/pec>.

Each of PEC's regional programs involves long-term partnerships with broad-based, inter-agency networks, and, within these regions, activities in several program sites—protected areas, watersheds, or forest zones. There are indeed important benefits to working in multiple sites simultaneously: the advantage of comparison, the ability to generalize to a broader program and policy context, and opportunities to build on complementary strengths across program areas and institutions. Most importantly for this analysis, the regional, multi-site approach presents opportunities to draw on varied perspectives and experiences in evaluating lessons learned.

1) Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

The Nusa Tenggara area comprises the arc of islands east of Bali, extending southeast from Lombok to Tanimbar, covering a distance of 1500 kilometers. The region's semi-arid ecology reflects the driest and most seasonally varying climate in Indonesia. It is certainly one of the more challenging social settings: there are more than 50 distinct languages, representing a highly diverse and largely traditional ethnic population. Per capita income is one third the national average; infant mortality and illiteracy figures are among the highest in the country (Fisher, Moeliono and Wodicka 1998). The region's agricultural productivity is generally viewed as marginal (maize and cassava are staples), and there are few obvious opportunities for industrial development. Corner (1989) noted the debilitating impacts of the region's physical isolation, inadequate infrastructure, and limited natural resources.

Nusa Tenggara forms a distinct biogeographical region within Indonesia. The region's long isolation from the continents of Asia and Australia and the great distances between islands has resulted in a unique evolutionary development. The region is characterized by a high degree of faunal endemism: it is home to many birds, mammals, and reptiles that are found nowhere else on earth. For this reason, and the importance of the area for our understanding of island biogeography and animal and plant dispersal, the area has been given priority attention by national and international conservation agencies (WWF 1993).

The contrast of stark rural poverty, rich cultural traditions, and unique natural systems make for a dizzying mix of social and environmental conditions. In many areas, traditional leaders still maintain broad decision-making authority over land and forest management. At the same time, the Indonesian government,

Table 1: Priority conservation sites in Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia

Name of site and location	Protected area designation; key management objective/s	Concerns and conflicts	Key institutions involved
Rempek, Lombok, NTB	Protection forest; watershed management	Boundary and land disputes, jurisdictional conflicts, encroachment, migrants, logging	Ministry of Forestry, Land Bureau, local government, LP3ES, LBH
Sesaot, Lombok, NTB	Protection forest; watershed management	Change in forest status, landlessness and population pressure, coffee taxes, illegal wood collection	Ministry of Forestry, local government, LP3ES
Bangkat Monteh (Taliwang) Sumbawa, NTB	Protection forest; watershed management	Enclave community, land use, forest boundaries	Ministry of Forestry, local government, LP3ES
Tambora, Sumbawa, NTB	Protection forest, nature reserve; watershed management and biodiversity conservation	Boundary and land use, encroachment by migrants, logging	Ministry of Forestry, local government
Ruteng Recreation Forest (<i>Taman Wisata Alam Ruteng, TWAR</i>), Flores, NTT	Recreation forest; recreation and tourism	Boundary and land use, encroachment, illegal logging	Ministry of Forestry, local government, Asian Development Bank
Riung, Flores, NTT	Protection forest; nature reserve, recreation park	Boundary and land tenure, migration and settlement, jurisdictional disputes	Ministry of Forestry, local government, Yayasan Sanusa
Wanggameti Conservation Area, Sumba, NTT	National park; biodiversity conservation, recreation and tourism	Boundary and tenure disputes, livestock grazing and fire management, illegal logging	Ministry of Forestry, local government, Yayasan Tananua, Birdlife International, Wildlife Conservation Society, WWF
Gunung Mutis, West Timor, NTT	Nature reserve; biodiversity conservation	Boundary and land disputes, livestock grazing, wood collection	Ministry of Forestry, local government, WWF, Livestock service, Dept. of Tourism, Public Works

Source: Fisher, Moeliono and Wodicka 1998

working with a number of international conservation organizations, has set aside an extensive system of protected areas for watershed management, biodiversity conservation, and tourism development. Differing views of nature and development, along with the different social systems to which they are associated, have led to frequent conflicts over regulatory and procedural matters, policies and programs, conservation versus development priorities, and basic social and cultural values (Fisher 1999). Since 1991, a regional inter-agency network, the Nusa Tenggara Community Development Consortium (NTCDC)² has focused attention on eco-regional conservation, selecting the following priority conservation areas for program activity and continued monitoring and evaluation (see table 1)

2) Northeastern United States

The US Forest Service has jurisdiction over four national forests in the northeastern United States: the Allegheny National Forest (Pennsylvania), the Finger Lakes National Forest (New York), the Green Mountain National Forest (Vermont), and the White Mountain National Forest (New Hampshire) (see Table 2). These four forests reflect considerable diversity—in terms of their size, geography, and ecology, as well as the priorities for management (see Table 2).

The four forests represent a small portion of the total land area in the Northeast, yet they are significant in terms of their ecological, economic, and recreational value. Views about the management of these forests have changed dramatically in recent years, and many concerns have emerged as the Forest Service's Land and Resource Management Plans are revised (a process which includes extensive opportunities for public input). Timber harvesting, oil and gas leasing, and land acquisition have generated conflicts in several of the forests; loss of revenue (either direct or through taxation) is often cited as a key issue for local governments. Recreational issues have raised varied concerns over the management of trails, use of motorized vehicles, and general public access. Biodiversity and wildlife conservation issues are also seen to be important, though viewed somewhat differently in each of the four sites (Twarkins, Fisher and Robertson 2001).

² The Consortium was originally established as the Nusa Tenggara Uplands Development Consortium, or NTUDC. The name was changed in 1997 to reflect a broader program agenda. Participants in the Consortium include representatives from government agencies, NGOs, research institutions, and local communities.

Table 2: National Forests in the Northeastern United States

Forest	Area (acres)	Key management objectives	Concerns and conflicts
Finger Lakes National Forest (New York)	16,000	Recreation and tourism (hiking, camping, horseback riding, X-country skiing, fishing, birding), wildlife habitat, cattle grazing, watershed management, some timber sales	Land acquisition, lakeshore property, trails management, oil and gas leasing, timber sales
Green Mountain National Forest (Vermont)	367,000	Recreation and tourism (2.4 million visitors/yr), timber sales, links to regional economic development	Forest health, biodiversity conservation, timber harvest, regional economic viability
White Mountain National Forest (New Hampshire)	780,000	Recreation and tourism (7 million visitors/yr), timber sales (20MMBF/yr).	Mix of recreational uses, biodiversity and habitat conservation, federal clearcutting policies
Allegheny National Forest (Pennsylvania)	513,000	Timber harvest (54MMBF/yr), oil and gas leasing, recreation, economic development	Timber harvest (currently in litigation), economic development, mix of recreational uses

Source: USDA/US Forest Service 2001a

Regionally, the Northeast has seen considerable changes in land use patterns, including a consolidation of agriculture into larger and more sophisticated farm operations, the sub-division of agricultural land, and expanding woodlands overall (Smallidge and Schneider 2000).³ Rural communities are experiencing rapid change as well in their general demographics—recent arrivals, rapid turnover in land ownership, a growing number of commuters and second-home owners, and a new level of diversity in the rural population. Off-farm employment is an increasingly important phenomenon, and there has been substantial change in the values and institutions that have been central features of these communities.

Along with these changes in land use and the make-up of rural communities, there is a growing regional interest in recreation and tourism, increasing concern for water and environmental quality issues, and obvious schisms over growth-related issues. Most communities in the Northeast reflect the history of “home rule” and local government control, and elected local government leaders are

³ Many people are surprised to learn that New York State has over 18 million acres of forest land—62% of the total area of the state (Smallidge and Schneider 2000).

struggling within this changing political and social environment as they seek to sustain the economic vitality of their communities. These diverse perspectives introduce dynamic, and often contradictory, views over the management of the region's national forests.

Key Elements of Environmental Decision Making

In both the United States and in Indonesia, simultaneous efforts at proactive planning as well as more crisis-driven conflicts influence management decision making. Long-term planning initiatives have been undertaken within individual forest zones, as well as at broader landscape, or ecosystem scales (see, *inter alia*, USDA-US Forest Service 1986; Departemen Kehutanan 1992; WWF 1993; Jepson et al. 1996). In several sites serious disputes threaten the implementation of existing forest management plans. In the Northeast US, public watchdog groups have challenged the Forest Service over land acquisition, timber harvesting, and oil and gas leasing issues.⁴ In Nusa Tenggara, conflicts over forest management—e.g., agency-community disputes over boundary setting and access, inter-agency disputes over jurisdiction and coordination, and general ideological differences over development vs. conservation—have led to serious forest degradation in the region.⁵

Research and ongoing program experiences in both regions indicate broad changes in land use (private and public), demographics (migration and diversity), in agency policies and practices related to forest management, and in the public's perception and involvement in forest management decision making (Fisher, Moeliono and Wodicka 1998; Smallidge and Schneider 2000). In both regions, fundamental (though changing) values about forest management and conservation are at the heart of many of these disputes.

In both countries, resource managers face difficult challenges in making and implementing decisions over the management of these protected areas. A useful way of analyzing forest and conservation management in these regions is to explore three primary aspects of the decision making process: 1) the role of science, 2) relevant policies and institutions, and 3) public involvement.

⁴ As an example, the Allegheny Defense Project has been pursuing active litigation over timber harvesting in the Allegheny National Forest (ADP 2001).

⁵ Reduction of forest cover in Nusa Tenggara Barat province was recently estimated at 2.15% (Suhardi 1996).

1) The Role of Science

The use of science as a basic management tool is perhaps the strongest aspect of contrast between the two countries. Forest management in the United States has a strong scientific tradition, and tremendous resources (intellectual, institutional, and financial) are invested in research efforts in these forests. In the US Forest Service's regional office, a highly trained technical staff offers research support for a wide range of issues: aquatic and wildlife biology, economics, forest mensuration and silviculture, geology, heritage resources, hydrology and soils, lands and minerals, mapping and geographic information systems (GIS), recreation, watershed management, and wildlife management. This agency-based research capacity is also augmented through partnerships and occasional sub-contracting agreements with regional universities and other research institutions, including NGOs.

Scientific research on basic aspects of forest ecology and wildlife management is sorely lacking in Nusa Tenggara. Many of the protected areas in the region were created through very cursory surveys in the mid-1980s, and there has been limited active natural or social science research in the area until very recently (Fisher 1999). Much of this research has been summary and descriptive rather than analytical, and there are many remaining gaps in our knowledge of these ecosystems, their wildlife, as well as community-forest dynamics. Given the limited research staff and capability with the Department of Forestry, many forest management plans rely on general data obtained from local and provincial agencies; this information is often outdated or inconsistent among different government agencies. As an example, different agencies' land use and boundary maps frequently disagree, as do census and economic data.

A recent emphasis on baseline research has been promoted by international agencies concerned about the region's biological diversity. These studies have largely been focused on wildlife and habitat surveys, in particular an assessment of the region's bird, mammal, and reptile populations. Recent research by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), The Nature Conservancy, and Birdlife International have highlighted the needs of individual conservation areas, and work has begun at a broader eco-regional scale. Collaborative research sponsored by the NTCDC's Conservation Working Group has also examined community-forest interactions, but it has been largely qualitative and diagnostic in its orientation (KOPPESDA 1998). Local universities, natural partners for collaborative research, have unfortunately been less than engaged in these

activities.

2) Public Policies and Institutions

In the United States, major environmental legislation was passed in the early 1970s. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA 1969) provides the overarching framework for all environment-related actions by federal agencies. The Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA, 1974) and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA, 1976) offer guidelines on land and resource management planning and multiple-use management for the national forests. The NFMA stipulates that forest plans are to be revised on a 10 to 15-year cycle. NEPA and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA, 1972) define some of the procedural requirements for public involvement, with FACA primarily focused on the role of public advisory committees.

The National Forest Management Act has been recently reviewed by a Committee of Scientists appointed by the US Forest Service. The Committee recommended sweeping reforms to the Act, including a new focus on broader landscape analysis, the use of indicators of sustainability for monitoring forest and ecosystem health, and enhanced public involvement (particularly partnerships with industry, recreation, environmental groups, and other governmental agencies) management decision making (USDA Forest Service 2001b). Recent reviews of NEPA, and a long history of litigation, indicate a drift toward procedural compliance rather than comprehensive environmental protection. There is currently a national effort to review and reform NEPA implementation (CEQ 1997; IENR/CRMW 2000).

All of these policies, and recommendations for reform, are currently under review during the transition to the new administration of George W. Bush, who has emphasized a more aggressive business-oriented philosophy and greater commitment to local control.

In Indonesia, laws governing the management of Indonesia's natural resources were largely determined in the early years of the Suharto New Order government (mid-1960s); they are still found at the many layers of the government structure and legal system. The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 directs the Ministry of Forestry to map, classify, and manage forest lands and to determine legal rights by category. A Consensus Forest Land Use Plan (TGHK) developed guidelines for this forest classification process as well as procedures for decision making at the local level. However, coupled with the Basic Agrarian

Law (1967), the Law on Foreign Investment (1967), and the Law on Domestic Investment (1968), the Basic Forestry Law, and its associated policies and procedures, have tended to strengthen the supreme role of the state in forest and land management. Since 1970, the Department of Forestry has conducted extensive national inventories delineating forest lands, in many cases creating serious conflicts over access and tenurial rights between local forest dwellers, local governments, and commercial enterprises (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1994).

Given the highly sectoral and hierarchical nature of the Indonesian bureaucracy, it has been difficult to reconcile some of the obvious contradictions in the spirit, intent, and interpretation of many government instruments, and this has created one of the most fundamental challenges to achieving effective management of forest resources (ICEL 1998).

Since the fall of Suharto's New Order government in 1998, there have been continuous, and oftentimes tumultuous calls for government reform, including, prominently, reform in the nation's land use, forestry, and environmental laws. Among the reforms considered of highest national priority: 1) decentralization of land use decision making to encourage greater local control, acknowledging local people's rights and institutions, 2) greater transparency, accountability, and public participation in forest policy and management, 3) a reorientation in basic philosophy and approach, from timber exploitation to ecosystem management, and 4) changes in forest management practices to guarantee improved forest health and greater economic benefit to local communities (LATIN 1998).

In summary, both countries are currently reviewing their national environmental policies in the transition to new political leadership and a change in guiding philosophy. Both nations are wrestling with questions over federal vs. local control, over the difficult trade-offs between environmental conservation and national development priorities, over the definition of ecosystems and sustainability, and over the role of the public at large in decision making related to natural resource management. However, the dramatic political and economic upheaval in Indonesia, particularly the new emphasis on decentralization, signal more fundamental changes in policies. Another key distinction is seen in agency and local government capacity (including funding) for implementing these changes—in this context, Indonesia will continue to struggle with challenges in strengthening the capacity of its agency officials

and locally elected officials, in building accountability in management, and in generating the funds needed to implement ambitious programs.

3) Public Involvement

New agency policies in both countries suggest a growing role for stronger citizen participation in environmental decision making. Growing interest in community-based conservation and in public participation generally have opened up new avenues for public involvement. Concurrent interest in eco-regional conservation and in collaborative processes offer new models for broad-based stakeholder involvement. In both the United States and in Indonesia, community leaders, NGO activists, and local elected officials are increasingly challenging government agencies to become more transparent, responsive, and integrative in their approach to forest management. This new activism has pressed for stronger transparency and accountability in agency-based decision making. The public is becoming more engaged in, and more informed about environmental actions that affect their lives.

Internationally, many conservation NGOs have begun to embrace approaches which emphasize more participatory and collaborative environmental stewardship. The Nature Conservancy, the largest conservation organization in the United States, has been particularly emphatic: “Coalition building is a mandatory and fundamentally necessary undertaking for any conservation project to have a realistic chance of long term success” (TNC 1999).

In the United States, the trends toward greater local involvement and broader collaboration are reflected in the ongoing review of national policies (particularly NEPA and the NFMA), and in the growing national phenomenon of community-based collaboratives (Jones 1996; Kenney 2000). In Indonesia, as in many developing countries, there has been a heightened interest in participatory approaches, including participatory action research, and particularly in natural resources management (e.g., social forestry and community-based conservation) (Thrupp 1987; Wells, Brandon and Hannah 1992; Wright, Western and Strum 1994; Chambers 1997).

In the northeastern United States, traditional commitment to “home rule” has invested considerable authority for land use in local government units; local taxation also provides significant revenues for strong local authority and control. In contrast, over the past four decades Indonesian policies and programs

have largely displaced the strong local control of traditional communities, seeking to create a more uniform and centralized bureaucracy (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1994; LATIN 1998). Public funding also proceeded primarily from the central government, thus creating stronger local dependencies. However, the fall of the Suharto government (1998) and continuing separatist movements in the provinces of Aceh and Irian Jaya have been viewed as a rejection of highly centralized control, and the move toward decentralization is certainly a response to these perceived failings.

But tensions between national policies and local control, particularly over questions related to balancing economic development and conservation, continue.

In both settings new alliances and forums are being created to offer forums for these debates. Watershed coalitions in Seneca and Cayuga Lake (surrounding the Finger Lakes National Forest), as well as challenges from environmental activists, such as the Allegheny Defense Project and the Finger Lakes Forest Watch, present new challenges to accountability to the Forest Service. The Forest Service has taken some innovative steps in facilitating public involvement in forest management planning, e.g., public hearings, open houses, the formation of Public Planning Groups, field visits, newsletters, and web sites (Twarkins, Fisher and Robertson 2001). At the same time, environmental groups continue to challenge the Forest Service in court on issues they view as irreconcilable through agency-led public involvement processes.

In Indonesia, the NTCDC and its Conservation Working Group have offered a new forum for agency and community participation, linking research and varied convening processes to decision making. Local site-based coalitions like the Wanggameti Communication Forum have sought to integrate stakeholders' perspectives into a new organizational framework. In the Riung Conservation Area, a year-long research and convening process led to the signing of a comprehensive, 62 point agreement, approved by a multi-stakeholder grouping of community leaders, government agencies, and NGOs. In Nusa Tenggara, local, national, and international NGOs—both conservation- and social welfare-oriented groups—present new opportunities for expanding the role of civil society in environmental management. A growing interest in linking conservation and the revitalization of traditional culture offers another new view favoring local participation in protected area management.

New Tools and Approaches for Environmental Management

As we have seen in both settings, natural resource management decision making is taking place under circumstances of rapid and uncertain change. Science, while still incomplete in both settings, is providing new insights into the functioning of these ecosystems. As national policies shift between more centralized and local control, we are also seeing significant changes in public attitudes about issues related to conservation and development. New approaches to environmental management—e.g., landscape and eco-regional planning, community-based collaboratives—are introducing new themes and new stakeholders into the decision making processes.

Resolving complex environmental conflicts requires multi-faceted responses. Formal mediation is but one among a range of responses to facilitating decision making. While it can offer periodic relief and clarity to these disputes, a more deliberate and nuanced approach is needed to create the conditions and systems for long-term and continuing dialogue over environmental management decisions: stronger science and information management, more responsive public policies and institutions, a more informed and engaged local citizenry, and new alliances that foster inter-agency coordination and broad-based public participation. This more comprehensive approach will necessarily include stronger analysis, enhanced agency and community capacity building, and new strategies for engaging and maintaining stakeholder participation.

The changing character of environmental decision making challenges managers and policy-makers to develop new skills and attitudes as they respond to change within their agencies and in the societies and landscapes where they are working. We must support our environmental practitioners through enhanced skill-building, work to reform outdated and inappropriate public policies, and support the establishment of strong new coalitions that encourage broad agency and stakeholder participation. Many important new tools and a host of innovative program experience have become available to practitioners and policy-makers. These approaches are beginning to become part of the curriculum in formal educational institutions and in-service training efforts within public agencies and NGOs. In our work in both developed and developing countries, we have noted the following general needs in the training of resource management practitioners:

1. **Science and information management:** Accurate, timely, and accessible information provides managers and the public with a common understanding of the ecosystem and social setting. This information provides the foundation for more deliberative and informed judgements, by both the agency and the public. Broad characterization of the ecosystem, good maps and GIS capability, solid socio-economic data and regular insight into public attitudes, and comprehensive policy analysis are all essential elements of information about a given forest area. In developing and developed country settings we are also seeing new joint fact-finding approaches that integrate technical analysis with local knowledge and perceptions, and exciting new efforts to make very technical information more accessible and intelligible to audiences with limited educational backgrounds. A strong, readily accessible information base helps educate stakeholders—about systems and issues, and about each other. This information (and its interpretation) provides the necessary criteria for negotiating decisions, an important reference for monitoring change over time, and in evaluating and adapting agreements and actions.

2. **Stakeholder analysis:** Resource managers require a clear sense of their public – the varied constituencies and their positions and interests. Systematic assessment of stakeholder groups and their perception of issues provide a solid basis for designing public involvement processes (Grimble and Chan 1995; Chevalier 2001). Stakeholder mapping, conflict assessment, and situation analysis tools can be used by resource managers to assess their public and define decision-making processes accordingly. Stakeholder analysis enables a more systematic approach to involving varied constituencies in decision making, ensuring stronger, more balanced participation and sense of ownership.

3. **Developing common vision:** Shared vision offers an overarching navigational tool for resource managers. Public input, understanding and support for these plans provide the guiding objectives, and the accountability, for all program actions. Clearly this vision will be subject to change over time, as broader contextual changes and ongoing monitoring influence core decisions. There are many creative and structured processes for convening a visioning process: design charettes, strategic planning processes, search conferences, as well as very visual and participatory activities.

4. **Designing public involvement processes:** Effective decision making derives from good process. A common road map of public input and decision making processes is essential in defining key events and decision points over these long-term processes. Process design incorporates basic public participation skills in a broad framework that allows for varied levels of stakeholder involvement over time.

5. **Building and maintaining coalitions:** New alliances and organizational structures will be needed to sustain public participation and agency coordination over time. Resource managers will require basic understanding of group dynamics, conflict management and mediation, team building, facilitation, and negotiation skills, along with good communication skills and a range of convening strategies.

6. **Assessment, learning and adaptation:** Monitoring and evaluation provide essential tools for accountability. Effective monitoring programs are needed for the early recognition of management problems in order to make necessary adjustments in programs and policies. Adaptive management provides a strong conceptual framework for dealing with the dynamic interactions between people and ecosystems as they evolve together (Gunderson, Holling and Light 1995).

Conclusion

Environmental decision making challenges our traditional ways of making politics. The actors and issues involved in making and implementing these decisions are increasingly complex and interdependent, the pace of change accelerated, the needs of growing immediacy, and the stakes of growing importance (Kinsley 1997). No longer are these decisions made through local consensus processes at the community level, nor can they be made solely by scientific experts or policy makers within their comfortable offices in a distant capital city. The ecosystem, as a new pivot of analysis, and the more democratic and complex social context for decision making, represent new challenges to these conventional approaches. New approaches to environmental governance must embrace both conflict and collaboration, and consider community, institutional, and science-based aspects of decision making.

Natural resource managers face a difficult calculus in facilitating environmental decision making. These decisions must be scientifically valid, consistent with national policies, and they must meet the needs of an increasingly varied constituency. In this view change and its inevitable associate, conflict, can be important, even necessary features of management decision making. As Kai Lee (1993) has written, “Conflict is indispensable to defining, over time, a socially sustainable order, because it impels institutions toward such a search in the first place.” This creative tension, while unsettling for many traditional managers, may be one of the more essential elements in achieving more balanced and durable decisions.

Resource managers, whether traditional community leaders, university-trained scientists, or agency-based policy-makers, are struggling with these new realities, and they will need to seek new tools, develop new attitudes, accept new answers, and acknowledge considerable uncertainty in these decisions. To be effective, these decisions must hinge on contingency and change. They must be subjected to regular scrutiny through routine monitoring, and undergo adaptation that incorporates new scientific insights and the inevitability of social change.

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3

Managing Conflict on the Use of Natural Resource

A Case of Conflict Management in a Concession Area
in the South Kalimantan Province of Indonesia

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Executive Summary

Conflict over the use of resources in many resource-rich countries such as Indonesia arising from state policies and development projects that affect the local community's traditional system of resource management is not new. Large-scale logging companies, national parks, forest conservation areas, and large-scale plantations are examples of development projects that often create conflict between the local community and the government as well as private agencies.

The Indonesian tropical rain forest has long been a foundation for the livelihood of forest-dwelling communities dependent on the primary products of the forest resource. The forest is not only a source of fast cash income for the rural community but also a place for their subsistence farming. However, the forest with its abundant valuable timber is also an essential source for economic development for the country. The latter has been the focus of the Government of Indonesia's (GoI) policy of economic development. A huge area of forest is allocated to timber companies in terms of utilization rights (HPH), to be logged in order to support the growth of the national economy. However, the economic development-support policy often ignores the local community customary practices and doesn't recognize the local community claim of traditional system and ownership.

In view of the complexity of the conflicts, it is time for the GoI to begin the process of developing policies that are related to resource conflict based on the understanding of the individual, socio-cultural and historical backgrounds of the forest-dwelling community. The policy must recognize that respect for human rights includes respect for the socio-cultural perspectives, rights and practices of the rural community.

The importance of respect for local community customary practices is exemplified by an EU-funded forestry project in South and Central Kalimantan. Aiming at establishing a sustainable forest management model, one of the project targets is to establish a conflict resolution practice between the local people, the concessionaire, and the GoI. The project has facilitated the process of conflict resolution and introduced a technical dimension to the resolution. The controversial issues have been resolved in an open and constructive way by the assistance of the project. The settlement of the conflict didn't end up with losers or winners but rather happy parties.

Background

Groups of local and rural communities within and around the forest areas of the Indonesian island Borneo—currently named Kalimantan—have existed for many years. A historical study indicates that settlements in such areas had begun many years before Indonesian independence. After Independence the state started to constitutionally claim the right to control all natural resources—including forest—within Indonesia's territory and thus prohibit any unlicensed activities in such areas. Furthermore the state expropriated land and natural resources to be exploited for economic development or to be protected for natural conservation. Forest areas occupied by local as well as indigenous communities were often the target of the forest management policy developed by the government in respect of deforestation, and population growth, etc. The rotational farming system adopted by local and indigenous communities is blamed as the cause of deforestation, with a loss to the state. The lands that are not occupied by anybody, although those are left to be naturally reforested as part of the fallow system employed by the rural community, must belong to the state.

As a result policy conflicts often arise over the management of resources.

The state control applied to a natural resource for the benefit of all Indonesian people, on the other hand, has limited and disregarded the local communities' claims of traditional ownership. Many of the local and indigenous communities have no legal recognition of their land use or ownership by the state. In addition, immigrant, transmigration and plantation projects have reduced the total land area available to the local communities. There were many cases showing how the Government of Indonesia (GoI) policy on forest management had interfered with the local community claim of rights.

It is now essential for policy makers to begin the process of developing policies related to the local and rural community and resource conflict based on the understanding of individual, ethnicity, customary law and practices—consideration of local situations that is founded on historical, socio-cultural and political economic perspectives. These policies must acknowledge that respect of human rights includes respect for the spiritual and cultural beliefs of ethnic groups—rights of cultural heritage as well as political rights. The policy-formulation process, which is based on learning and understanding the perspectives, knowledge and practices of the local and indigenous communities, will produce positive results to the community, natural resources, the country and the economy as a whole.

This paper examines the importance of conflict resolution strategy to resolve the existing and potential arising conflict over the use of resources. This paper also presents the experience of an EU-funded forestry project on conflict resolution issues within a concession area in the South Kalimantan province of Indonesia. This paper is limited only to the conflict resolution action within the project site in South Kalimantan where the livelihood of the local communities living within and around the concession area is being addressed.

Learning From Past Indonesia Forestry Policy

As in many countries, government policies concerning forest management and land use planning often interfere with local communities' claim of rights. The government control over the resources based on the Indonesian forestry law has limited the authority of local communities' customary law. For example, the Indonesia Basic Forestry Law (BFL) No. 5/1967 prohibits any human settlement as well as private land titles on the state forestland. The law provides

sole authority to the government to control the natural resources. Similarly, the new Forestry Law Number 41 of 1999 that replaces the 1967 BFL also states that all forest lands within the Indonesia territory are controlled by the government for the benefit of the people.

Under the BFL No. 5 of 1967 provisions the Ministry of Forestry has jurisdiction over all land designated for forestry use. In the higher hierarchical level of law, article 33 of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 vests in the state power of control of forestlands and the harvesting of their resources. Under this authority the GoI controls, manages and administers the nation's forests. Forestlands are categorized into five groups: protection forest (intended primarily for watershed protection), conservation forest, limited production forest, production forest and conversion forests.

Nevertheless, there have always been human communities that settled in the forest areas in Kalimantan island, and new settlers come to the forest area every year as well. There were many examples in the past of how the customary practices often clashed with the government policies concerning resource use and management. With the increased utilization of forest land in the form of timber concession (HPH) and the promotion of industrial tree plantation (HTI) in the mid 1990s, the issue of local land tenure systems for land and forest resources has come into sharper focus.

In many developing countries such as China, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia, utilization of forest resources by the local communities living in upland areas has traditionally taken place for hundreds of years (Yus 1996). Certain rules and regulations were developed within and by the community leaders in order to maintain their access to natural resources. Such rules and regulations are called customary laws. Due to their local and regional importance, many groups in Southeast Asia have staked claims and managed forest resources (Peluso, Vandergeest, and Potter 1995).

The forest provides many necessities to the local communities such as building materials, fruits, vegetables, honey, medicine, resin, meat of wild animals, and fishes from rivers. Ultimately the swidden cultivation, which, in the local language is called *ladang*, has created certain rights upon land (land rights) as well as rights in the forest region.

Despite its important role in the economy of local communities, swidden cultivation has often been blamed as an element of forest destruction. This type of traditional farming system, which is also often called "shifting

cultivation,” or “slash and burn cultivation,” has been criticized as wasteful, primitive, and unproductive (Yus 1996). The upland-dwelling shifting cultivators are frequently blamed for a wide range of environmental impacts and have long been the scapegoats for environmental degradation in Southeast Asia and have been portrayed in particular as the principal culprits responsible for deforestation (Hirsch 1997:25). In Indonesia, the role of shifting cultivation in deforestation has been an area of great debate. The two sides of the debate refer to different farming systems at opposite ends (Sunderlin 1997:1).

The last three decades witnessed excessive government control over natural resources in Indonesia. With the justification of supporting economic development, Indonesia’s outer islands (Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya) were opened to intensive and extensive commercial logging and plantation operations. These include HPH, HTI and nucleus estate program (NES/PIR). In the early ‘70s, timber concessions were granted to foreign logging companies from Japan, the USA, the Philippines, and European Countries. Peluso (1995) noted that until the end of 1989 a total of 564 concessions were in operation.

Since the early seventies the industrial utilization of forest resources in Indonesia has supported the nation’s economic growth. For almost two decades the country enjoyed a boom period in the timber trade. However, the utilization of Indonesian forest is considered not to be sustainable as there is degradation of the forest resource and deforestation of forest areas due to shifting cultivation and plantation clearing for timber and non-timber crops. Moreover, overcutting of production forest, coupled with an increasing incidence of fires in the forest areas has ultimately escalated the rate of decrease in the size of forest areas. This has been seriously affecting the long-term ability to manage the resource on a sustainable basis. Current estimates that have been published for the rate of deforestation range between 600,000 ha and 1.3 million ha per annum.

The Sustainable Forest Management Project

Tropical forest management policies have evolved in many tropical countries over a number of years, driven by institutional change, changes in public perceptions and increases in the level of knowledge about forests. A major requirement for sustainable management is the need for forest management

systems that are based on ecological principles. Since the mid-1980s, the GoI has recognized the need to improve the management of forest resources and resolved in 1992 to meet the provisions of “Target 2000” of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) for sustainable forest management (SFM) certification. The ITTO mission is to encourage the development of national policies aimed at sustainable utilization and conservation of tropical forests and their genetic resources and at the maintenance of ecological balance.

To meet the requirements of the SFM, the Indonesia Ministry of Forestry (MoF) has, forced by international pressure, begun to investigate suitable changes to policy in the forestry sector. Ideally, an appropriate system should be developed which is uncomplicated, so it can be understood by all stakeholders, transparent to all, and can be implemented by enhancing the capabilities of the central government and provincial institutions.

Since early 1999 a European Union-funded project called South and Central Kalimantan Production Forest Project (SCKPFP) initiated its sustainable forest management project in South Kalimantan province. The project involves technical cooperation between the EU and the GoI. The purpose of this seven-year project is to assist the government to develop and replicate a sustainable forest management model with full stakeholder participation, which integrates value-added forest products processing to achieve ITTO sustainable management Target 2000 guidelines. The project sites, therefore, are located within a selected concession area—which is categorized as production forest—in the South and Central Kalimantan Province.

The project activities in South Kalimantan Province were started in early 1999, while the activities in Central Kalimantan Province have just been started in early 2000. In South Kalimantan the project site is located in the concession area of PT. Aya Yayang Indonesia (PT. AYI), with an area of approximately 85,000 hectares, within the administrative territory of Tabalong District. PT. AYI is a private company that received a forest utilization right from the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry for a period of 55 years. The area lies within two sub-districts: Haruai and Muara Uya. The concession area is located at the upper Tabalong River, which flows from the northern to the southern part of the province.

Besides carrying out logging operations, PT. AYI also undertakes rehabilitation work to reforest degraded areas. The company planted these areas with commercial trees which in the future can be an alternative source of

timber, particularly to support the timber industry. The “Hutan Tanaman Industri” (HTI) program, which is an industry-support tree plantation, introduced by the Ministry of Forestry as an alternative to the previous reforestation program that failed, encouraged the company to shift their sole logging operation to also include HTI operations. This was supported by a number of facilities offered by the GoI, such as soft loans from the reforestation funds and a license to clear out the forestland and convert it to commercial forest plantation. The conversion of the natural forest applied to the logged-over area, with the total area already planted of 6,000 ha out of the target of 17,000 ha.

There are five villages that are located within or neighboring the concession area, i.e., Panaan, Dambung Raya, Hegarmanah, Salikung, and Kumap. Hegarmanah and Kumap are transmigration resettlements co-sponsored by the GoI and PT. AYI. Most of the settlers of these two villages are Javanese and only a small number are local Banjarnese. The villages of Panaan, Dambung Raya, and Salikung comprise several other small sub-villages or hamlets. The majority of the local people residing in the three original villages of Panaan, Dambung Raya and Salikung belong to two tribal groups: Dayak and Banjar. Historically the Dayak are the original inhabitants of the area while the Banjar themselves can be classified into two groups: local (long-time) residents and recent migrants.

The communities of the five villages are mostly traditional farmers who employ a traditional farming system commonly named “slash and burn” or “shifting cultivation.” They use a rotational system based on soil productivity. When the farmer considers the soil to be unproductive, he or she will relocate to another of his lands or open new forest land. Based on the soil productivity a farmer can cultivate the same plot for at most three times consecutively. After that the land is abandoned for natural succession (Werner 1993:12). Once the forest has been cleared and cultivated the land is claimed to be under the ownership of the cultivator. No one can cultivate it in the next rotation. Farmers believe that the forest areas were inherited from their ancestors, thus giving local inhabitants traditional ownership. The traditional ownership system that is mainly based on customary law, however, does not receive any recognition from the government.

The land use system consists of three main components: shifting cultivation, forest gardens, and multistory tree gardens (Werner 1993: 9). Land use is

classified into three groups:

- Land for subsistence farming
- Land for cash crop plantation such as for rubber trees, fruit trees, etc.
- Land for special purposes: funeral, honeybee trees, etc.

Opening forested land has another dimension besides the land rotation function, one that has to do with land control or “ownership.” After the harvesting period traditional farmers plant permanent trees, usually fruit trees or rubber trees, in the field they have cleared and cultivated. A primary reason for this is that after the field is left fallow for the next rotation, the trees mark that the plot belongs to the farmer, and in the future it would also be an alternative source of income. Hence, farming a piece of land is not only an activity that is essential for their daily subsistence, it becomes a guarantee of financial security. To the local people this acquisition of land is one of the best benefits of their traditional farming methods. To them, the fact that they own a plot of land is much more beneficial compared to their losses while farming on that plot.

The communities in the villages had various perceptions of forest in terms of ownership. The majority views the forest as a common heritage of the local communities, and thus it is open to every person within the community. Every person is free to clear a plot for farming but an outsider must get permission to do so. Ownership applies only to certain plots that have been cultivated by certain people. Every member of the community recognizes the ownership of other people, so conflict over resources hardly occurs among the people. A few people understand that forest areas belong to the government and that certain areas are designated for HPH or HTI operations.

Besides farming, the communities of five villages also collect forest products from the forest areas around their village, either wood products or non wood products such as rattan, resin, fruits, honey, birds, etc. They use these forest products both for satisfying their daily needs and also for sale.

In the minds of the local people, the extraction of timber in the forest area by large-scale logging would produce problems to the community. The reason is that, after their gardens, plantations and farmlands, the forest was the next most important source of livelihood and income of the local communities. They assess that the forest is important for three reasons: selling forest products is one way of getting fast cash; marketing the products is relatively easy; and

the forest is a reliable backup when their other source of income fail.

In light of these facts, from the local peoples' point of view, over-exploitation of the forest by outside agents such as the licensed HPH, is threatening their existence. The demise of the forest would eventually result in the disappearance of water sources—and hence the sustainability of human habitation for the original forest dwellers that have been living there for so long.

The “slash and burn” farming method is the only system—and hence the sustainability of the Dayak and Banjar people have known from generations of ancestors. The change that has taken place recently is that the rotation period from site to site has steadily become shorter and shorter. If before, the shift or rotation occurred every 10 years, now it occurs only every four or six years. The increase in the number of population and limited forestland are two main reasons behind the shorter rotation period of the farming. Prior to the logging operations in the 1970s only a few Lawangan and Manyaan people, two sub-groups of the Dayak tribe, inhabited the upper Tabalong. Then the Banjarnese came to the area, looking for new land for farming and forcing the Dayak to the upper river, and built new settlements. The number of incomers, mainly the Banjarnese, increased following the logging company activities in the early 1980s and was doubled by the government resettlement program that encouraged people from the most-populated islands such as Java to join the transmigration program.

There is a significant difference, however, between the Dayak and the Banjarnese concepts of land tenure. Despite its similarity in the ownership claim, the Banjar tend to manage their land as their future capital. The Dayak, after the crops in their field were harvested, left the field fallow and would return to and cultivate the same plot four or five years later. In the meantime they looked for and opened a new plot again and followed the same way in the next planting season. The Banjarnese, on the other hand, planted certain cash crops such as rubber trees, fruit trees, candle nut trees, etc. While the trees are growing, the Banjarnese still cultivate the plot for the next two or three planting seasons.

Unsustainable shifting agriculture, particularly within and around production, protection and conservation forests, is a problem of increasing severity that has not been adequately addressed yet. Unless local people are allowed to and encouraged properly to cooperate in forest protection, conflicts will continue and it will not be possible to conserve forest resources.

Resolving the Conflicts

The project aims to establish a conflict resolution practice between the local people, the concessionaire, and the GoI. Like in many other parts of Indonesia, within the EU project site in South Kalimantan conflicts have mainly developed between local communities on one side and the concessionaire on the other. The conflicts are caused by a number of different issues ranging from past implementation policies that privilege concessionaire rights over local populations to claims for a common finite resource (e.g., the forest resources). The indigenous people's claim over forest resources has been overruled by the presence of logging concessions in that area. The concessionaire, with utilization rights from the forestry department, claimed sole control to the forest resource, while the existing indigenous community also claimed their control over the forest area as a heritage from their ancestors. Thus there is a need to address issues related to land and forest traditional rights of tenure on the one hand and the need of the concessionaire to exploit the forest area. Furthermore, the project also aims at creating a forum for conflict resolution between all forest stakeholders involved in the forest management.

In the concession area of PT. AYI two major activities have been undertaken by the project as an initial conflict resolution strategy. The first is participatory mapping of the land use practiced by the local people as well as by the current existing forest dwellers. The mapping is done to measure the areas used by the local communities around their villages and establish the village boundaries as well as identifying areas associated with traditional customary rights. The mapping was done at the end of 1999 and involved local NGOs, the local communities, project staff and related government agencies' staffs. The maps produced from this activity have been distributed to the related government institutions such as the Forestry, Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Fishery, and local government agencies, the concessionaire and the local NGO.

The second activity was to gather the local customary laws shortly after the mapping process was accomplished. A survey was done to collect the existing customary laws and institutions of the local community, covering five villages within or neighboring the concession area. A preliminary meeting then followed this on customary laws with *adat* (traditional) leaders and local community leaders. The meeting, which is locally called *musyawarah*, aimed at gathering *adat* and local community leaders to discuss the existing customary laws present

within different groups of the local communities. The customary laws discussed at the meeting were those primarily related to natural resource tenure as traditionally managed by those communities. The participants also noted the reduction of their available natural resources and discussed their implications for the current and future life of the communities.

The preliminary meeting, which involved representatives of different villages and groups of the local communities, may constitute the primary element of a forum for conflict resolution to be established in the near future. The meeting was then followed up by a larger *adat* law workshop that involved a broader set of participants consisting of the *adat* and local community leaders as well as other stakeholders such as government-related institutions, NGOs and the company staff.

The idea behind these two activities was to gather in a participatory manner and to respect the local customary rights and laws as a key element of the conflict resolution strategy. This is also one of the SFM criteria and a requirement for getting certification for the timber products. To date the legal status of the local residents in and around designated forestlands has remained ambiguous under Indonesian law. At the present time there are no formal mechanisms established to define and recognize the rights of the local residents under the existing Basic Forestry Law of 1967 and the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960. Lacking any formal or expressed legal basis for their claims to the utilization of arable forestry land, the capacity for these forest-dwelling communities to protect their customary rights is extremely weak and by no means assured when faced with the economic and political weight of large private forestry companies.

There is a need to assist the local communities to gather their customary laws and rights and then assist them to have these customary laws and rights recognized by the government as well as by the concessionaire. A formal recognition in terms of an endorsement of the local customary laws and rights by the local government will provide the local communities with a recognized body of rights and ultimately help them in addressing the future. The forum will be held in the concession area and will regularly meet to examine possible sources of conflict. Legal rights and tenures, as they relate to the local communities, will be clearly and favourably defined to be supportive of community development.

Another example experienced by the project that underlines the importance

of a participatory approach in conflict management is in the resolution of a conflict between PT. AYI and the people of Dambung Raya and Hegarmanah.

In mid-2000 the people of Dambung Raya and Hegarmanah questioned the status of forest area in the Kasali Hill. The Kasali forest area has been designated by the Forestry Department as the 2000 annual cut area of PT. AYI, while the people of the two villages recognize the forest area in the Kasali Hill as protection forest. The people are afraid of the impact of the logging operation in the hill that could damage their environment, cause a decline in the water quality and flow, and cause erosion and landslides that could be significant potential risk to the community. However, the community was divided in the resolution that should be undertaken. Some would like the hills to be a protected area while others agree that the company can log the area, but with certain prerequisites: that the company has to reconstruct a road to the village, provide water supply, school and healthcare facilities, and other incentives to the villages. It is interesting to note that opinion was split between the ordinary villagers demanding full protection, and the village institutional members (subordinate of the sub district office) allowing logging with the “strings” attached.

The project has facilitated the process of conflict resolution and introduced a technical dimension to the resolution. These controversial issues had been resolved in an open and constructive way by the assistance of the project. A participatory approach was used by the project to bring together the related stakeholders in a *musyawarah* (village meeting) to discuss the matter and find a better solution for resolving the conflict. After several meetings were organized in the village, attended by all stakeholders (the company, the inhabitants of the two villages, NGO, and the Forestry Department), the local government of the Tabalong District came up with a consent decree that satisfied all parties in the dispute.

The compromise that has been agreed upon by all parties is that logging by the concessionaires be restricted and may only take place under project supervision on the western slopes that will not affect the villages. The logging operation will open roads into the area and give the villages better access to the markets. The villages will assist in the protection of the eastern side of the forest, and thus address illegal logging.

Conflict resolution requires transparency and full participation of the parties involved, with the additional participation of the institutional framework that does exist. The project’s role of facilitator and technical back up should diminish

over time as the concept of conflict resolution becomes more frequently practiced.

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4

The Global/Local Preconditions of Peace-Building

A Multi-level Analysis about Resources,
Conflict and Development
(Summary)

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The present paper is an attempt to show that the present theoretical framework within which conflict, development and peace-building is discussed cannot understand realistically the role of mineral resources in conflicts and peace-building. Mineral resources are not additional factors in conflicts but are part of the global structures of industrial development and peripheral conflicts which require an alternative analytical framework to the one which sees peripheral conflicts as part of underdevelopment and assumes that the industrial countries are external beneficial actors intervening for peace-building, forgetting that they are part of the conflict-generating global structures.

The paper is not based on scientifically tested truths, but merely proposes an alternative conceptual framework which requires empirical research on both global and local levels.

1. The role of mineral resources in conflicts

- 1) The concentration of post-Cold War conflicts in African regions rich in mineral resources indicates that mineral resources are not just occasional and additional factors complicating conflict, but rather, play a key role as part of the international system making conflicts part of the economic/political structures of development.

- 2) Mineral resources, i.e., non-renewable resources, constitute a major part of the expansion of mega-cycles of resources, labor and money that characterize the globalization of the modern economy.
- 3) The mega-cycles are ecologically and economically disruptive of the natural and social systems of reproduction. The competitive market forces add other disruptive factors due to the zero-sum character of the political-economic interests engaged in the mega-competition in controlling the mega-cycles—technologically, economically, and in terms of global finance.

2. The global/local nexus of industrial development and ethnic politics

- 1) The historical process of industrial development has experienced different stages, from colonial exploitation to post-colonial exploitation, and now to a global stage. At each stage, the economic/political linkages, open and covert, have competed in creating larger cycles channeling resources, especially mineral resources, from their exploitation sites to the industrial centers where they serve industrial development.
- 2) This competition created zero-sum conditions within and between the ethnic security communities in the developing regions where the resources are exploited by specific power groups. This creates mutually exclusive interests between groups with and without access to these resources.
- 3) The traditional small cycles of natural resources exchange, human interactions, and trade, which were ecologically healthy and positively linked to the social reproductions of eco-cultural values, had a non-zero-sum nature which reduced the cases of intra and inter-community conflicts. The globalization of the political economy has broken these ties, and created conditions for more political and economic competitions, closely connected to violent competitions of external agents, states, corporations, and criminals.

3. An alternative conceptual framework combining global and local structural perspectives is essential.

- 1) Non-zero-sum relations characterize all transactions among the different agents in and between traditional communities. For example, the artisans using metals to produce tools for agricultural work, and exchanging them for agricultural products in local markets create non-zero-sum relations between the exploitation of non-renewable and renewable resources. The long-distance exchange cycles of mineral resources and artisanal mineral products along the traditional trade routes create mutual interest among the trade partners, given the limited amount of trade products and lack of competitive agents in the international market.
- 2) The capitalist economy, especially its most advanced global economy, is characterized by non-zero-sum relations in the core region where interdependence exists. It is characterized by zero-sum relations in the peripheral regions where the different agents exploit mineral resources, or have exclusive control over their extraction and distribution—a fierce competition intensified by the core agents.
- 3) The zero-sum conditions between the haves and the have-nots created by mineral resources, characteristic of all peripheral regions, complements the non-zero-sum conditions created in the core regions of industrial development. Zero-sumness takes different forms depending on the local conditions within which the different security communities interact, seeking maximal power and security, but depends on the same overall global conditions of international development exploiting natural resources of conflictual peripheral regions.

4. Mineral resources' zero-sum effects on conflicts between different ethnic security communities are part of a complex power/interest competition locally and globally.

- 1) The zero-sum effect of natural resources is not manifested in a univocal manner, such as a conflict between resource-rich vs. resource-poor communities. The zero-sum condition created by mineral resources lead to a power/interest competition over their control, directly or indirectly, openly

or covertly.

- 2) Mineral resources constitute the base of economic competition between corporate agents using them in their productive activities. They are also a power base for states and political elites, which compete over their exclusive exploitation. In the speculative financial market, the qualitative and quantitative indicators of their extraction and exploitation cause shifts and fluctuations in the stock and currency market.
- 3) The global economic and financial speculation over mineral resources creates a multi-cyclical and multi-layered complex economic and political process of overt and covert competitions and contradictory formations, with shifting alliances between the different actors. These include the ethnic security communities, as well as those between the political and economic forces within them (mostly hawks rather than doves) with external interests, including industrial states (former colonial rulers), multinational corporate interests (diamond interests), and transnational criminal organizations (combining the smuggling of mineral resources, women and children, drugs, and arms).

5. Mineral resources are part of the resource base of eco-cultural/ethnic security communities, and should be treated within this local endogenous complex if the mineral resources would cease to play a negative role for peace among the eco-cultural communities. The global economic/political exploitation of mineral resources should be regulated to enable local peace building.

- 1) The creation of non-zero-sum conditions between the different political and economic agents in the periphery, including the competing ethnic security communities, cannot be achieved unless a mutually reinforcing process of socio-ecological reproduction of mutually beneficial resource development systems is successfully rebuilt in the peripheral regions of the global economy.
- 2) The global cycles reproducing zero-sum relations in the peripheral regions will have to be addressed by a combination of global structural measures counteracting the effects of the political, economic, and financial cycles linking the non-renewable resources to the global cycles. The regulation of

the over-speculative financial market, of the criminal organizations supported by corrupt politics, and the overt and covert alliances to control mineral resources should be the object of international surveillance and restriction.

- 3) The traditional local cycles linking the non-renewable resources to the renewable ones have to be reintroduced through local eco-cultural activities. The exploitation of mineral resources should be locally coupled with the development of other resources, especially renewable ones, and local endogenous industrial development combined with agricultural development must be supported by the economic cooperation of the industrial countries, so that exogenous zero-sum-ness ceases to be the predominant mode of their exploitation. Such regimes are extremely difficult to materialize, but can be established if the natural resources are collectively owned by a public body (the state, the region or a coalition of security communities) which guarantees non-zero-sum cooperation by the concerned eco-cultural communities, giving all of them equal stake and share-holding.

The above five points lead us to consider seriously the development of an alternative conceptual framework which takes into account the fact that ethnic conflicts are integral parts of a global macro economic and power political system, where mineral resources play a key role in global competition: non-zero-sum in the center but zero-sum in the periphery. To assume that the global economic/political conditions can be held constant and the effects of mineral resources on ethnic conflicts in the peripheral regions can be dealt with without touching the macro-economic and power political realities of the global political economy is completely wrong. Such a view misses most of the key problems involved, not only in the global exploitation of mineral resources, but of all other resources, whose exogenous exploitation, through zero-sum large cyclical processes, should be regulated. Furthermore, new small cyclical processes enabling the local eco-cultural communities to develop a local endogenous system of common exploitation of non-renewable and renewable resources should be encouraged. This is a sine qua non condition of peace building. This fundamental shift of paradigm has to be made by all the concerned agents if a global governance regime for security and development is to be created in the peripheral regions of the global system.

5

Comments and Discussion

Comments

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I have five comments from a perspective of conflicts in Africa. The reason for this is that Africa is the most relevant region in the present world for considering today's theme of "conflict over natural resource management and preventive diplomacy." In fact, after three years of joint research with NIRA (National Institute for Research Advancement) on African intra-state conflicts and preventive diplomacy, the final chapter of which is being distributed separately (See Appendix), I am convinced that this theme is critically important.

1. First, except a few like a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, most conflicts in Africa are intra-state conflicts. In Angola, Mozambique, and Congo, armed conflicts are taking place within their national boundaries between an armed group and the government forces, or among armed groups. This means that in many conflicts governments are not able to control their own territories and peoples. In other words, in most cases, armed conflicts are taking place in the so-called "Failed States". In such countries, the approach explained by the panelists in the morning may not be applicable as a means to prevent conflicts. While the cases in North and Latin America or in Indonesia are all conflicts over natural resource management *within a framework of a functioning state*, presuming a legal order and political stability, such assumption does not hold in Africa. How should we think of this?

2. Second, intra-state conflicts do not take place in isolation. There are international factors. e.g. interests and involvement of other countries and firms within and outside Africa, desiring to have access to natural resources. Most of arms are manufactured in developed countries and sold to Africa by firms from developed countries. Thus, behind the African domestic conflicts, whirl around diverse international interests. As Prof. Mushakoji rightly pointed out, this “hidden internationality” and “domestic conflict as a phenomenon on a surface” should be more carefully analyzed. Statements like “there are intra-state conflicts in Africa,” or “religions, ethnicity and corruption are the causes of African domestic conflicts” are all true, but these factors alone can not trigger and sustain violent conflicts with such magnitude. We should recognize that African conflicts occur as a consequence of involvement of foreign firms selling arms to armed groups and making money therefrom and of foreign governments that support these firms.
3. Third, we tend to focus on natural resources alone when we consider conflicts over them. This is justified in the case of developed countries where the state is functioning. In Africa, however, various factors surround conflicts. Africa-specific social and human relation, e.g., patron-client relationship, provides a background. It alone, however, will not cause conflicts. Diverse other factors, e.g., domestic and international interests over natural resources, ethnicity and religion, affect conflicts. Thus, once conflict is triggered for whatever reasons, it spreads in an uncontrollable manner. This is a phenomenon in Africa. Therefore, an approach focussing only on a single specific issue (such as natural resources) will not succeed in conflict resolution in Africa where conflicts are conducted as a result of mixture of complex issues; e.g. problems within African communities and ethnicity, communication difficulty due to old colonial legacy of linguistic problems such as English, French and other languages. Thus, what is required is a comprehensive approach to respond to all factors with all means.
4. Fourth, states normally are primary actors in conflict prevention. In Africa, however, we should recognize that states often can not play their role sufficiently. Multilateral organizations such as UN are playing, and they

should play, an important role. Among them, such institutions as the World Bank, UNDP, FAO and WFP that are engaged in development assistance should play a significant role because poverty constitutes one of the root causes of conflict and UN Peace Keeping Force can not address these issues. As for civil society, NGOs in developing countries should be more involved than NGOs from developed countries. This kind of bottom-up or participatory approach, as Prof. Mushakoji called it, is important in Africa. How to involve local armed groups into this process is a difficult issue. While, crime organizations can not be included in stakeholders, in Africa armed groups can not be *a priori* classified as crime organizations. In a case of a country ruled by an extreme dictator, an armed group in opposition may be a new emerging democratic group and this poses a question of which of them is to be considered as a stakeholder in an African context.

5. Lastly, most countries in Africa are currently experiencing armed conflicts or are about to face them, due to poverty, political corruption, tightly involving foreign firms and ethnic and religious tensions. If a comprehensive approach is taken in order to prevent conflicts from occurring or from aggravating, various actors should address each one of these diverse causes of conflicts in Africa. It then emerges that the coordination among these actors becomes an important issue. At present there is hardly any coordinator. UN should play coordinating function more actively. UN Economic and Social Councils are supposed to play such a role but it is hardly doing this. Their coordination function should be strengthened.

Comments

Yoshihiko Kono

Senior Executive Director, Japan Bank for International Cooperation

Being just a practitioner in the area of ODA provision, I am wondering from where I should speak today.

The first point I would like to make concerns the “cycle of conflict” of the countries concerned. While ODA yen loans are being provided to almost 100 countries, typically the main recipients are in Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Asia. Stages in the cycle of conflict and development can be: conflict stage→peace stage→reconstruction stage→development stage. Major recipient countries of ODA yen loans are in the “development stage.” (In some cases, assistance has been provided to support post-conflict reconstruction, e.g., Nicaragua, Honduras, and Indonesia after the collapse of the Sukarno government.)

On the issue of natural resource management and conflict, unfair transboundary water development could be a source of bilateral inter-state conflict. Fortunately, as far as JBIC operations are concerned, however, there have not been any specific cases of water disputes between riparian countries. In the future, if current projects such as the Greater Mekong Sub Region Development reach a serious development stage, due attention should be paid to these issues.

On intra-state conflicts, prior to implementation, negative effects upon project beneficiaries, particularly populations affected by relocation and ethnic minorities, as well as mitigating measures, if necessary, are scrutinized in accordance with JBIC environmental guidelines.

Though the stakeholder approach as such is not being intentionally incorporated in the JBIC operations, in the end JBIC does pay attention to the importance of participation by different stakeholders.

It is difficult to explicitly show direct “interfaces” between conflict, development and JBIC operations. It is, however, presumed that different development projects, particularly poverty-reduction oriented ones, can have positive “indirect-conflict-prevention effects,” by reducing forest destruction caused by cutting for fuel wood, which, in turn, is due to the widespread poverty.

Comments

Jin Sato

Associate Professor, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences,
University of Tokyo

It is my great pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on these stimulating papers presented this morning. It is certainly beyond my capacity to respond to all the issues that were addressed, and I will have to be very selective.

Now, before I go on to specific questions, let me outline the common themes. I detected two interesting paradoxes co-existing in parallel:

- (1) Why are the poor and the marginalized people living close to a rich forest, that is so much in demand by the global market, unable to benefit from it? This contrast of stark rural poverty and unique environmental conditions was clearly laid out in Prof. Fisher's paper. When I say "global demand," I am referring not only to economic production but also to environmental protection. This is the first paradox at the micro level.
- (2) Why do countries with rich natural resources tend to have poor economic performance? The contrast of rich mineral resource and poor governance was one of the main points Prof. Mushakouji highlighted.

In an attempt to tackle these problems, we must ask a third question:

- (3) What are the appropriate methods to address these issues when there are multiple realities with diverse power holders? Prof. Chevalier and Mr. Yus indicated the importance of developing new methods for our decision-making.

These questions, despite their obvious importance, have seldom been raised in the way I just framed. This is not only because the questions tend to go

beyond the conventional units of analysis such as villages, cities and nations, but also because they fall between the cracks of traditional academic boundaries (or disciplines). Perhaps it is time for us to face them seriously.

Let me begin with the first paradox. We know that resources on the earth are unevenly distributed and those with easy access are the first ones to be exploited. The more scarce the resources become, the more we need to look for them in the hinterlands and peripheries. There, we often find relatively undisturbed nature and indigenous people living close-by. The resources that are demanded by the global market are then defined as being too valuable to be left to the local people, and therefore they are taken away or “protected.” These forces explain why we often find marginalized people living right next to rich resources without having access to them.

The second paradox, and this perhaps addresses the theme of this panel more directly, is based on the following observations: we see many of the developing countries, especially those in Africa and Latin America, being plagued with poor economic performance despite their natural resource wealth. Furthermore, those countries tend to have authoritarian governments and occasional domestic conflicts. Why? Although the exact answer to these questions is yet to be found, scholars have pointed out some plausible explanations: In poorer countries, public authority has been constructed in a context where little bargaining between the state and the citizens is needed. This is possible because state elites can gather resources internationally by selling their natural capital or attract foreign aid while not having to rely on their own people. In short, they can live on “unearned income” —income that is not based on tax revenues from their own people. In exchange for easy profits from oil, diamonds, timber and mineral resources, elites in poorer countries can purchase military hardware that equips them with overwhelming coercive force. Civil war is ignited when rival forces in the government resort to the same strategy. In this way, competition among donors in poor countries might promote political corruption and intensify conflicts, rather than offering solutions.

Finally, in order to address these trans-boundary questions, we need innovative ways to capture the problems. This point was clearly indicated in Dr. Chevalier’s paper on stakeholder analysis. Japanese people love methods. There are now many workshops and short courses on PCM, PRA, etc. in Japan. Perhaps one of the unintended side effects of the diffusion of handy methods is

that we do not have to think as we used to. The formula is there, and we just have to throw in the ingredients that fit the framework well. Prof. Chevalier mentioned in his paper that SA is still “rough and not so ready.” Perhaps this is not a disadvantage at all since it leaves us room to make efforts to improve it or supplement its shortcomings. That is, we may say that SA allows us to think—and that’s the strength of it.

Let me now turn to more specific questions that came to my mind. I have three of them. The first is primarily addressed to Prof. Fisher but also relates to Mr. Yus’s point. Prof. Fisher mentioned the importance of strengthening scientific information and monitoring to improve the decision processes.

My question is this. Doesn’t the emphasis on stronger science dis-privilege the ordinary people and therefore obstruct the “broad-based participation” that is originally intended? In other words, how do we make sure that strong science will lift people’s agendas up to the policy-making level? Let me elaborate on this point. Prof. Fisher does mention his concern about people with limited educational background. My concern is not so much on the educational level of the audience, but on the function of “scientifically objective information” itself.

Roughly speaking, and it may be too rough, I wonder who would care much about scientifically precise information besides the scientists themselves. In my research experience in Thailand, for example, I have come to realize that more information about the situation of local people does not necessarily influence policy towards democratic management of forests. The Forestry Department does not want to give up their good forests no matter how much scientific research tells them to do so. We have enough research to inform the government that, given the right incentives, people will demonstrate their capacity. It is not the lack of research about people; the research exists, but is simply ignored by the policy-makers. We tend to think that more information is helpful. Yet, in a complex situation where the conflict is not over “what the facts are” but over “what facts are wanted to support your interests,” science is not helpful in policy judgments, and even worse, it may mask political realities in the field. I wish to hear from Prof. Fisher on this point.

My second question relates to methods. My understanding is that innovation about research methods in the development field originally grew out of the realization that there is not enough time to do research, especially in remote locations. RRA and PRA lies somewhere between two-day development tourism

and the year-long fieldwork typically conducted by anthropologists. Does SA score well in terms of time? By attempting to involve those who have good reason not to be involved, the process may take even longer.

Finally, to all the panelists, I wish to pose the following question: Can we solve environmental degradation and conflicts while preserving the system that produced those problems? I found this to be the most challenging theme implied in Prof. Mushakouji's paper. Prof. Chevalier's paper also indicates that no matter what improvements we want to pursue, we have to start from the existing power structure. Yet, on the other hand, many of us in the development industry hesitate to pursue this path. This is because it soon makes us realize that we are part of the problem and, therefore, makes us question the sustainability of our very profession.

Interestingly, this question of "power" was addressed in all the papers presented this morning. To raise the issue of power is not so much about poor people or forest depletion in the developing countries; it is about lifestyle in the rich countries and the system that produced inequality in resource access. The first step we should take, perhaps, is to see ourselves as part of the problem.

Session 1 Discussion

- Summary -

Discussions considered the role of outsiders and the broader stakeholder community in the area of conflict prevention in natural resource (NR) management. Among the issues taken up were:

What can they do? What can't they do? What shouldn't they do?

Conflicts from power struggles over resources should be considered from both the consumption and the supply sides. Local confrontations can be due to external conflicts (e.g., ideological conflicts from outside). In the case of mineral or forest resources, the main consumers of these products are based outside—without addressing the interests of these consumers, it is impossible to address the local conflicts.

For example, mineral resources are deeply implicated in, and continue to aggravate, conflicts in areas such as the Congo. In this case, neighboring warlords expropriate the land from farmers to obtain resources and sell them to MNCs. Consumers in developed countries can also become stakeholders; they should press firms not to trade in resources such as diamonds. In analyzing conflicts over natural resource management, we should therefore distinguish between those that occur in stateless areas, and those in well-functioning states.

As another classic example, consider the forestry sector in places like Sumatra: there are companies that obtain concessions, and there are people, through customary law, who claim the land. What kind of agreement or peace building can be expected between the two? Do these people have to shift from slash-and-burn agriculture to stationary agriculture? Governments cannot just perceive NRs as just economic resources, but also as important for the local people and environment. Income sources must become more diversified.

Stakeholder involvement is quite distinct from what was fashionable just a few years ago: 'community-based NR management'—i.e., local community. Now, it is expanded to include 'communities of interest': stakeholder involvement thus, by definition, includes external actors. Stakeholder involvement is geared towards the 'leveling of the playing field'; it does not take for granted the existing power structure. We must consider some forms of restricted stakeholder involvement—i.e., in cases where some stakeholders

are unacceptable because they're simply trying to expropriate the land.

SA is not just a technique to gather information; it's a process in which the stakeholders must talk to one another, not just about technical problems but the social obstacles to reaching better management of natural resources and conflicts. There should not be a division between 'scientific' approaches and participatory ones, given the great diversity of knowledge systems. Complexity should not be used as an excuse for inaction. Hegemonic science has been used to the detriment and disenfranchisement of local people. But having objective scientific, economic and social data for NR management issues is very important.

In sum, how should we think about stakeholders in the context of globalization? In considering the roles of outsiders, we can help identify and analyze these problems, and add to their legitimacy. We can act as conveners, in the absence of honest brokers. Building capacity at the local level is another critical role. Under globalization, we're all stakeholders in these situations.

Outsiders should be good mediators. Scientific wisdom should be integrated with indigenous wisdom in common forums. Consumption patterns in the developed countries is an important issue to address, and makes us stakeholders with considerable responsibility. When development assistance bureaucracies such as MOFA make development assistance plans, different divisions are looking at the problem in different directions, and are insufficiently integrated in their concerns. We will return to this issue of policy coherence below.

In conclusion, six summary points can be made:

1. Considering the world system, we foresee a major increase in NR consumption, in which we are integrally involved.
2. We therefore see the emergence of a wide variety of NR conflicts, with very diverse stakeholders.
3. We have to think about the renewability of NRs, and respect the wisdom and experience of local people in trying to solve conflicts.
4. There are no 'outsiders'; we must consider our potential roles as conveners or honest brokers.
5. We have to create a system for NR conflict resolution.
6. We need to create a network of alliances to deal with these issues, including NGOs, NPOs, etc., in the context of globalization. Intellectual contents can be created through the joint activities of the network members, such as action research.

Session 2

Prevention of Conflict Resurgence

6

Preventing the Recurrence of Violent Conflict

Susan Collin Marks

Executive Vice President, Search for Common Ground

Another way to frame the question *how to prevent recurring violent conflict* might be *how to build sustainable peace*, or even *how to make the world safe for difference?*¹ As a South African who was engaged in the peace process that underpinned South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, and through the work of Search for Common Ground around the world, these are the recurring themes of my work.

I took part in South Africa's National Peace Accord, the peace pact between the major stakeholders that carried us across the abyss from apartheid to democracy. I was there right in the beginning of the peace process. On February 11th 1990, the day Nelson Mandela was released from prison, I stood in the city square of Cape Town with eighty thousand other people. We waited all day, through the heat of that day, and finally, in the evening, our future president stood before us on the steps of the city hall. We were seeing him for the first time in 27 years. For twenty minutes or longer, the crowd just shouted, sang, and danced, welcoming him in a very African way. People put their children on their shoulders to see over the great crowd so that one day they would be able to say, "I, too, was there the day Mandela was released."

I was privileged to be part of the process that followed on from that day of rejoicing. Soon after, the pictures on our television screens changed from celebration to violence as the oppression of decades erupted and the struggle for power in the *new South Africa* commenced. Ordinary South Africans

¹ *How to make the world safe for difference* is the guiding principle of The Coexistence Initiative, a non-profit organization established to put and keep coexistence on the policy agenda at national and international levels, to build a network of coexistence professionals, to institutionalize coexistence, and to disseminate coexistence information to the public.

recognized that the violence was likely to ruin our chances of achieving democracy, and some citizens got together and said, “We have to do something about this.” The result was that on September 14, 1991, with the support of the major political parties, including the government and the African National Congress (ANC), a National Peace Accord (NPA) was launched to try and stop the violence, and steer the country towards its democratic future.

The NPA was not just an accord on paper. It created a network of peace committees throughout the country at national, regional and local levels. In the end there were 220 committees which brought together all the stakeholders in South Africa’s bid for peace. For the first time, the right and left, black and white, security forces and community, met together and began to work out the future of South Africa. It was an extraordinary time as, for the first time, we sat down together, talking, getting to know each other, breaking down the stereotypes and finding each other as human beings. This was key. This getting to know each other was what, in the end, made South Africa work.

I would like to draw four principles for peacebuilding from that work in the South Africa.

- i. Top down and bottom up.** Mechanisms that connect the top and the bottom of a society, and provide the means for the top and the bottom to come together into a national voice, must be incorporated at all levels. The National Peace Accord straddled the country from top to bottom and shore to shore.
- ii. Inclusivity.** We were grappling to pull together a country that had been *very successfully* divided by apartheid. We knew that all the stakeholders had to be invited to join in the peace process, and although not every party came to the table—some on the extreme left and right chose not to—the main body of people and groups embraced the peace process. Inclusivity was one of the bases on which we built our new society.
- iii. Relationship building and healing.** When there has been a deep division, the oppression of one group by another, or civil war, the wounds from that time need to be healed. I would like to tell a story that is quite extraordinary but that became quite ordinary in the course of our transition in South Africa.

It takes place on a Thursday afternoon in October of 1992. Our peace

process has been underway for a very short time and we are convening one of the very first meetings in my region of the police with the human and civil rights organizations. We were quite nervous. We do not know what is going to happen. Everybody has agreed to participate. We have consulted with both sides, getting agreement on the agenda, participants and venue. Now the moment has come. We are in a hotel conference room in downtown Cape Town. The police arrive early, come into the room and sit at one end of the oval seating arrangement. Civil and human rights representatives start coming in too and they sit more or less at the other end. A few people sit in the middle and I notice who they are—they are important because they are the bridge-builders. It is getting late but we do not want to start the meeting, because there is one person we want to be there. And then he walks in. His name is Stewart. He is 32 years old and he is a black South African who as a member of the ANC was tortured by the South African police as an opponent of Apartheid. Now he works as a paralegal for a human rights law group. He walks in the door, and hesitates for a moment as he chooses where he is going to sit. Then he walks around to the middle and he sits next to a police colonel. He turns and shakes his hand. Two or three of us in the room know that he has sat down besides his former torturer.

This is a story of forgiveness in action. The peace process provided the context for actions like this to take place throughout our country, as for the first time people sat down together and began to know each other. We recognized that the only way forward for us as South Africans was to find a way to forgive, but not to forget, as Mandela once said. We had to reconcile if we were to create a new, democratic nation.

- iv. Socioeconomic and political development.** I have just spent two weeks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. As I went across the country talking to a wide spectrum of people from the top to the bottom, I heard what the Congolese people most want from their peace process, the Lusaka Agreement. They want new institutions of government. They want political and social development. They also want the enormous resources of that vast country to be brought into an uncorrupted, commercial venture that will benefit the people of the country. They want the wealth of the country to improve the quality of their lives, and they want new political institutions to support good governance and the rule of law. This is also what the majority

of South Africans wanted, and which, with all its flaws, they essentially achieved.

The major truth we discovered in South Africa is that we need **political will for peace**, that we can **decide for peace**—and that at the same time we can only truly make peace in our hearts. We need political will, and we need our hearts to agree!

We need our hearts to come into any peace process. Everything we did in South Africa brought these two together. So when we talk about how we stop conflict from recurring, we need to not only build structures and develop systems to sustain peace, we also need to bring ourselves to that process, because, in the end, **peace begins with each one of us**.

Conflict is inevitable because we will always have our differences. In fact, conflict is a good thing, as it provides the dynamo for change that is an essential part of the evolution of society, and the world. It is how we handle it that counts. My organization, Search for Common Ground, is dedicated to transforming the way societies deal with conflict. The knee-jerk reaction to conflict in most of the world today is adversarial, violent and destructive. We work to transform this into nonadversarial, nonviolent and constructive responses.

Think of our responses to conflict as a spectrum with violence and war at one end. Forgiveness, acceptance, mutual understanding are at the other end—that's where the story about Stewart belongs. There is a full range of possible responses in between. We are not condemned to recurring cycles of violence, **we can change our response to conflict**. Just as we have learned war and violence, nonviolent, nonadversarial responses to conflict can be learned and taught.

This is what we do at Search for Common Ground, based in Washington, D.C., and our sister organization, the European Centre for Common Ground in Brussels. Together, we form the largest nongovernmental organization working in conflict resolution in the world. We have 250 employees in ten countries, and we have been engaged in programs and projects aimed at the transformation of conflict for nearly twenty years. We have operations in Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the former Soviet Union, and we are just opening an office in Indonesia.

We have **a toolbox of approaches** that we use in our work. Along with

others, we are pioneers of the use of **the media** for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. We recognize that the media can be a tool for conflict creation as well as a tool for conflict resolution. In developing it as peacebuilding tool, we have come to believe that it is possible to bring the principles of conflict prevention and conflict resolution to any format, including the news, soap opera, features, and drama.

We discovered many years ago the principle that the power of the media resides with the person or the organization that owns it. So we created our own radio and television division, **Common Ground Productions (CGP)**. CGP has established three radio studios in Africa—in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia—and we do radio in other places, too. We have an ongoing children’s television drama series in Macedonia, we have made a series of television documentaries about peacebuilders in Angola, and we coproduced a 13-part television documentary series about conflict and its resolution throughout Africa.

In 1995 in Burundi, we established Studio Ijambo, which means *wise words* in Kirundi, to counter hate-radio. Our **radio soap opera**, *Our Neighbors Ourselves*, has been airing twice weekly since 1997. It is written by a Hutu playwright, and the ongoing story is about a Hutu and Tutsi family living next door to each other in the context of the conflict in Burundi. They get up to all the things that you would expect from soap opera—falling in love, fighting, having political and philosophical disagreements, etc. At the end of each episode the problem is resolved through mutual understanding, tolerance, and where the adults are concerned, sometimes by drinking beer together! This is now in about its 400th episode, and is an example how an organization like ours can support creative peacebuilding work on the ground.

We do soap opera in a number of other countries too and we have found it an effective way of conveying the values of peacebuilding. In Burundi, we have over 90% listenership. Even more interesting is that, according to surveys, around 80% of the people who listen to it understand the message.

In Macedonia, for the last three years we have produced a **children’s television drama** *Nashe Maalo*, which means *Our Neighborhood*. It does a similar job to the Burundi soap opera, providing a mechanism for disseminating principles of tolerance and mutual understanding between Albanians and Macedonians. In the recent crisis, we have made **public service announcements** with the tag line: *We are Macedonia*. One of them features

the Macedonian soccer team, which includes both Macedonian and Albanian players.

Sport is another tool for peacebuilding, as sports stars carry enormous weight with their fans. When they speak for peace, their fans listen.

We also use **the arts** in our work. We recognize that conflict carries strong emotions. It is something we feel within us. Music and the arts reach us in an emotional way, and can touch that place where we hold onto the anger and pain of conflict. We have made peace songs in a number of different countries, bringing together the musicians from the different sides of the conflict to sing for peace, and for a new kind of future. In Macedonia, for example, we produced the theme song of *Our Neighborhood* as a music video. It includes the top Macedonian and Albanian pop singers, who sing together for the first time. Another first is that they sing in their own languages. The video, which includes the cast of *Our Neighborhood*, has become a number one hit—a number one hit embedded with the values of tolerance and mutual understanding.

We also do **Track Two**, unofficial people-to-people work. We have a program to improve Iran-U.S. relations that brings together Iranian and American environmentalists, journalists, film-makers, philosophers, scientists, and even astronomers. The program is a response to both President Khatami and President Clinton's call for a dialogue of civilizations. In the face of the two governments' inability to talk to each other, the goal is to build relationships at a people-to-people level and prepare the way for later, official communication.

At the suggestion of our Iranian partners, our first exchange was with wrestlers. In 1999, we took the U.S. National Wrestling team to Iran to participate in a major wrestling tournament. For the first time since the hostage crisis in 1979, the American flag was paraded in Iran with honor, without chauvinism, and in an atmosphere of respect. The Iranian audience got to its feet and applauded the American team, sending a strong signal of acceptance.

When the American wrestlers returned to the United States, President Clinton received them in the Oval Office at the White House. The State Department filmed the encounter and then sent the film for broadcast in Iran so that the Iranian people could see for themselves that the American president had honored the wrestling team, and therefore given his blessing to their participation in the Iranian tournament. This provided the counter signal of approval and acceptance.

As a footnote, when the wrestlers came to Washington D.C. for the White

House ceremony, my husband John Marks and I invited them to have dinner at our house afterwards. When I asked what they wanted to eat, they looked at each other and said, “Pizza and beer.” For wrestlers on a careful diet, this was a real celebration!

These are just some of the ways that we work to transform the way societies deal with conflict. You can look at our full toolbox on our website at www.sfcg.org.

From my experience, to prevent the recurrence of conflict, I recommend:

1. That we generate the **political will**, build structures and systems, and devise policies to prevent conflict from recurring—and we also recognize that we can only build sustainable **peace from our hearts**.
2. That we recognize that **peace is a decision**. The president of an African country recently told me, “If we can decide for war, we can decide for peace.” We can encourage leaders to make the decision for peace.
3. That funders and practitioners recognize that peacebuilding is a long process. Practitioners need **donors to offer sustained support to peacebuilding**. Healing and relationship building are not something that can be done in the timetable of a yearlong project.
4. That development agencies, including multilaterals like the World Bank, accept that there can be no development without peace. (It is also true that peace needs a strong development component.) There is a need to **integrate a peacebuilding approach into development programs**, so that development work is not continually undermined by the recurrence of war.
5. That we **inform and educate** for sustainable peace. In schools, we can revisit school curricula that demonize and dehumanize the other. For instance, in both Israel and in Palestine today, school curricula reinforce hateful stereotypes. We can remove the stereotyping, and instead teach coexistence throughout the educational system, at all levels, and begin the process of restoring the humanity of ourselves and each other, transforming fear and hate into acceptance and mutual respect. Education is a critical tool for building sustainable peace.
6. That we invest in **media programs** that support finding common ground, as in the examples discussed above.

Most of all, we need to **draw on the best of the human spirit**, in ourselves, and in others. We need to create the space for each other to be the best that we can be. For South Africans, our transition from apartheid to democracy was one the most difficult things any of us had ever done in our lives—and it was also the most joyful and liberating. The day I stood at the voting booth to vote for the first democratic government of South Africa, I cried, and many of my South African compatriots cried too. For the first time in our lives, we were voting for a common future. It takes our hearts and minds, our tears and joys, and a deep commitment to the human spirit in each of us to make a world that belongs to all of us, that we will all value so much that we will ensure it is not destroyed by recurring violent conflict.

Each of us has responsibility to do this. Each of us can do it. Each of us has means in us to contribute in some way, however small, to making and keeping a world that is safe for all people, and safe for difference. That is how we can stop violent conflict from recurring.

7

Mental Health in the Region of Conflict and its Prevention

Etsuko Kita

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Japanese Red Cross Kyushu International College of Nursing

In the late 1980s, I worked at the UNICEF Afghan Programme Office, which was newly established in Peshawar, Pakistan, to support 3.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In the region, I saw many boys who were born as refugees and grew up in the environment where weapons and armed conducts spread, and took up arms, either joining their father or elder brother, or in place of fellow tribes men killed in conflict. There were a large number of graves of fallen soldiers around the refugee camp, and I saw a lot of men who had lost one or more limbs among the people in and around the refugee camps. Such scenes should not be a reason for them to reject joining in the fight; rather, taking up weapons seems to be necessary and honorable for their mother and family as well as themselves.

My job, in collaboration with other UN agencies and NGOs, was to promote the Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) in the refugee camps in Pakistan and within Afghanistan, their home country, which was initiated and managed by UNICEF.

The result of EPI was fair and in fact successful in protecting children from catching infectious diseases and dying of them. There were, however, cases in which whole villages where the EPI was going on were destroyed in armed assaults. I was irritated that it was impossible to prevent not only childrens' deaths, but the involvement of surviving boys in killing others.

As a matter of fact, Taliban, an Islamic students' armed group, controls most areas of Afghanistan and, in adherence to extreme fundamentalism,

restricts women's schooling, employment and other basic freedoms. It is very likely that some of the Taliban soldiers are the boys who got vaccinations in the EPI around 1990.

It is not children's fault that they were born and obliged to grow up in such a violent environment of sustained conflict, and that they are continuously exposed to destructive acts. But who should be responsible for providing them with a better environment? Who can assure them of future hope and a stable life?

Mental illnesses in developing countries have been well researched and tackled from an anthropological perspective. With regard to the psychiatric problems of individual victims of natural or man-made disasters like war and internal conflict, a great deal of research on and measures against them, as part of humanitarian aid, have been seen. Issues of child soldiers and children separated from their family have also been actively tackled in some countries and areas in or after conflict. However, there are few studies on and measures against effects of conflict in developing countries on the local communities, i.e., a group as a whole.

It is said that where conflict occurs over and over, there is a culture of revenge. It is thought that hatred and antagonism remain over generations. It seems a plausible argument that they are due to ethnic or religious differences, but is this true?

What leads "ordinary people" into indiscriminate killing in a group, raping of women who have been their close neighbors and elimination of the whole ethnic group concerned?

Why do they think that they cannot ensure their security unless they get other ethnic groups eradicated?

Why do the two sides that are both poor keep destroying the limited infrastructure of each other?

And why does hatred remain over generations?

Apart from direct and visible physical destruction of health facilities, and the excessive death toll, or wounded and crippled, it appears that little systemic research on the serious indirect and long-term psychological impacts of conflict on mental health has been done, and that few measures against them have been taken.

An African professor emeritus of pediatrics said to me that conflict and social devastation in Africa were like a "chicken and egg" problem. He said

the “primitive” society was not culturally inferior, but African countries have considered their indigenous cultures something to be abolished and inferior, and have tried to adopt Western-style systems since the independence of many countries, starting in the 1960s. He also said that the initial cause of conflict is trivial, although it can sometimes become a matter of life and death. For example, scrambles for watering places for livestock and thefts of livestock—some of which turned out to be nothing but livestock’s capricious wandering—have been among the causes of disputes. Then, such disputes were settled in a traditional system in which a senior in the group plays an intermediary role between the two sides.

Because new political, economic and other foreign systems that were taken in Africa after independence are still foreign, and furthermore, the traditional system of mediation has been abolished, conflicts are occurring in many places. To make matters worse, large-scale interventions by the international community, whether for “development” or “emergency aid,” keep the “primitive” society in a state of confusion. Disputes involving politics and the economic concerns of the outside world resulted in the spread of regional conflicts. The consequences are that families and communities have collapsed and that people have lost their identity. They have come to live for the moment increasingly and become more and more desperate.

Does moral decay trigger conflict? Or vice versa? Whichever is correct, the society is devastated in this vicious circle, according to the professor emeritus of pediatrics.

In fact, in and around the disputed areas of countries comprising the Great Lakes Region (GLR), there are many people who say that everything is not like the way it used to be. It is true that physical health has been improved due to the epoch-making primary health care (PHC) programs in which all inhabitants participate for the purpose of sustaining and improving their own health. However, I have strong impressions that conflict nearby involving inhabitants destroys community solidarity and families, and that local communities are getting devastated while losing something that humanitarian aid cannot restore.

There is an obvious limit on outside interventions in conflict, particularly in regional conflict. Outside interventions in the form of large-scale emergency aid are of life-saving nature and have no choice but to focus on physical health and protection. In a corner of a region in conflict, I strongly felt that what

people are losing sight of—what has to be supplemented in combination with short-term humanitarian aid and long-term development co-operation, and what is needed to truly stabilize conflict-affected regions—is “nutrition for the mind of those affected by conflict.” It can be considered moral support from international society.

Having done field research on health conditions in African countries, in particular GLR such as the People’s Republic of the Congo (the former Republic of Zaire) for months at the turn of the century, I now would like to state future perspectives upon reflection of the field research.

Professor Meredith Turshan, studying developing countries, especially gender and development in Africa, says in her book, *What Women Do in Wartime*, that the increases in the number of conflicts over 30 years, whatever the form is, have led to militarization everywhere and turned Africa into unprecedentedly devastated societies such as Chad and Sudan. Those who have military power control society. Those who beat them also do it with arms. We are witnessing the birth of society where soldiers, that is, those who handle weapons, are superior to religions leaders, educational or health specialists, and even to seniors and leaders who have traditionally controlled regions.

Dr. Carl Taylor, professor emeritus of Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health, says that traumas incurred during childhood can become not only a cause of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but a remote cause of the future persecution of children, who are weaker than them, by those who have a childhood trauma, when they get involved in war or cruel incidents. He also points out, from his 50 years of experience with health activities in developing countries, that although physical pains directly inflicted by rape, severance of limbs, etc., are an important cause of trauma, it is not the only cause. He says that children can lose their identity due to the collapse of family and/or society and separation from them, and that they might grow up without the development of personality and personhood that would be facilitated only in a stable and safe environment.

However, Dr. Taylor mentions that children have great recovery power and it is possible to effect recovery through counseling and appropriate support despite the seriousness of short-term direct effects and long-term indirect effects of mental traumas. In other words, he says that even if children have had a mental trauma caused by a disaster, they can recover and grow up in a normal manner if the problems are found and treated at an early stage, just like external

wounds such as fractures and injuries are treated, or food, water and vaccinations are supplied.

He concludes that the root of repeated ethnic and religious conflict lies in children's traumas that have not been treated, and that, since tackling the issue is not an easy task, it is very important to achieve peace.

I would like to introduce two regional experiments for healing children's traumas, which I got to know about during the field research. Both are conducted by regional offices of UNICEF where Dr. Taylor was long involved. An experiment as part of regional health activities was about to be launched at the Southern Sudan office, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya. Despite being in the middle of decades-long conflicts and droughts, the project aimed to increase as many contacts with regional inhabitants as possible through small-scale school-based counseling which fits in with health activities, such as EPI in small areas.

Another experiment is in Uganda, where regional conflict has been lasting, though not large in scale.

According to the Northern Uganda Psycho-Social Needs Assessment Report (NUPSNA), for more than 10 years in Northern Uganda, a lot of inhabitants have had no choice but to escape from their original place of residence. Kidnappings of thousands of children, destruction of residences, schools, health centers and other infrastructure, and regional conflict incurring deaths and wounds have been happening. The report tells us that these conflicts have been being embedded in residents' society and people have lived with fear. When they encountered trouble, they got together, discussed and found a solution, but such a traditional system does not exist any more. The stable environment that is appropriate to bring up children has been disappearing, and some children witness brutal acts and sometimes have to attack neighbors. The preface of the report, written by the minister of gender, labor, and social development, says that society is sick, but children will elastically recover if they have appropriate supports.

These pilot studies are quite unique in that they assess the conditions of the societies from the perspective of community psychological health and further, try to intervene, depending on their analysis.

Interviews have been done in the five disputed areas, firstly with individuals who are likely to be potential sources of information of the area, then with groups who are familiar with the conditions of conflict, totaling 205 people

from 86 groups.

People in these areas have been always under stress from the danger in their lives, and it is far from peaceful. They can never get rid of anxieties that something bad may happen and are suspicious of everything from excessive worries and fears, and thus cannot help but live with bad memories. Some people have mental confusion and cannot concentrate on their daily work. Since many people are not protected from long-lasting conflict and are thrown into the deep end, they are in a condition of depression. Also there are people who kill themselves because of a feeling of helplessness. They have lost confidence and self-esteem, and are pessimistic about their future, and think that war will last forever.

People in disputed areas cannot become self-reliant and need external aid, including that from international society, but normal social institutions cannot be maintained for security reasons. Childcare is neglected. Solidarity among family and relatives breaks down and family discipline disappears. Education is discontinued. Marriages and family life are breaking down. As a result, people's dependence on alcohol increases. Also, apart from rapes as one way of attacking in conflict, there are attacks against females of the same ethnic group by ordinary residents and soldiers in the areas where they used to be safe. Sexual misconduct is increasing, and not only HIV and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), but also unexpected pregnancies and births are on the rise. Increases in the number of abandoned children and street children make the social order worse.

Health services and education in these areas become unsatisfactory in their functions not only because infrastructure like buildings, facilities and equipment become physically and functionally unavailable, but because exchanges of people as well as communications, traffic and transportation become unstable. Staff morale tends to become lower due to social uneasiness and job instability. Accordingly, superficial support or material assistance is far from the real solution.

In this project, the research has been conducted since 1998. The representative of Uganda at UNICEF strongly agreed on the necessity of aid for "nutrition for the mind or moral support" in disputed areas, as I have proposed. It also emphasized that restructuring of society based on cultures and traditions was necessary in disputed areas, and accordingly, that it was important to intervene in psychological and mental health in the whole societies

in the conflict region. However, it pointed out logistical difficulties. The first involves technical problems, such as what kind of indicators should be introduced to assess the impact of intervention, and whether it is possible to standardize them. The second is, despite having interests in aid for PHC-related projects, which can be assessed easily according to standardized procedures and understood, for PTSD or mental and psychological issues, not many experts have been involved and few donors may understand the importance of psychological and mental health, which is a vague subject. Hence it is difficult to expect financial support. By the way, this research has been supported by supplementary financing to UNICEF Uganda from Belgium, Canada, and Sweden.

It is obvious that the most vulnerable in the complex humanitarian emergencies (CHE) are poorer and/or minorities of poor developing countries but, definitely, CHE pervades the whole society. Like endemic diseases, which are seemingly ongoing, it is as if it were part of “ordinary daily life.” Some point out that people’s daily decision-making processes are unconsciously influenced by CHE. Dr. Joshi, who has studied cases of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, says that the most desperate and helpless are young people.

Whether governmental or NGOs, front-line organizations involved in humanitarian aid have made their greatest efforts regarding the very basics like food, water, shelter, and health care. They have also paid attention to mental and psychological health of victims. However, as Dr. Ayalon, who has long dealt with mental problems of children says, in the Middle East, where there have been a lot of terrorism and conflicts, all factors related to people’s life—not only at the individual level but also the community level like family and society, ethnic group, cultures, and religions—have to be appropriately dealt with in order to ease people whose minds are wounded by war and domestic conflict. Nevertheless, mental health problems of regional community groups have not received sufficient attention.

My experience in disputed areas is still limited, but last of all, I would like to mention my own haunting memories of war and traumas caused by assaults, and recovery processes. Takarazuka, my hometown, which is located between Osaka and Kobe, was in 1945 a small mountain village. I was before the age of going to kindergarten, and in my memories at that time there was no day when the air-raid alarm did not sound. My father was in the army. One night, I was frightened at the ground shaking from aerial bombardment in the air-raid shelter

into which I had run with my grandparents, mother, and elder sister. Although more than a half century has passed since then, I still cannot forget that the grass near the air-raid shelter moved like creeping on the ground, every time the ground rumbled, against a background of a sky with flaring red and black colors. Hunger and an indescribable sense of urgency lasted only a short period, but were memories that would not disappear.

However, as a result of the lost war, I got to know American music like Glen Miller, and motion pictures like Disney, and delicious chocolates and mayonnaise. Vaccinations, health projects pest extermination, and more important policies must have been implemented. But what I remembered, as a small girl who was at the age of starting elementary school, is delicious foreign food for physical nutrition and beautiful and comfortable music or movies; I believe that they helped in healing my trauma and in providing nutrition for the mind.

8

Governance Capacity-building for Prevention of Internal Conflict

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The frequency of inter-state warfare has been declining for some time, and since the end of the Cold War, most conflicts and wars have been internal. It has been stated that such internal conflicts have claimed more than five million lives, and that the majority of these conflicts have broken out in developing countries.¹ In this paper, I would like to analyze the measures and activities of the United Nations, in particular those of UNDP in order to assist developing countries in the area of governance. First of all, I will examine the root causes of conflict and their manifestations, and the significance of establishing sound governance in order to prevent conflicts in four areas relevant to those root causes. Secondly, I will look closely at the activities of UNDP in the area of governance and conflict prevention. In addition, I will introduce the experience gained by UNDP in the following areas: achieving political reconciliation; support for holding of elections; strengthening of the legislative system and legislatures; enhancing the judiciary and the civil police; improving the effectiveness of macroeconomic management; governance at the local level, public administration; and human rights. Lastly, I would like to examine the views of the UN concerning the significance of establishment of sound political systems for conflict prevention, as well as the activities of the UN in relevant areas.

¹ Kofi A. Annan, *'We the Peoples' The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, (United Nations, 2000), p.43-45.

A. The Root Causes of Conflict

Based on the idea that an understanding of the root causes of conflicts is necessary in order to prevent conflicts effectively, UNDP has undertaken various research analyses on the situations from which conflicts emerge. The following four factors may be identified as triggering conflicts:

1. Struggles for power among ethnic / tribal groups and individuals;
2. Competition for resources acquisition;
3. Economic and social exploitation;
4. Widening inequity and inequality accompanied by growing divide among difficult ethnic, religious, cultural and social groups.

The following may be listed as more specific examples of the above four factors:

1. Political vacuum following a dictator's death and concomitant collapse of legal order, along with an increase in crimes;
2. A situation in which leaders or groups exaggerate the differences among beliefs, religion, and culture, and agitate confrontation among ethnic and tribal groups;
3. Rapid and marked changes in macroeconomic conditions that lead to depression or marked increases in income disparities, forcing a part of the population into a hopeless situation by further excluding them from access to opportunities;
4. Mismanagement and corruption in government institutions leading to a breakdown in confidence in public institutions;
5. Reform of the public sector, such as structural adjustment programmes which pay little attention to its negative impact on the parameters of human development, depriving some populations from a minimum decent standard of life;
6. Emergence of groups receiving support from overseas and standing up against suppression of free expression, association and dissent;
7. Narrow State revenue bases and paralysis of tax enforcement and accounting functions, resulting in the breakdown of the State financial system and of government services including maintenance of law and

- order; and
8. Marked environmental degradation, endangering the assurance of the minimum decent standard of life and the security of human beings.²

In order to address the above root causes of conflict, it is indispensable to establish good governance in the following four areas.

(a) Establishing Governance to Address the Structural Causes of Conflict

As the UN Secretary-General proposes, “preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective. One of the principal aims of preventive action should be to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts.” He also points out that “an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term measures.”³ According to UNDP, this would require support to democratic governance institutions and strengthening of the rule of law.⁴

There is a general assumption in some that democratic governance is the single most appropriate cornerstone upon which to build a system of conflict prevention or resolution. At the core of the assumption is that under a democratic system, conflicts in a society are allowed to formulate, find expression and to be managed in a sustainable way, via institutional outlets such as political parties and representative parliaments, rather than being suppressed or ignored. It could be said that the above assumption is particularly relevant in the context of prevention of structural and deep-rooted conflicts. A system by which the root causes of conflict, such as accumulated resentments that arise from perceived misallocation of resources, be it land ownership rights or rights to mineral resources, discrimination on the basis of gender, religion or race, can be aired and reconciled is necessary in order to prevent such deeply felt grievances from leading to conflict. It is thought that democracy is the most appropriate system to achieve this objective.

² Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Governance Foundations for Post-Conflict Situations: UNDP's Experience*, (2000), pp.20-22.

³ *Prevention of armed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. A/55/985 - S/2001/574, 7 June 2001, pp.35-37.

⁴ *Role of UNDP in Crisis and Post-conflict Situations*, DP/2001/4, 27 November 2000, p.18.

Recent research work on the relationship between governance and conflict prevention demonstrates that there are various power sharing and institutional options available. One example of power sharing is the “consociational” approach. Under this system, elites co-operate after elections to form multi-ethnic coalitions and manage conflicts. Groups are autonomous, and minorities are protected under this system. Another approach is the “integrative” approach, under which parties are encouraged to create coalitions before elections, creating broadly inclusive but majoritarian governments. Research has been undertaken on the pros and cons of various options of constituting an executive government. Such research demonstrate that in the final analysis appropriate choice is dependent upon the characteristics, peoples, history and desires available in those engaged in the conflict resolution / prevention process.⁵

However, in a majoritarian democracy, government is formed and run by the majority, and there is a danger that many minorities in plural societies may be permanently excluded, discriminated against or marginalized, since this would not affect the electoral prospects of majority-based political parties. For example, Rwanda, where I served as UN Resident Coordinator from January 1995 to June 1996, is a country where the domination of the majority resulted in tragic ethnic conflicts and genocide in 1994. In Rwanda, after World War II, democracy was established under which the Hutu population took hold of absolute power, allowing the oppression and even genocide of the Tutsi minority. Therefore, democracy must be inclusive in order to secure human rights of all human beings. Inclusive democracy is “built on the principle that political power is dispersed and shared in a variety of ways—to protect minorities and to ensure participation and free speech for all citizens. Inclusive democracy emphasizes the quality of representation by striving for consensus and inclusion, not the brute electoral force of the majority.”⁶

(b) Importance of Addressing Power Inequalities and Asymmetries

As with deep-rooted conflict, the governance options for addressing power inequalities and asymmetries differ depending on situations. The reason is that “in so many respects deeply-held grievances that result in deep-rooted conflict are often the result of structural power imbalances. They are asymmetries that

⁵ UNDP, *Promoting Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution through Effective Governance: A Conceptual Survey and Literature Review: An Interim Report*, pp.63-67.

⁶ UNDP, *Human Development Report 2000*, pp.56-57. See also pp.58-72.

are built into systems that usurp and dominate the rights and access of the “unequal”. In addressing such a situation of power inequality, it is necessary first to recognize the existence of the problem itself. On that basis, it may be necessary to establish focal points within institutions that can keep injustices on the agenda, and to consider what sort of government system will be responsive to such special pleadings.⁷

(c) Governance as a Comprehensive Solution to Prevent and Resolve Ethnic Conflicts

Perhaps the most important difference between groups that are disempowered or hold deep grievances and ethnic groupings, is that the latter for the most part seek to break away from the state or at least the form of state governance to which that ethnic group is tied. Unless governance structures listen to and can reconcile “the drive towards ethnic-national self-determination,” the ultimate objective of ethnic groups in conflict is to change the basis of their relations with the state or states.

Such ethnic determination poses complex issues for governments and governance structures. Even if the demands of the ethnic minorities are extremely radical, governments may be in danger of losing their legitimacy and being criticized by the international community if they simply ignore them. Thus, the importance of reconciling differing interests of ethnic groups through governance has been stressed, and research has been undertaken on specific areas related to this issue, such as ways to meet the demands of ethnic groupings through public policy initiatives, accede to certain kinds of territorial arrangements or alter constitutional structures in ways that will satisfy the self-identity objectives of the ethnic grouping. One example is the proposal to set up new institutions and procedures to which all groups can subscribe, such as ensuring that an all-encompassing human rights agenda is established with institutional force to promote compliance.⁸

(d) Multicentrism and Diversification in States and Civil Society

In a society in which globalization is proceeding very rapidly, there is very little certainty about the consequence of major transformations upon the global system and their impact upon present state systems and structures. Such

⁷ UNDP, *supra*.n.5, pp.67-68.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.68-69.

transformations may also have substantial impact on the nature and intensity of conflicts. Besides, many states, both developed and developing countries are going through regional integration and formation of alliances among them. In contrast to such regional integration, however, self-assertion by ethnic and religious groups and social and cultural diversification are becoming more prevalent. In some cases, illiberal processes of political exclusion are emerging.⁹ Under such circumstances, a democratic system to ensure human rights and freedom is expected to reconcile varying interests in a society heading simultaneously in two different directions: uniformity and diversification.

B. Governance and Conflict Prevention: UNDP's Experience

1. Overview

Since the beginning of the 1990s, UNDP has carried out various programmes in post-conflict countries. UNDP has developed a standard hierarchy of governance objectives that can be developed for countries emerging from armed conflict. In this process, steps are to be taken in the following order: (1)Political reconciliation; (2)Re-creation of the institutions of sound governance; (3)Stability, law and order; (4)Enabling environment for investment, economic growth; and (5)Sustainable human development.¹⁰

Governance programmes undertaken by UNDP in post-conflict countries have the objective of restoring political and social stability, and to create an environment enabling economic recovery and sustainable human development. The importance of strengthening governance institutions has been stressed, in particular in areas such as prevention and management of structural / systematic crises and recovery from such crises. UNDP's strategy in post-conflict countries is highly country-specific and depends considerably on the assessment of needs and strategic planning of the UNDP country office itself. However, in instances where governance has played an important part, there has been a certain degree of commonality in the areas of focus, even if the approaches and strategies have varied considerably. In countries emerging from conflict, governance programmes are frequently complicated by the following factors:

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.70-71.

¹⁰ UNDP, *supra*.n.2, p.27.

- The absence of a universally (either nationally or internationally) recognised government;
- The absence of a single governmental authority with unitary control over the entire geographic territory of the country in question;
- The need to preserve a level playing field in the run-up to democratic elections;
- Extreme lack of governmental capacity;
- The paucity of the national revenue base and the dominance of civil service salaries (the wage bill) in national budgets;
- The low level of civil service salaries and the absence of performance incentives for public sector personnel; and
- The high degree of politicisation of all aspects of decision-making due to the need to ensure preservation of an existing balance.¹¹

UNDP interventions in support of the reintegration of war-affected populations fall into three main categories:

- a. Economic and social assistance for the recovery of war-affected communities, popularly known as “area-based programmes”;
- b. Reintegration support for specific target groups, for example demobilized combatants, IDPs and returnees; and
- c. Capacity-building and strengthening institutions in the peace-building and recovery process.¹²

Examples of initiatives taken under the third category include support to election commissions, legislative bodies, the judiciary, municipal and local administrative structures, public safety and mine action centres.¹³

2. UNDP Activities in Specific Areas

In this section, I will introduce the lessons UNDP has learned from its experiences in several specific areas of governance.

¹¹ UNDP, *supra*.n.2, p.25-27.

¹² Evaluation Office, UNDP, *Sharing New Ground in Post-Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Reintegration Programmes*, (New York, UNDP, 2000), p.9.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.15-16. See pp. 15-16 for details on specific projects.

Political Reconciliation

UNDP has rarely overtly involved itself in the reconciliation process. One of the principal reasons stated for this is that involvement in the political negotiation process is likely to compromise UNDP's particularly close relationship with the government concerned. However, studies indicate that UNDP support can be useful in facilitating parties towards accommodation by creating or sponsoring a forum for discussion. Nevertheless, it has been advised that UNDP should act within a wider political support framework rather than acting alone.

Election Support

Elections are viewed as a means of legitimising a government on the grounds that it represents the view of the people expressed democratically and with the participation of all communities. In practice, however, the degree of legitimacy conferred depends on the structure of the elections, and on the type of representation required. In addition, there is no guarantee that a democratically elected government will adhere to democratic principles once it is established. In a post-conflict situation, it may happen that the government concerned takes advantage of the political vacuum and establish an autocratic regime based on the temporary support of the people. In sum, the holding of elections is a necessary entry point for the establishment of democracy, but it is not a goal in itself. Elections should not be heralded as the end of the transition, but rather as an entry-point for shifting focus and support to developing the capacity of governing institutions.

UNDP's experience reveals that pressure to hold elections before basic institutions are established can harm the credibility of the elections, and can delay the establishment of the fundamental institutional foundations necessary for recovery and stability. Although holding elections at an early stage to legitimise new democratic power structures is of crucial importance, some minimal institutional capabilities need to be put in place before one can expect the elections to be conducted properly.

Legislative Systems and Legislature

Substantive constitutional issues lie at the core of the process of reconciliation, usually needing reintroduction or revision to ensure separation of powers, accountability, equitable distribution of representation, protection

of minority rights, manageable parliamentary procedures and transparency, and progressive legislative and policy review. The structure and management of parliamentary systems are crucial factors in the process of peace-building as they involve the distribution of political power. UNDP projects so far have mainly concentrated on the strengthening of administrative and management systems associated with running legislatures rather than focussing on the core of the political issues associated with the role, structure, and functions of parliament. Thus, it has been proposed that UNDP should not miss opportunities to influence the substance of political development. In addition, a special emphasis should be placed on civil society access and participation in decision-making processes.

Judiciary and Civil Police

In extreme conflict situations, the legal infrastructure and police often become targets of destruction by the people as they are seen to represent the current regime and those in power. Therefore, in post-conflict situations, it is essential to establish a fair judiciary which is trusted by the people.

UNDP has been involved in this area in various ways. However, it has been pointed out that UNDP's approach to strengthening the judiciary has been diverse and sometimes piecemeal. Due to the absence of even minimally trained lawyers in countries such as Rwanda, there was an urgent need for UNDP to provide assistance for training lawyers. Thus, more effort needs to be made in the training of lawyers in post-conflict countries. In designing related programmes, it is necessary to give due consideration to the promotion of the independence and accountability of the judiciary.

With regard to the police forces, it has been observed that UNDP has been hesitant to enter into police capacity-building programmes for fear that such assistance might merely strengthen the repressive capabilities of the police force and undermine the long-term credibility of UNDP. In this regard, it is therefore essential that programmes geared to development of the police force not only concentrate on the normal areas of police training such as criminal investigation, traffic control and accident investigation, but also on human rights, prison management.¹⁴

¹⁴ UNDP, *supra*.n.2, pp.28-48.

Macroeconomic Management

Economic stability is a crucial factor in securing long-term political stability and preparing a country for democratic elections and the formation of a legitimate government. Prospects for peace often result in a rapid influx of cash and large numbers of people into the country. This may lead to further distortions of the local economy, if the economy is not managed effectively. Thus, immediate measures must be taken to provide assistance to countries to secure economic foundations of transition. In this regard, UNDP must be more rapidly engaged, and cannot wait for the Bretton Woods institutions to take action.

Studies indicate that economic rehabilitation requires a coherent macroeconomic framework for peace and recovery, possibly including budgetary support, rehabilitation of financial institutions, restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks, creation of enabling conditions for savings and foreign investment, debt relief, and return of expatriate / émigré expertise.

Reintegration and Governance at Local Levels

Creation of capacity within community based institutions to manage incoming assistance, the inclusion of new target groups in decision-making processes and the participatory selection of sub-project activities, all contribute to maximising local ownership and commitment, increasing effectiveness and ensuring the sustainability of project results. In order to deal comprehensively with such needs, UNDP has promoted Area Development Schemes, and national and local Mine Action Programmes. Area Development Schemes tend to be most successful when they focus at the outset on the creation of conditions that enable people to return and resume the management of their own communities and their development.

In this regard, the issue of land ownership is one that is of great importance in the reintegration and reconciliation process, and support for the legal resolution of disputes and the apportionment of land often forms an important part of the work of area development. However, government capacity to ensure agrarian reform and the fair and equitable distribution of land is however often weak or non-existent. Therefore, it is necessary to support capacity building of the government in this area. Reintegration assistance must be designed based on a long-term perspective but also be started early enough to cover the

resettlement and reintegration needs of returnee refugees, internally displaced persons, and demobilised ex-combatants.

Demobilization can be hampered due to a number of complex factors, such as: the absence of political commitment to reconciliation; breakdown in trust; continuing foreign interference; lack of an independent monitoring institution; failure in the extension of state administration to opposition areas; poor training of decentralized staff; and criminal interests and profits from illicit trading. Hence there is a need for comprehensive approaches, but also adequate resourcing through early funding and expertise needed to sustain a positive momentum in peace implementation.

Public Administration Reform

Public sector reform is an issue of central importance to the process of stabilisation and peace-building. In order to overcome political resistance and to drive forward the process of public administration reform, UNDP has often supported the creation of Public Service Reform Commissions in the most sensitive reaches of government.

As institutional foundations of crisis countries, already weak before, deteriorate further during crisis, there is a need to assist their recovery. In addition, decentralisation should be undertaken in tandem with revitalisation of the centre, otherwise centrifugal forces can rip the fabric of society asunder again. Decentralisation, local governance and support to civil society organisations can empower people and local organisations so that they can claim and exercise their rights, and make decisions in an equitable and efficient manner. Therefore, decentralisation will result in the empowerment of previously excluded groups. On the other hand, the centrifugal forces in post-conflict situations can result in breakdown of the fabric of government if the centre is not sufficiently revitalised and consolidated. However, this must be done in a way which allows it to be sensitive to the concerns of peripheral areas. Thus, the negotiation process for post-conflict recovery often requires reconfiguration of centre-periphery relations.

Human Rights

Human rights play an important role in the outcome of the reconciliation and recovery process. Difficult issues concerning the accountability of individuals and groups who have committed human rights violations in the

past emerge in the aftermath of conflict. The way in dealing with these issues is often at the very core of the peace process. Restoration of the rule of law and respect for human rights must have absolute priority in such situations.

Human rights must be understood as the spectrum of political, civil, social, cultural and economic rights. In addition, human rights must not become just one other compartmentalised aspect of recovery, but must be infused throughout all activities, “mainstreamed” in all recovery and development programmes. Considerable effort must be invested in promoting human rights education and training towards key actors in post-conflict situations.¹⁵

Role of the Media

Transparency of government and freedom of information, as well as access by citizens to information concerning politics and domestic conditions to enable their active participation in decision-making processes are important preconditions for the sound functioning of democracy. To achieve this objective, ensuring the freedom of the press is indispensable. It often occurs that in countries where armed conflicts have broken out, the media is controlled by the government. Consequently, programmes contrary to governmental views are suppressed, and the media is used as a tool of agitation and instigation, resulting in the aggravation of relations among opposing groups. In this regard, developing independent media is of crucial importance.

UNDP has conducted a project in the Philippines to strengthen media capacity with the aim of securing accountability and transparency in the Government. Initiatives in this project include provision of information concerning participation in governance and decision-making, and training of “investigative reporting”.¹⁶ UNDP has also undertaken projects to support the development of independent media in Kosovo.

C. The Importance of a Sound Political System for Conflict Prevention

In order to realize conflict prevention, it is important to prevent the confrontation among ethnic groups and to ensure the fair distribution of resources, the protection of basic human rights, and the establishment of a

¹⁵ UNDP, *supra*. n.2, pp.28-73.

¹⁶ <http://www.undp.org.ph/portfolios/Enabling%20Environment/Investigative%20Reporting.asp>

democratic government in order to guarantee a minimum standard of living. It is also crucial that leaders have the political ability to manage the country fairly and effectively. The existence of a strong leader who can protect the interest of the country and all citizens is necessary in order to develop stable government institutions, improve governance, and to prevent conflicts.

Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, stresses the importance of the establishment of a democratic regime, respect for human rights, and the protection of the rights of minorities. He states in his report that “every step taken towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth – is a step towards conflict prevention”, and “[i]n many poor countries at war, the condition of poverty is coupled with sharp ethnic or religious cleavages”, and that “the rights of subordinate groups are insufficiently respected, the institutions of government are insufficiently inclusive and the allocation of society’s resources favours the dominant faction over others. Therefore, solutions for long-term conflict prevention must include promotion of human rights, protection of minority rights, and instituting political arrangements in which all groups are represented.”¹⁷ Protection of the political and economic interests of various ethnic and tribal groups not only by the central government but also in local contexts are indispensable to resolve conflicts and to maintain stability in the region. For example, the importance which cooperation among the central and local governmental institutions, NGOs and other civil society organisations had in Ghana in designing and implementing policies which would benefit all citizens is demonstrated in the study undertaken by Oxfam.¹⁸

In the Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly, the determination to “give full support to the political and institutional structures of emerging democracies in Africa,” and to “encourage and sustain regional and subregional mechanisms for preventing conflict and promoting political stability.”¹⁹

The UN has developed new approaches to post-conflict peace-building and is placing new emphasis on conflict prevention. The objective of today’s peace operations is “to assist the parties engaged in conflict to pursue their interests through political channels.” “To that end, the United Nations helps to create and strengthen political institutions and to broaden their base.”²⁰

¹⁷ Annan, *supra*.n.1, p.45.

¹⁸ Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor, *Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation, and Civil Society in Northern Ghana*, (Oxfam, 1999), pp.47-50.

¹⁹ United Nations Millennium Declaration, UN Document A/RES/55/2, (18 September 2000), para.28.

According to the “Agenda for Development”, rapid provision of humanitarian assistance by the international community is imperative. “However, this form of assistance must be planned with a view to an equally rapid transition to rehabilitation and reconstruction and be part of the continuum concept which aims at resuming development at the earliest opportunity.” “In virtually all post-emergency situations, resettlement of refugees, displaced persons and other disaster victims as well as the restoration of physical infrastructure are some of the major conditions for recovery. In cases of post-conflict peace-building situations, programmes such as demining, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as confidence-building and reconciliation measures are essential for moving forward in the continuum toward development. Equally important are restoring public institutions, police and judicial systems, and resuming economic and social development in preventing possible resurgence of conflict situations.”²¹

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary-General, also asserts that “democracy is an ingredient for both sustainable development and lasting peace.”²² He states that “[m]any internal conflicts stem from the belief, justified or not, that the State does not represent all groups in society or that it seeks to impose an exclusive ideology.” However, as democratic Governments are freely chosen by their citizens and held accountable through periodic and genuine elections and other mechanisms, they are more likely to promote and respect the rule of law, respect individual and minority rights, cope effectively with social conflict, absorb migrant populations and respond to the needs of marginalized groups.” Therefore, the culture of democracy is closely connected with the culture of peace, and lasting peace is built on the foundation of internal democracy.²³ On this basis, recent UN peace-keeping activities have put much effort in the “drafting of constitutions, create independent systems for the administration of justice, provide police forces that respect and enforce the rule of law, depoliticize military establishments and establish national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights.”²⁴

It is also emphasized in the “Human Development Report 2000” of UNDP that the underdevelopment of democracy and the failure to integrate minorities

²⁰ Annan, *supra*.n.1, p.48.

²¹ *Agenda for Development*, (United Nations, New York, 1997), paras. 159-161.

²² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda for Democratization*, (United Nations, New York, 1996), para.21.

²³ *Ibid.*, paras.17, 64.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, paras.5, 46.

may lead to conflict. Giving the examples of Yugoslavia and Sri Lanka, it is stated that “despite reasonable progress in income, the failure to integrate minorities can lead to violations of human rights and to war. The spirit of democracy has to be inclusive, embracing the principle that power must be dispersed and shared. The multiple layers of people’s identity and loyalty – to their ethnic group, their religion, their region and their state – have to be recognized and given fair play in democratic institutions – or explode into conflict”. Hence, the importance of ensuring horizontal equality and promoting the institutional framework and value of inclusive democracy in order to prevent violence and internal conflict is stressed.²⁵

²⁵ UNDP, *supra*.n.6, p,60-61, 63.

9

Comments and Discussion

Comments

Nobuhiko Suto

Member of House of Representative

I would like to submit my comments from the point of view of a researcher and a NGO member who has been dealing with conflict prevention since ten years ago, and also more recently as a parliamentarian.

Conflict prevention is not an easy issue. When I think of conflict prevention I feel as if I am watching a black hole.

In Rwanda, for example, after the genocide which erupted on 6 April 1994, the NGO I was involved in (ARC—the Africa Reconciliation Committee) has been making efforts for the reconciliation of the Tuti and Hutu. It was a success as a NGO activity, but I feel that our activity was in a sense meaningless when I think of the following two facts. First, Rwanda, which was the victim at that time, is now attacking Congo. Rwanda thus became a “hegemonic” state, despite a large population that we should still help after all.

The second discouraging fact is that while Rwanda is recovering from the massacre, becoming a “normal poor African country,” and its economic reconstruction has begun, so has the revenge. Immediately after the massacre, national reconciliation had taken place, but now the serious feeling of revenge against those who have killed family member or relatives is spreading.

Why does conflict prevention not work? There are three reasons.

1. Due to the large accumulated negative assets and stocks causing conflicts, the energy for conflict is gigantic, whereas the energy, knowledge, technology and funds for conflict prevention are extremely small. The

defense budget, as an example of the energy for causing conflicts, is 1% (on the order of a few trillion yen) of the Japanese GNP. On the contrary, the amount of money spent for NGOs working for peace in Asia is incomparably small. In a number of countries, the energy for conflict is reaching the level of 30 to 40% of GNP, but the energy for peacebuilding and conflict prevention constitutes only about 0.00004% of those same countries' GNP. Preventing conflict is impossible under these circumstances.

2. Negative assets provoking conflict include the following: the Great Navigation Era leading to the "Geographical Discoveries"; slave exploitation of Africa; the massive inflow of industrial products to Africa after the Industrial Revolution (most of the small weapons spread in Africa were made in developed countries, such as guns used during World War I and II); communism and socialism (neither of these was made in Africa, they emerged through the negative outcomes of the Industrial Revolution).

Conflicts are occurring on the basis of accumulation of these enormous negative assets. This process cannot be easily stopped; this is the reality. In the case of Rwanda attacking Congo, the border between the two countries has been arbitrarily drawn by West European countries seeking resources, in the large area where the Tuti population (called Banyarwanda) was living. As the result, the original inhabitants had to live separately in Rwanda, Burundi, Congo and Uganda. Therefore there is nothing that can prevent the Tuti population from attacking for the establishment of their own country.

How seriously, then, had the international society addressed conflict prevention? I visited Israel and Palestine in February 2001, just before the Israeli election. The water level of Lake Galilee, where Jesus preached and gave bread to everyone, has been lowered by 5 meters. This was caused by the increase of area occupied by the Israeli settlers, who use underground water in higher elevations by pump irrigation. The Palestinians, living in lower-lying lands and using wells, are having less and less available water; even drinking water is lacking. It is difficult to prevent conflict in such a situation. Then, did the international society try to prevent the increase of Israeli settlers? In reality, the answer is no.

Viewed in this way, we are obliged to understand that no one is doing anything to adequately manage natural resources and prevent conflict.

3. We tend to think that “conflict is bad,” but it is necessary to see the background of the conflicts. There are people who attach values such as rationality or justice in conflicts. At the currently ongoing UN meeting for small arms reduction, the first American representative has made his position clear. He was opposed to the draft resolution prohibiting citizens, other than the government, from carrying or using arms. He was also against confining arms trade among governments. In his view arms should be provided to freedom fighters fighting against “rogue states.” It is difficult for us to change this type of thinking. We could not prevent the Taliban of Afghanistan from destroying the Great Buddha of Bahmyan. This event helps us to understand that there is no common value in today’s world about what justice is—whereas having a common understanding among parties to the conflicts, about what is justice and what is a fair world, is indispensable for conflict prevention.

Thus, conflict prevention is an extremely difficult issue. We should recognize that conventional volunteer activities or charity works alone can never prevent conflicts. It is necessary that all existing institutions (ranging from NGOs to national governments as well as multilateral institutions) make a determined and ultra-effective approach to this issue by using tax revenues, if we really wish to prevent conflict. As the IMF was created after the World War II, very serious approaches such as creating multilateral organizations such as the ICMF (International Conflict Management Fund) instead of the IMF or a World Governance replacing the World Bank should be considered. These organizations will draw funds, human resources and knowledge from all over the world in order to appropriately address conflict prevention.

The lack of physical space to receive refugees can also be mentioned as something important but lacking. The scope for policy measures is substantially narrowed due to this problem. It would be desirable to review the borders fixed during the colonial era, yet there are no spaces to become a buffer zone for that matter. Including this space problem, it is necessary to address conflict prevention by mobilizing all kinds of institutions, with the understanding that conflict prevention and its resolution is the most important role for governments.

Comments

Kinichi Komano

Director, Research and Programming Division,
Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Ms. Susan Marks quoted a statement by an African president that if we could decide for war, we could also decide for peace. We would like to believe also that conflict prevention is possible, if we have the will for it.

After the end of the Cold War, the 1990s saw a number of intra-state conflicts. A major part of the 1990s was spent to deal with these conflicts. In 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed to nurture the culture of conflict prevention. Such culture cannot be sustained unless it emerges spontaneously among the parties to the conflicts. From this perspective, there is a noteworthy development in Africa. Having been rather passive in dealing with conflict prevention and development, influential African leaders such as South African President Mbeke are now proposing the MAP (Millennium Action Plan for African Recovery), based upon the philosophy that Africa should address on its own major issues of governance, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and development. After discussion and expected adoption at the OAU general assembly currently taking place at Zambia, the MAP will be introduced at the G8 Genoa Summit and later at the UN General Assembly in the fall of 2001. The MAP will thus become a basic guiding principle for African peacebuilding and development. Japan keeps closely watching this movement. Japan has been taking initiatives for promoting African development through hosting TICAD II, and we will organize a ministerial meeting in Tokyo in December 2001 preparing for TICAD III to be held in 2003. Discussions are being held within the Japanese government proposing that Japan should prepare a Tokyo meeting for mobilizing international support for the MAP.

The efforts made by the Search for Common Ground for promoting reconciliation among the parties to conflicts by mobilizing various means, including radio broadcasting, movies, music and sports, are highly appreciated. Japan also once made so-called "ping-pong diplomacy." It is hoped that making

use of the Japanese government's small-scale grants for supporting grassroots activities will further strengthen such efforts.

Since conflict prevention, peace and development are closely related, they were jointly examined at the last G8 Summit and, taking the name of the host city, the Miyazaki Initiatives were announced. For the first time in the Summit meetings, concrete and specific, rather than abstract, agreements have been reached, covering five areas, including small arms and the illicit diamond trade. It is hoped that by dealing with specific issues step by step, peacebuilding process will be promoted. The Japanese government considers conflict and development as high priority policy areas. It thus announced the "Action from Japan," which describes the way Japan addresses the issue. Conventionally, Japan's ODA has been mainly focussing on the post-conflict development stage, rather than conflict prevention or immediate assistance after the conflict. In the "Action from Japan," emphasis is placed on preventing conflict recurrence, emergency assistance immediately after the conflict, as well as assistance conducive to conflict prevention.

Examples of assistance in these new priority areas are:

1. Support to a project in the border area between Peru and Ecuador. This project was taken up in view of consolidating the newly achieved peace accord between the two countries. The project aims to equally benefit poor populations in the border area by building bridge, roads and other facilities.
2. School education and medical clinic support programs which will be committed in response to the amount of collected small arms threatening reconstruction process in Cambodia.
3. Support to de-mining projects in 20 countries, including Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, Afghanistan, and border areas between Peru and Ecuador.

Under the severe economic and fiscal situation currently prevailing in Japan, the general public's views on ODA are increasingly critical. A review of ODA policy is being conducted in these circumstances. Regardless of its outcome, however, Japan is bound to continue to make an international contribution. ODA should play a major role in it. Environment and peacebuilding are both "fundamentals" of Japan and the world and they are

the basis of a sound human society. Therefore Japan should and will actively address these areas.

Priority Areas for Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Satoru Kurosawa

Director of Global Issues Division, Planning and Evaluation Department
Japan International Cooperation Agency

Introduction

In order to prevent conflict and bring about sustainable development through promotion of reconstruction, it is vital to combine a military framework, political framework and development assistance. Based on the study in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as experiences in peacebuilding gained so far, JICA has identified six priority areas for post-conflict reconstruction as follows: (1) Assistance for Refugees/Returnees/IDPs; (2) Security Control; (3) Rehabilitation of Social Infrastructure; (4) Government Institution-building; (5) Promotion of Democratization; (6) Economic Recovery.

1. Assistance for Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Emergency relief for post-conflict reconstruction consists of support for the refugees staying outside their home countries and assistance for repatriation of the refugees and the internally displaced persons (IDPs). Repatriation of refugees and their reintegration is crucial for maintaining regional security. When refugees stay outside their home countries on a long-term basis, there is a tendency to create economic and social burdens on the host countries, thus leading to political insecurity in the region. Meanwhile, assistance for the refugees who are not able to repatriate to their home countries is also necessary. Emergency relief assistance includes support in the areas of food, basic living commodities, water/sanitation, and shelter. Security protection of refugees and returnees, and psychosocial counseling for the traumatized persons are also an important part of the assistance. One point that shall be taken into account when assisting refugees, returnees and IDPs is not to concentrate assistance to

a certain group only as it may trigger conflicts among different groups.

2. Security Control

Maintaining security is prerequisite for preventing conflict and building peace. Multilateral forces or PKOs are among the means to maintain peace and security. Security sector reform, including reforms in the military, police, and judicial system, is another way of ensuring security. Moreover, arms control, including control of illegal transactions of weapons and DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), contributes to security control. In some cases such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, prosecution of war criminals was considered to be an important factor.

3. Rehabilitation of Social Infrastructure

Rehabilitation of social infrastructure is another key pillar for the reconciliation and reconstruction process. Rehabilitation of infrastructure includes not only basic infrastructure (shelter, water supplies, electricity), but also basic needs such as food, health and education, including peace education. Also significant as part of social infrastructure are de-mining, support for landmine victims and landmine awareness raising. Furthermore, the assistance shall include support for war-affected children.

4. Government Institution-Building

With the rise of intra-state conflicts in today's international political scene, we often witness failure of states that require either reconstruction or new establishment of government structures in post-conflict countries. For reconstruction that is self-sustainable and self-governing, establishment of administrative structures/systems as well as law and regulations at both central and local levels is a significant component in post-conflict reconstruction.

5. Promotion of Democratization

As inequality of access to political and economic opportunity is one of the causes for conflict, promotion of democratization is another major pillar for conflict prevention. It usually starts with promotion of democratic elections. This, however, does not necessarily create a foundation for peacebuilding as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It needs to be accompanied by empowerment of the community as well as promotion of the involvement of civil society into the public decision making process. As there is often a lack of trust and confidence among citizens towards their own government, any assistance shall aim at rebuilding and strengthening the relationship between the local population and government and creating a collaborative process. Furthermore, boosting more equal access to services by different groups of people, including the marginalized, the poor and the vulnerable shall be given attention.

6. Economic Recovery

An enlarging economic gap among the population, deterioration of economy, and increase of unemployment can be the influencing factors for conflict resurgence. Reconstruction of a nation would require revitalizing the (macro) economy, infrastructure, and promotion of industry as well as employment creation. Particular to the post-conflict countries is promotion of creating alternative employment for ex-combatants and their re-integration into society.

Issues to be Taken Into Account


JICA has identified the following seven issues to be taken into account when operationalizing the framework for assisting post-conflict reconstruction:

1. Apply a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach through mixing different sets of approaches (i.e., top down and bottom up, large-scale and grassroots)
2. Assess root causes of conflict as well as new possible factors for

resurgence of conflict

3. Incorporate conflict prevention lenses at all stages of peace building efforts
4. Promote involvement of a wide range of stakeholders, including those parties which were in conflict, IDPs, returnees, politicians, people from different professions, ethnic groups and religions, as well as men and women
5. Coordinate assistance among different sets of agents, including the government, international aid agencies, NGOs, and private sector firms
6. Fill in the gap between relief and reconstruction/development by:
 - (a) Collaborating closely with agencies assisting refugees to make mutual use of skills and experiences in relief and development
 - (b) Synchronizing the assistance for relief and rehabilitating/development
 - (c) Intervening at an early stage in post-conflict situations
7. Make a long-term commitment as governments of developing countries need to work through long-term plans for sustainable development and the healing and reconciliation process requires time

Priority Areas for Post-conflict Reconstruction



(Governance support is related across various areas, including SSR, government institution-building, and promotion of democratization.)

Jun. 2001, Global Issues Division, JICA

Comments

Naoki Saito

Professor, Graduate School of Law, Heisei International University

First of all, I would like to give brief comments on three presentations from this afternoon, and then talk about the importance of the post-conflict stage in terms of conflict prevention. I will take up the East Timor issues lastly as a case of peacebuilding efforts.

Let me begin with Dr. Kita's impressive presentation. Although I am not a specialist in medicine, I reckon that an immensely important issue is how to heal the traumas of conflict-affected people, above all, youths, as Dr. Kita pointed out. It should be given high priority in the post-conflict stage.

I also agree with Ms. Marks on the call for a change in the way that we respond to conflict. The kind of approach she describes would carry weight in order to help affected people get over the bloody past and to reconstruct a society where all parties to the conflict can live together peacefully.

With regard to Dr. Hasegawa's presentation, I was impressed by the proposal of the new concept of "paradigm shift" that UNDP endorses. It can be regarded as part of efforts to remove the root causes of conflict. I will return to this point later.

Let me now explain why the post-conflict stage is of critical importance. It is one of the three phases of conflict, like the pre-conflict and the conflict stages. To look at the chronological developments of conflict, at the pre-conflict stage, conflict is just around the corner and the main objective at this phase is to prevent the breakout of conflict. If a conflict has already broken out, we are at the conflict stage, and the primary concern is the prevention of escalation and spread of the conflict. In contrast, at the post-conflict stage, conflict is over but the region is in danger of another round of conflict. Therefore, efforts are directed at the prevention of the recurrence of conflict.

Preventing the recurrence of conflict requires dealing with its root causes. To that end, a comprehensive effort will be needed, including monitoring of cease-fire; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants

(DDR); removal of landmines; collection and destruction of small arms and light weapons; promotion of mutual understanding; humanitarian aid activities; assistance for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons; development assistance; monitoring of free elections; assistance in the establishment of the judicial system; establishment of a new police system and training of the police; monitoring of human rights protection; and establishment of an international war crimes tribunal.

The post-conflict stage is a crucial period to break the vicious cycle of cease-fire and its collapse. Numerous conflicts in the world fall in this vicious cycle, as is clearly seen in the countries in the African continent, such as Sudan, Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, the Congo, and Angola. These conflicts illustrate that a comprehensive effort at the post-conflict stage is critical to break the “vicious cycle.”

Let me move on to the East Timor issue. This is an important test case for post-conflict peacebuilding. As we know, East Timor is likely to declare independence by the end of next year following the withdrawal of the United Nations Transition Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The case of East Timor reminds us of that of Cambodia. In Cambodia, UNTAC built the foundation for state reconstruction during its 18-month mandate. East Timor, however, is placed under much tougher conditions than Cambodia was. UNTAC engaged in seven major tasks in reconstructing the devastated country whose former social and economic infrastructures were destroyed in the decades-long conflict. In short, the operation in Cambodia was virtually the “reconstruction” of a state. On the other hand, East Timor’s case is literally “state-building,” given that the population was under Portuguese occupation for hundreds of years and Indonesian control for the last 25 years. Besides, the locals do not have sufficient understanding of, nor experience and skills for, state building.

Their independence will be officially declared by the end of next year with prior establishment of a national constitution and political system framework. Such processes are, however, no guarantee of a bright future of East Timor, since important questions remain about how to build infrastructure and establish governmental machinery, i.e. the legislature, the judiciary and the administration, and key state sectors such as national defense, state police, educational, medical, and employment sectors. These sectors are fragile in East Timor and some of them do not even exist. This means that they must start from scratch. Given

these facts, I doubt whether East Timor will be able to function as a state after independence. Although it will gain independence formally, such independence will be overwhelmingly dependent on international assistance.

There is no doubt that vast amounts of international assistance will be needed. The questions are what kind of and how much assistance is needed, and how long it is for. The capacity of the international community is limited. What if assistance is insufficient or inappropriate? We have to keep an eye on the issue.

The international community is closely watching what is happening in East Timor, and Japan is in a position to contribute greatly to peace-building efforts in the region, in such areas as education, medicine, and reconstruction of infrastructure.

The East Timor issue brings another difficult question to light, which is related to how to deal with separatist movements happening within Indonesia. Indonesia has several separatist provinces in its territory, such as Aceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. While East Timor is a former Portuguese colony, these regions are former Dutch colonies and therefore had gone through rather different decolonization processes. Nevertheless, East Timor's independence has had a great influence on separatist movements in these regions. The Indonesian authorities have little room for concessions over the matter and are in fact taking a tough stance against such movements.

This brings forward, as a matter for consideration, the issue of how the international community should respond to such separatist movements. East Timor's choice for independence in the referendum is based on the principle of the right to self-determination. To take Indonesia's unstable political situation into account, the country could disintegrate if a separatist movement robustly claims the right to self-determination and the Indonesian authorities attempt to crack down on such a movement. Given such a possibility, the question is whether the international community should provide support for such separatist movements—or observe the development of the situation on the basis of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other countries?

Session 2 Discussion

- Summary -

This session's discussion briefly raised the issue of diverse values and conflict resolution. In international law and peace building, there may be conflict between the values of the individual and those of the nation. How to reconcile these two sets of values? Despite globalization, individual societies' identities will persist. For example, is what happened to Milosevic a result of the paradigm shift that was discussed?

The international criminal court is under discussion, but the major powers have not signed the treaty. The trend towards globalization and global governance cannot be stopped, and we must consider how to preserve the culture and identity of each local community. We have to distinguish principle and values: values can be held by anybody, but they are not shared across communities. Common values must be decided by global governance.

General Discussion

10

General Discussion - Summary -

Policy Coherence and Effectiveness

In the developing countries, the number of conflicts is increasing rapidly; policy responses must carefully take into account the relevant political and economic backgrounds. For global macroeconomic issues, in MOFA, in the past, the economic affairs division was involved. For ODA, there were other sections dealing with this. During the Asian financial crisis, some people proposed the creation of a new Asian fund to respond to this kind of crisis, but this was not realized due to various reasons. Neoliberals advocate imposition of global standards, which would prevent decent responses in this area. So the issue of policy coherence is very important.

We have to improve the international financial system. As for ODA in the 1990s, it represented about one-third of the inflows to developing countries; after the Asian financial crisis, this declined by about half. The absolute amount of ODA declined through the 1990s as well. ODA was a catalyst to promote the flow of private sector investment into these countries. This process must be promoted further, as Japan's role has not been very big so far.

In the world system and conflicts in developing countries, the issue of policy coherence is being shared internationally. ODA is becoming more and more like a catalyst. The concept of 'primary health' has been developed; when it comes to conflict prevention, the discussion is very advanced and high-level. What's needed instead is the counterpart of 'primary health' care. The concepts and philosophy are good, but they need to be made more applicable.

Diversity and Interdependence in Conflict Resolution and Governance

Local conflicts are in many cases small-scale skirmishes, but may threaten to broaden in scope to be nationwide. So in NR management, how can we utilize the local culture, knowledge, wisdom and customary laws to respond to those issues? We need analysis of the relation of diversity in local communities to conflict resolution and governance. National interests and political powers will threaten to erode the conflict resolution process. We need objective judgments about what is permissible in human societies. For example, in Aceh, as a case of resource-rich areas, while the assumption previously was that the natural gas was to be used for the benefit of Indonesian development nationwide, now local residents seek to retain the benefits for their own use.

In the post-cold war era, we continue to have cases of conflict in which people seek self-determination, e.g., Indonesia. Similarly, in Africa, national boundaries were determined by colonial powers, and were not chosen by Africans; how should this issue be dealt with in the 21st century? The nation state is originally a European concept, not an Asian one; but now this framework is applied everywhere. Some parts of these nation states feel discriminated against, and that they're not getting a fair share. Further, some outside countries or external forces try to encourage or fuel this dissatisfaction, perpetuating such conflicts. We see this especially in resource-rich areas, where resources are inequitably distributed. Some argue that all these so-called internal conflicts are really proxy wars, subject to external assistance or pressure. In the new post-cold war system, we don't have any new security system that can respond well to these conflicts.

The fact of interdependence is a perception that is not shared by the decision makers of this world. In Africa in the 1990s, the message from New York and Washington was that because of the Somalia debacle, such operations were not worth the risk or expenditure of more American lives. Dependency by resource-importing countries such as Japan has been decreasing due to technological advances. As we become independent in this regard, the global community will pay less attention to those marginalized areas. In Japan, due to demographic shifts, it will be necessary to import immigrants—and we will become increasingly interdependent.

Natural resources and ODA from abroad—nominally appearing to be blessings—can often be the seeds of conflict. As Japan is one of the most

significant resource-importing countries and also provider of ODA, Japanese are very definitely major stakeholders. Research in this area should be promoted further in Japan. Africans have been talking about using NRs to develop industries, and relatedly, creating an international consortium. MNCs may be mobilized to develop NRs in a given country, based on paying taxes to that country. In this way, maybe MNCs and other private sector actors, NGOs, and governments can cooperate with each other to develop these countries. What's important is the self-determination of peoples.

Peace accords might be signed in conflict-ridden areas, but they may be very fragile. Focusing just on various proximate causes of conflict (resources, power, corruption, erosion of political institutions, etc.) will continue to miss the point. What's needed is a new overarching framework—a decision for peace—that will be able to address all these issues. This means creating a common vision, a national interest, that people can stand together and face. But this takes courage and leadership, and the ability to put aside the smaller issues and differences. This will involve governments, NGOs, multinationals and the global community through a top-down and bottom-up approach, given our interdependence.

Multiple Stakeholders

The concept of human security needs to be highlighted, not just national security. We have stakeholders for different kinds of security, at various levels. A concept of common security recognizes the legitimacy of different groups, each with its own security interest. Right now, there are stakeholders sticking to their own community, but opposing other communities. But there are other stakeholders who are common security-oriented, and we need to work on identifying them.

Multistakeholder dialogue can occur at national and even broader levels, not just the local or regional levels. Conflict management is necessarily a multilevel process. The stakeholder process requires people to sit down and accept that there are differences between them, and that differences in interests can be admitted and negotiated. Recognizing the flexibility of boundaries in the stakeholder process allows the search for a common interest or vision, i.e., common grounds. Sometimes the historical moment is favorable for major

breakthroughs in crystallizing a collective vision; other times, this is not possible, as the right conditions do not exist, and all that can be done are lots of smaller, more routine actions.

Peacebuilding Measures

We've been accumulating many negative legacies or assets, as shown in the fact that there are conflicts in over 40 countries. These cannot be eliminated by just continuing current measures. Responses must focus on peace building, rather than just passively responding to conflicts that have already occurred. How can we do this, turning accumulated negative assets into positive ones for peace building? We might well consider how the principles discussed in the South African case could be applicable to other countries. Models based on a given case generally cannot be exported wholesale to other places—but principles, practices, and lessons learned can be taken and adapted and transferred.

As a concrete step in transforming accumulated negative assets into positive ones for peacebuilding, we should consider whether past identities and affiliations had better be kept secret—or revealed—so as to promote the reconciliation process. This will, in practice, vary according to the timing; people do what is necessary, given certain conditions. Probably without a safe framework very soon after a conflict, people would tend to keep secrets. Hopefully, over time, the stories could be told, as part of the healing and forgiveness processes. There's increasing interest worldwide in truth and reconciliation commissions. Within this framework, people are freer to speak out, and spur the healing and forgiveness processes. In conflict areas, such as in Africa, even people in their teens are fighting; some people are living in refugee camps for 10 or 20 years. In such areas, how are we going to educate people about assistance? A microscopic approach is necessary in this sense.

Conclusions

The basic assumption behind our discussion is that human beings and society can change. The multistakeholder approach can be used profitably at different

levels and different areas. Timing is very important; when conflict has already erupted, it may be too late. Next, mediators are necessary in such a situation. Therefore, we need professionals in conflict prevention.

While we're in a situation of deepening complexity, we're also seeing some positive factors as well. For example, in Africa, some people are taking initiatives for the millennium, and the international community should support such efforts. Trauma and psychological damage are important. Through long-term commitment, personal and social injuries may be healed to some extent.

Despite the enormity and complexity of these problems, at all levels, we should seek to address them through policy coherence and other tools. By accumulating these tools, we can better address problems brought about by larger structures, and avoid fatalism. This area is quite underdeveloped as a research topic, and requires more resources and the accumulation of intellectual assets.

Hopefully this symposium can help trigger a small change that can help change the world.

Appendix

Intra-State Conflicts in Africa and Preventive Diplomacyⁱ

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1. Introduction

As a summary of the examination above, an attempt will be made in the following sections to articulate issues relevant to conflict prevention in Africa, the research subject of this book, from the perspective of who should do what. In order to simplify the argument, the agenda will be divided into five issues, i.e., the target, subject, means, timing, and evaluation of preventive diplomacy.

2. From the Viewpoint of the Target of Preventive Diplomacy

First, the target of preventive diplomacy: what should be prevented? If the target of preventive diplomacy were to be set up along with the concern of this book, “prevention of domestic armed conflict” would be the central focus of preventive diplomacy as a first step. However, as it is clear from examination of the concrete cases in this book, even if the target of preventive diplomacy were to be identified as “the prevention of intra-state conflict” and a mechanism for this were made, it would not necessarily function well, especially in Africa. This is because domestic conflicts in Africa are caused by various factors, and

ⁱ In collaboration with many other researchers, I have recently published a book from Kokusai Shoin entitled *Afurika no Kokunai Funsou to Yobougai kou* [Intra-State Conflicts in Africa and Preventive Diplomacy] as the outcome of a joint research project conducted over the past three years with the National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). At its end, as a conclusion I have contributed a chapter entitled “Rethinking Preventive Diplomacy: A New Perspective from Africa on Preventive Diplomacy.” The following is an almost complete reproduction of that chapter that I decided to print and distribute as a reference of comments I made today. For this reason, expressions such as “in this book”, or “Section X, Chapter Y” will appear in the following text.

this is creating complicated co-relationships among factors as well as with the intra-state conflicts. In other words, the relationship between a domestic conflict and its causes is not so much a simple one-way causal sequence that could be described by a “factor-to-conflict” relation. It can also be a “conflict-to-factor” relationship where intra-state conflict creates new factors or exacerbates existing factors, further worsening the situation. It is also important to note that there are also relationships between factors that influence each other, i.e., “factor A \longleftrightarrow factor B” relationship. This makes the circumstance even more complicated. In short, intra-state conflict and various factors thereof are interrelated in a complex way and, therefore, addressing the outbreak or aggravation of intra-state conflict and resolution thereof in isolation would not lead to a fundamental solution of the problem.

Bearing this complex interrelationship between a domestic conflict and factors thereof in mind, especially in the context of Africa where that situation is salient, confining the target of preventive diplomacy to prevention of “imminent intra-state conflict” (a “narrowly selective approach” of preventive diplomacy) involves a risk of downgrading preventive diplomacy into one of symptomatic treatments. This may produce a different result from a “search for measures that would bring a fundamental solution of conflict” which preventive diplomacy should aim at. In this sense, one of the lessons that should be learned from the cases in Africa is that, while the central target of preventive diplomacy could focus on “intra-state conflict,” it should not be confined to it. In other words, preventive diplomacy should take a “comprehensive approach” that takes account of whole complicated interrelationships between the factors and domestic conflicts. (See Figure 1)




Figure 1: Two Approaches to Preventive Diplomacy

Causes of intra-state conflicts in Africa can be roughly divided into (A) internal factors and (B) external factors. Internal factors can be further divided into political factors (A1), economic factors (A2), and social factors (A3). Political factors (A1) include power struggles over control of the government, widespread domestic corruption, military dictatorship, human-rights abuses, and so forth. Economic factors (A2) involve poverty, unemployment, large income gap between the rich and the poor, and disputes over natural resources development. Social factors (A3) include tribal rivalry, religious conflicts, and patron-client relations that are prevalent in many African countries.

External factors of domestic conflict can be further divided into the factors from neighboring African countries (B1), and factors from non-African countries (B2). In the former (B1), there are border disputes with neighboring countries, intervention into domestic affairs by neighboring African countries for various reasons, and massive inflow of refugees from neighboring countries due to natural disaster or political instability. As factors from non-African countries (B2), there are political and economic controls by non-African countries, inflow of arms, structural adjustment pressures by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank, and direct investments by multinational firms.

	Political Factors (1)	Economic Factors (2)	Social Factors (3)
Internal Factors (A)	Power struggle Movement for autonomy or separation Lack of governance Corruption, depravity Military dictatorship Human-rights abuses	Poverty Income gap Unemployment Disputes over concession on natural resources	Tribal rivalry Religious conflicts Patron-client relations
	Neighboring African Countries (1)	Non-African Countries (2)	
External Factors (B)	Territorial disputes Intervention into domestic affairs by neighboring countries Inflow of refugees from neighboring countries	Political and economic control by the developed countries Inflow of weapons, structural adjustment pressure by IMF and World Bank Investment by multinational firms	

Figure 2: Main Factors of Domestic Conflicts in Africa

Several points are to be noted. First, the factors above are illustrative, not exhaustive. Second, the above classification of the factors of intra-state conflicts is made only for facilitating understanding and analyzing the numerous factors. There can be a factor like corruption, for example, which is classified as an internal political factor (A1), but could also be related to an internal economic factor (A2) or to an internal social factor (A3). Third, each factor constitutes a relatively large concept and it can be further separated into more specific sub-factors. Fourth, as the above enumerated are the factors commonly seen in many of the intra-state conflicts in Africa, the relative importance of some of these factors may lose some weight or become irrelevant in a context of a specific and concrete intra-state conflict.

When preventive diplomacy is discussed in the context of African intra-state conflicts, it is important to consider complex factors of conflict in their totality. While each of the factors should be addressed specifically, a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention is essential, paying due attention to the interrelationship between the whole factors and the specific domestic conflict.

3. From a Viewpoint of the Subject of Preventive Diplomacy

The next issue is the subject of preventive diplomacy. What may be said from the cases in Africa is that preventive diplomacy should consider that political groups at various levels, starting with a legitimate government and ending, in particular, with armed groups, are concerned parties in domestic conflicts in Africa. This is because the most important actors in preventive diplomacy are the very parties involved in the conflict.

The fundamental fact that the parties involved in the conflict are at the same time the most important actors of preventive diplomacy tends to be forgotten, in considering preventive diplomacy in the context of Africa in particular. When preventive diplomacy is discussed at CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) or at OSCE (Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, a successor organization of CSCE), the participating European countries are at the same time *the subjects* promoting preventive diplomacy as well as *the objects* to which preventive diplomacy is applied. However, when discussing preventive diplomacy in Africa, has there not been

a tendency to treat African governments or armed groups, the parties concerned with conflicts, *only as the objects* of preventive diplomacy? This is a fundamental methodological mistake when considering preventive diplomacy in the context of Africa, and it represents the application of a double standard to Africa.

African countries and their people that have been actively addressing intra-state conflicts in Africa have already raised this problem, yet imperfectly. That is, African countries have been, *as subjects*, addressing intra-state conflicts, especially their prevention, through the Organization for African Unity (OAU), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

What is specifically meant by treating the parties concerned with intra-state conflict as the subjects of preventive diplomacy rather than the objects thereof? It is to make them recognize that the prevention of the conflict or of the aggravation of the situation would bring better results to their own interest and thus encourage them to seek measures that would contribute to the peaceful resolution of a conflict, or calm down a violent conflict. Important domestic components of “infrastructure for preventive diplomacy” for realizing this are: the establishment of a democratic government by election, the creation of a peaceful conflict resolution mechanism such as independent court system, abolition of corruption and nepotism, and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The cases in Africa manifest two problems. One is the extremely inadequate domestic “infrastructure for preventive diplomacy.” The second is that the parties concerned with a conflict tend to think that the only way to realize their objectives is to resort to violence, without fully understanding the significance of preventive diplomacy. Thus, the deployment of preventive diplomacy by a third party—an actor other than the parties concerned with conflict—becomes important.

The most important subject, or player, in this case is obviously the United Nations. As it is already examined in Section 3, Chapter 2, the United Nations at its creation was not supposed to address domestic conflicts of member countries. The principle of non-interference into domestic affairs, Article 2, Clause 7 of the UN Charter has its exception only in the case of coercive measures under Chapter 7. Since it had not considered intervention for peaceful resolution of conflict under Chapter 6 as an exception of the non-interference

principle, even if the UN were to apply preventive diplomacy in connection with an intra-state conflict, it could not justify such an action when the country concerned asserts that the issue is a domestic problem. However, this systemic defect is being overcome step by step through the accumulation of UN practices over the years as follows.

- (a) UN intervenes in a conflict¹ by agreement with parties in conflict, including the government concerned.
- (b) Even without agreement of the government and the parties in conflict, UN intervenes in intra-state conflict, based on a decision under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. (Examples: the economic sanctions applied to South Africa under *apartheid*²; the establishment of the criminal court for punishing those who committed the violation of international humanitarian law, e.g., massive massacres and rapes.)³
- (c) Actions in the form of so-called peace-keeping operations (PKO)⁴
- (d) Activities for removing root causes of intra-state conflicts through the activities of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and so forth.

It is argued in detail in Section 2, Chapter 4 that non-state actors other than the UN play an important role as the subject of preventive diplomacy. They include, for example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a regional organization, South African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as sub-regional organizations, and they also include the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Amnesty International,⁵ as non-government organizations, and prominent individuals like former U.S. President Carter. Furthermore, in Africa, other African states, as third parties, are important subjects of preventive diplomacy.

Although involvement of these non-UN actors can be significant in certain circumstances, the UN does have a special status in preventive diplomacy for the following reasons.

First, there are explicit stipulations on regional and sub-regional organization (both are referred to as “regional arrangements or regional agencies” in the United Nations Charter) in Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter. Namely, “the

Members of the United Nations...shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council” (Article 52, Clause 2) and though the “Security Council shall...utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority,” regional organization shall not take any “enforcement action” “without the authorization of the Security Council” (Article 53). In other words, in connection with preventive diplomacy, if settlement can be reached in a non-coercive way, the Charter assumes that the member nations utilize the regional organizations proactively, without referring the matter to the Security Council. In this case, although the meaning of “local disputes” is not necessarily clear, they are different from “regional conflicts,” and a broader interpretation is possible that they include “intra-state conflicts.” On the other hand, a regional organization should not take any coercive measures without the permission of the Security Council.

Second, concerning NGOs as actors of preventive diplomacy, a certain status is provided in Article 71 of the Charter, i.e., “the Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, which are concerned with matters within its competence.” By virtue of this article, NGOs are given a certain status and opportunities for their activities within the UN system.⁶ The problem is that the UN body that looks after NGOs is the Economic and Social Council and not the Security Council. As mentioned earlier, however, consideration of preventive diplomacy in the context of Africa would deal with economic and social factors, which are largely ECOSOC concerns, in addition to conflict itself, which is a matter to be addressed by the Security Council. In this sense, the fact that the Economic and Social Council is in charge of NGOs is not a problem per se. It becomes an issue when the NGOs under the Economic and Social Council become involved in an intra-state conflict that is already taken up by the Security Council.

Thus, it should be noted that the activities of non-state actors are also recognized under the broad framework provided by the Charter of the UN. In this sense, the UN should be given primary importance among the non-state actors engaged in preventive diplomacy.

Means	Substance	Actors
Negotiation	Dialogues among the parties concerned	Parties concerned with the conflict
Good offices	Promotion and support to the dialogues among the parties concerned by a third party	Third party (e.g., UN Secretary-General)
Enquiry	Factual survey by a third party	Third party (e.g., commission set up by UN)
Mediation	Positive participation by a third party to the negotiation between the parties concerned	Third party (e.g., UN Secretary-General)
Conciliation	Proposal of conciliation plan by a third party	Third party (e.g., UN Secretary-General)
Arbitration	Legal solution by an arbitration tribunal	Arbitration tribunal
Judicial settlement	Legal solution by an international court	International court
Confidence building	Creation of mutual trust based on agreement between the parties concerned	Parties concerned with the conflict
Early warning	Early detection of the outbreak or aggravation of an armed conflict	Third party (institution set up by UN)
Peacebuilding	Assistance for the elimination of the root causes of conflict such as poverty	Development assistance agencies
Judicial Assistance	Technical assistance for the reinforcement of legal system	Development assistance agencies, UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights

Figure 3: The Relation of the Means and Actors of Preventive Diplomacy

4. From a Viewpoint of the Means of Preventive Diplomacy

Various means of preventive diplomacy so far have been proposed. Article 33 of the UN Charter enumerates six specific means of peaceful conflict resolution, i.e., “negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.” Although these are means contemplated in connection with inter-state conflict resolution, they can also be applied to intra-state conflict when the conflict aggravates and a violent fight between two or more armed groups has become prevalent. Then, the relation between those groups can be assimilated with the inter-states relations and means for inter-state conflict resolution can be applied to an intra-state conflict. Particularly in Africa, there

are more than a few cases where states have collapsed, such as Somalia and Rwanda. In such circumstances, these conflict resolution means can be effective. But since both arbitration and judicial resolution presume the existence of an effective court system, it may not be applicable in practice in Africa, where a general international judiciary system applicable to intra-state conflicts does not exist. However, if the possibility of future institutional progress were taken into perspective, the idea to establish a court for intra-state conflict settlement in the form of arbitration rather than judicial court would be more realistic. The creation of an international criminal court has been underway. This is rather a unique court because it pursues the responsibility of individuals who committed international crimes, e.g., genocide or serious violation of international humanitarian law. Along the same line, an international criminal tribunal for Rwanda was established on an ad hoc basis under a resolution of the UN Security Council, although the range of crimes to be taken up and the period of its existence were somewhat limited. This is a court for genocide and for securing observance of international humanitarian law and it is a system aiming at maintaining minimum law and order in an intra-state conflict, and it thus can be regarded as a means of preventive diplomacy.

The experiences of CSCE (OSCE) and other regional organizations have proved that confidence building and early warning are effective means of preventive diplomacy. Both can be effective means, to some extent, with regard to intra-state conflict as well.

Development assistance and emergency relief are also effective means of preventive diplomacy, addressing root causes of conflicts, e.g., poverty and economic disparity, and catastrophic natural disasters, respectively. After a violent conflict has been brought to a manageable level, assistance in the form of peace building is particularly indispensable for prevention of the recurrence of conflict. At such a stage, aid agencies and donor countries should avoid giving loans that worsen debt burdens, but should rather extend grant aid as much as possible.

5. From the Viewpoint of the Timing of Preventive Diplomacy

It is often said on the timing of preventive diplomacy that “the earlier it is, the better and greater would be the effect with smaller costs.” There is no

objection to this as a general statement. The problem lies in the point that the timing of preventive diplomacy greatly depends on the target of the preventive diplomacy. For instance, when the target of preventive diplomacy is narrowly limited to the “occurrence of domestic armed conflict,” that timing will be the point in time when a certain dispute exists in a country and when it has developed into anti-government armed conflict by a certain armed group. If, however, the target of preventive diplomacy is specified as “the existence of extreme poverty or economic disparity, or a large number of unemployed in a country that may give rise to an armed conflict,” the preventive diplomacy will be deployed at the point of time when any “existence of poverty, economic disparity, a large number of unemployed” is recognized. In the latter case, as a matter of fact, all the poorest countries will become target countries for preventive diplomacy. In this case, a problem arises of how to distinguish “preventive diplomacy” from “development assistance,” which the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank have been pursuing, despite its imperfection and insufficiency. In other words, it raises an issue of why one asserts a particular policy concept of “preventive diplomacy.”

What is evident from the cases in Africa is that for intra-state conflict prevention in Africa, from the distinction mentioned above, it would be indispensable to consider the target from a broader perspective. This would mean that virtually all the countries of Africa would become the target countries of preventive diplomacy. Then, how should the problem arising therefrom—i.e., the distinction of “preventive diplomacy” and “development assistance”—be considered?

The following conceptual distinction is probably necessary for the circumstances in Africa. That is to distinguish situations by stages. In a zero stage, though there are a number of factors of domestic conflicts, there is no possibility to develop into armed conflict (Conflict Stage 0). In the next stage, though there are a number of factors of a domestic conflict, they are least likely to develop into an armed conflict (Conflict Stage 1). In the subsequent stage, these factors are more likely to develop into an armed conflict (Conflict Stage 2). Development assistance should deal with Conflict Stage 0 and Conflict Stage 1. Once the situation escalates into Conflict Stage 2, “preventive diplomacy” in its broad meaning should be deployed.

Indeed, when the situation develops into Conflict Stage 2, aid agencies like the World Bank are likely to suspend or postpone their assistance programs on

the grounds that “the situation may lead to economic disorder.” Extending proactively “economic support for the removal of the factors of an intra-state conflict” under such circumstances, “preventive assistance” would be characterized as “economic support for conflict prevention,” rather than calling it “development assistance.” In this case, the distinction between “development assistance” and “preventive diplomacy” should be made based on whether the purpose of the project assisted lies in “the profitability of the project and its contribution to self-sustained economic development” (this is the case of “development assistance”), or in “prevention of the occurrence of intra-state conflict” (this is the case of “preventive assistance” which is performed as a part of “preventive diplomacy”). In short, the distinction between “development assistance” and “preventive diplomacy” will be found in the difference in the evaluation of an assistance project.

How should we consider the relation to the timing of preventive diplomacy when the conflict stage is more serious than Stage 2? The situation after Conflict Stage 2 can be further classified into two stages. Conflict Stage 3 would be “a situation where a large-scale conflict actually has taken place and has expanded to such a level that the central government cannot put it down immediately.” Conflict Stage 4 will be a “situation where the conflict is somehow settled and the violent fights have come to an end.” In the Conflict Stage 3, although there may be a view that it is no longer a target stage for preventive diplomacy, there are various levels in the use of armed forces and it is also important to consider the activities as “preventive diplomacy” to calm it down without worsening the level of use of armed forces. In this sense, preventive diplomacy needs to be positively deployed in Conflict Stage 3 as well.

Then, how is it in Conflict Stage 4? This is what was meant by “post-conflict peace-building” by former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in his “Agenda for Peace.” After a conflict is over, the country is usually in devastation, with decline in productive activity and increase in the number of unemployed, and the hatred between groups remains or is even heightened by the conflict. It is a situation that is not the same as Conflict Stage 0, nor Stage 1, but rather very close to Stage 2. Thus, it is the situation where preventive diplomacy should be actively deployed and immediate preventive assistance is needed.

The following chart shows the summary of the foregoing discussions.⁷

Peace Building → Conflict Stage 4

A situation where the factors of conflict remain, despite the termination of armed conflicts

Preventive Intervention → Conflict Stage 3

A situation where large-scale armed conflict is in place and its settlement is difficult

Preventive Interference → Conflict Stage 2

A situation where serious causes of conflict exist and the possibility of it developing into an armed conflict is large.

Preventive Assistance → Conflict Stage 1

A situation where there is a small possibility of the outbreak of armed conflict, though certain factors of conflict exist

Development Assistance → Conflict Stage 0

No possibility of the outbreak of armed conflict despite the existence of factors of conflict

Figure 4: Stages of Conflict and Corresponding Prevention Measures

As for the timing of preventive diplomacy in the context of Africa, it would be most effective if deployed at a transition from Conflict Stage 1 to 2, or at the latest during Stage 2. There is no doubt that appropriate preventive measures should be taken even after such stage.

6. From the Viewpoint of the Evaluation of Preventive Diplomacy

The most difficult issue in preventive diplomacy is its evaluation. As pointed out by many researchers, although failure of preventive diplomacy is known immediately (and there are too many examples to mention), it is almost impossible to give a successful example of it. When preventive diplomacy is deployed in a certain situation, and actually when the danger of the outbreak of an intra-state conflict diminished, it is very difficult to distinguish clearly whether the situation was managed as a result of the preventive diplomacy or by other reasons. The conflict might have been avoided even without the preventive diplomacy.

Concerning this point, it will probably be most realistic to establish

evaluation criteria and methods through implementation of actual policy instead of theoretical arguments. Preventive diplomacy is conducted intentionally in order to prevent a certain situation from developing into an intra-state conflict or to prevent the aggravation of a conflict. It is first necessary to clarify the following when preventive diplomacy is going to be deployed in a specific situation. That is the recognition of the situation that needs preventive diplomacy, the clear identification of the subject and means of the preventive diplomacy, and its objective to realize. And when the deployment of preventive diplomacy is terminated, the following points should be evaluated: whether it had been conducted as planned; whether its objective had been attained; where the problems had been; and where the reason for its smooth implementation had been. Although self-evaluation by actors of preventive diplomacy is important, evaluation by a third party specialist would also be helpful for future operations to be more efficient and effective.

There is an important point that should not be forgotten with respect to the evaluation of preventive diplomacy. It is that preventive diplomacy always has a risk of exacerbating the situation as it is itself an action that has a certain impact on intra-state conflict. For instance, the activity in the initial stage of a domestic conflict for transforming a military dictatorship into a democratic government based on multi-party election can be characterized as preventive diplomacy. Suppose that it succeeded in pulling down the military dictatorship from political power by taking various approaches to it. In this case, it can be evaluated that preventive diplomacy scored a success for the moment. However, if this leads to domestic turmoil, causing riots in many places with dead and wounded persons (e.g., Indonesia after the collapse of the Suharto Administration), there is a question of how to include this outcome into the evaluation of preventive diplomacy.

Although preventive diplomacy is an activity for avoiding imminent conflicts, the responsibility should always be clearly established concerning the situation it had induced as the result of its activity, and lessons should be learned for future activities. Thus, the evaluation of preventive diplomacy should include not only the direct achievements of its original objectives, but also its broad impact on the situation.

7. Conclusion

Through the cases in Africa, the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy has been addressed. As for conclusion, a brief analysis would be made here on measures for strengthening domestic and international structures in considering preventive diplomacy in relation to intra-state conflicts in Africa.

First, it is important to take parties concerned with the intra-state conflict as subjects of preventive diplomacy. For this, the African countries are urged to adopt the following measures:

- (1) Establishment of a democratic government based on the multi-party election system
- (2) Establishment of an independent judiciary system and the rule of law by a democratic legislature (Parliament)
- (3) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
- (4) Full protection and consideration for racial, religious, and national minorities
- (5) Establishment of an institutional system that will preclude frustrated people from resorting to violence, e.g., an administrative supervision system like an ombudsman system
- (6) System for the equitable distribution of wealth and for meeting basic human needs

Many African countries would not be able to manage alone these institutional reinforcements because of shortage of human and physical resources. International organizations like the UN and developed countries like Japan should actively extend human, financial and technical assistance to those African countries eager for such institutional improvements.

Second, it is important to use regional and sub-regional organizations effectively within a broad framework of the UN, as an international system for conducting preventive diplomacy in Africa. In this case, it would be important to find a policy to effectively coordinate military and political activities that directly deal with a domestic conflict with economic and social activities. In terms of the UN organizational framework, this means close cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Such cooperation will enable the Economic and Social Council and its related aid

agencies to respond to the risk of outbreak of intra-state conflicts, as identified by the Security Council. It would also make it possible for a UN-related assistance organization to succeed and promote peacebuilding after the PKO dispatched by the Security Council has completed its mandate. Furthermore, such coordination will promote and coordinate the activities of non-state actors, NGOs in particular, which play an important role in preventive diplomacy.

Third, when deploying preventive diplomacy for intra-state conflict in Africa, it is necessary to take account of the role played by the regional and sub-regional organizations. As the Paragraph 1, Article 52 of the UN Charter stipulates, the UN member nations are supposed to attempt to solve the conflict first with the regional mechanisms in the area. In Africa, “regional mechanisms,” such as OAU, SADC, and ECOWAS, are already playing a certain role in preventive diplomacy. At this point, it is very important for the UN, UN-related assistance agencies, and the developed countries to support these regional and sub-regional organizations through human, financial, and technical assistance.⁸

Fourth, it is particularly required to take the following points into consideration as policy issues in considering preventive diplomacy in Africa.

- (1) Preventive diplomacy should not be a mere response to an imminent intra-state conflict, but it should deploy broader measures against all factors of a conflict, whether economic, social or political, at the appropriate moment for responding to every stage of the conflict.
- (2) Arms trade in and to Africa should be effectively restricted and controlled.
- (3) Cooperation with the international and local non-government organizations (NGOs) working in Africa should be strengthened.

- ¹ The typical example of this pattern is the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF), dispatched by Mr. Hammarskjöld, then Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time of the Suez Crisis in 1956, assuming the “consent of the parties concerned”. A. Ninomiya, “Daiichiji Kokuren Kinkyugun” [The First United Nations Emergency Force], in *Kokuren ni yoru Heiwa to Anzen no Iji—Kaisetsu to Shiryō* [The Maintenance of Peace and Security by the United Nations—Introductions and Materials], Y. Yokota, ed., Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2000: p.350-351.
- ² For the UN economic sanction to South Africa, see doctoral dissertation presented to the Graduate School of Public Administration of International Christian University on December 26, 1996 by S. Yoshimura: *Kokusairengo Ketsugi ni Motozuku Keizaiseisai no Houteki Mondai—Keizaiseisai no Rikou to Tekiyo ni taisuru Jisshouteki Kenkyū* [Legal Problems of Economic Sanction Based on UN Resolutions—An Empirical Study on the Implementation and Application of Economic Sanction]: p. 136-180.
- ³ See following documents on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to be established under a statute adopted at the conference held in Rome in July 1998.
- K. Shibahara, “Kokusai Keiji Saibansho Setsuritsu Joyaku no Seiritsu” [Conclusion of the Treaty on the Establishment of International Criminal Court], in *Hougaku Kyoushitsu* [Classroom of Law]. Tokyo, No. 219, December 1998.
- A. Mayama, “Kokusai Keiji Saibansho Kitei to Senso Hanzai” [Stipulations of International Criminal Court and War Crimes]. *Kokusaiho Gaikou Zasshi* [Journal of International Law and Diplomacy]. No. 5, Vol. 98, 1999.
- T. Saeki, “Jindo Hanzai wo Sabaku—Senpan Hotei to Kokusai Keijisaibansho” [Judging Crimes—War Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court]. *Gakushikaikaihō* [News from Gakushikaikan]. No. 826, Jan. 2000.
- Besides, No. 1146 of *Juristō* [Jurist], published in December 1998, features on “Kokusai Keiji Saibansho no Setsuritsu” [The Creation of International Criminal Court] and the following debate and articles are included.
- H. Owada and K. Shigehara, *Roma Kaigi wo Furikaette* [Looking back over the Rome Conference <Debate>].
- Y. Nagamine, *Kokusai Keiji Saibansho Kitei no Seiritsu* [The Drafting of the Statute of International Criminal Court].
- A. Mayama, *Kokusai Keiji Saibansho no Taishohanzai* [The Crimes to be Judged by the International Criminal Court].
- M. Matsuda, *Kokusai Keiji Saibansho no Kankatsuken to sono Koushi no Jyoken* [Jurisdiction of International Criminal Court and Proviso for its Application].
- T. Natori, *Kokusai Keiji Saibansho niokeru Keiji Tetsuzuki no Gaiyou* [Outline of the Criminal Procedures in the International Criminal Court].
- M. Yamaguchi, *Kokusai Keiji Saibansho nitaishuru Kuni no Shihoujyo no Kyouryoku ni tsuite* [On State’s Judicial Cooperation to the International Criminal Court].
- ⁴ See S. Kouzai, *Kokuren no Heiwaiji Katsudou* [UN Peacekeeping Operations]. Yuhikaku, 1991, Tokyo, for general information on PKO and for its concrete cases see Y. Yokota ed., op.cit.
- ⁵ See the following on the relationship between the UN and NGOs.
- Yobougaihou no Jissen to NGO no Kouken* [The Practice of Preventive Diplomacy and the Role of NGOs], Record of the third international workshop hosted by Japan Forum on International Relations. Tokyo, 26 October 1998.
- Yobougaihou no Gutaisaku to NGO no Kouken* [Concrete Measures of Preventive Diplomacy and Contribution of NGOs], Record of a concluding symposium sponsored by Japan Forum on International Relations. Tokyo, February 10, 1999.
- Kevin Clements, *The Roles of Non-governmental Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa*, Paper presented at the International Symposium on “Roles of Sub-Regional and Non-governmental Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Peace Initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Tokyo, 27-29 March 2000.

- ⁶ See the following documents for the relation between the UN and NGOs.
 K. Fukuda, Kokuren to NGO [UN and NGO]. Tokyo: Sanseido, 1998.
 N. Yamashita, “Dai 4 Shou. Kokusaiikou to Kojin Dantai” (Chapter 4, International Organization and Individuals / Groups), in Kokusai Kikouron (Hoteiban) [International Organizations <revised edition>], Y. Yokota ed. Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 1998. P. 177-186.
- ⁷ M. Donowaki has divided the stages of conflicts into the following four categories in his book, *Yobougaikou Nyumon* [An Introduction to Preventive Diplomacy]. Tokyo: Zaidanhoujin Nihon Kokusai Forum, 1999. He has defined the “first stage” as “a state where the armed clash is not yet imminent”; the “second stage” as “a situation where the armed clash is impending”; the “third stage” as “a state where the armed clash has partly taken place”; and the “fourth stage” as “a state where the armed clash has widely spread”. This classification of Donowaki has divided the Conflict Stages 1 to 3 used in this chapter a little more in detail, but the fundamental view is almost the same. See also Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict*, New York, 1997.
- ⁸ As for the role of regional and subregional international organization in the preventive diplomacy in Africa, “Chairman’s Summary Report” of the “International Symposium on the Roles of Subregional and Nongovernmental Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Peace Initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa” organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo, March 28-29, 2000) summarized the discussions and recommended the followings.

“Efforts Made by Subregional Organizations to Enhance their Capacities and Concrete Measures for Improvements”

- (1) It was the evaluation of the participants that subregional organizations have already committed to playing active roles in conflict prevention and resolution, and that they have already made certain achievements in this area.
- (2) Based on their evaluation that subregional organizations are currently building legal and institutional arrangements to increase their conflict prevention and resolution capacities, participants reached the consensus that further efforts should be made; specifically, arrangements relevant to effective communication which would lead to mutual trust amongst member states, adjustments to their respective interests, the decision-making process of the organizations, and their methods of engagement, among others.
- (3) Participants acknowledged that subregional organizations should pay attention to constructing their own early warning systems, and also that the UN, the OAU and subregional organizations should make concerted efforts to build an integrated and functional three-tier early warning system. Recalling some delayed responses by the international community in dealing with African conflicts in the 1990s, participants, being aware of the need for early response and action, emphasized the importance of efforts in bridging the time-lag between early warning and early response.
- (4) Participants expressed support for the efforts by subregional organizations to tackle security problems, such as the proliferation of small arms, trafficking in illegal goods, and environmental problems through regional programs.
- (5) Participants shared the view that subregional organizations can play a significant role in the post-conflict stage, such as monitoring cease-fire, or “DDR” (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration). There was agreement among participants that the accumulation and dispersion of small arms, which is one of the most significant causes of the expansion and prolonging of regional conflicts, be addressed with some urgency. A consensus was reached that ECOWAS’ (Economic Community of West African States) declaration of a moratorium on light weapons should be appreciated as a significant step, and similar practices should be urgently introduced in other African regions.
- (6) Additionally, a consensus was reached that further discussion is welcome on the issue as to whether regional or subregional organizations would be placed at the focal point, where appropriate, as the main recipient of international assistance. In relation to this, the leading role of the OAU was recognized, as well as the need to support efforts to enable the OAU to work in tandem with subregional organizations.
- (7) While each subregional organization is surrounded by different circumstances, there are many commonalities that subregional organizations share. Assuming that the exchange of past experiences between subregional organizations would be mutually beneficial, the promotion of such mutual exchange and other cooperative activities should also be given consideration.”

The following papers submitted to this symposium are particularly relevant to this theme:

- Adebayo Adedeji, "Capacity, Achievements and Constraints of Subregional Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution";
- Jackie Cilliers, "Strengthening Sub-Regional Organizations in Africa";
- Mitsuro Donowaki, "Keynote Speech";
- David Hamadziripi, "Capacity, Achievements and Constraints of Subregional Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Resolution: SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security";
- Sverre Lodgaard, "Conflict Prevention in Sub-Saharan Africa: Desirable Assistance by the International Community"; and
- M. Sahnoun, "The Role of the Regional, Subregional and Non-governmental Organizations in Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution".

Annex

A

Issue Paper

Background and Objectives of the Forum

In the 1990s, some 70 or 80 countries experienced armed conflicts. Promoting reconciliation and confidence-building among different groups is a major challenge in these countries.

Even in countries where large-scale armed conflict has not occurred, there are increasing disputes over natural resource management, i.e., water, forest and mineral resources. This is adding tensions for potential conflicts.

Against these backgrounds, this forum aims at discussing “prevention of conflict resurgence” in general and “natural resource management and conflict prevention” in particular, with participation by both foreign and Japanese experts on these subjects.

These themes represent major challenges to development cooperation in the present world under dynamics of globalization.

* * *

Following are issues to be presented by panelists and to be discussed with the audience

Session1: Conflict Prevention in Natural Resource Management

Major themes in this session are:

- 1) Natural resource management related to the livelihood of local population (forestry, water etc.), and**
- 2) Natural resource management related to large economic interests and transnational companies; e.g., diamond and other mineral resources**

Session 1 aims to review issues common to various sectors and their policy implications. **Relevant issues under theme 1** could include:

- The gap between modern law and indigenous customary laws concerning rights on land forestry ownership and their use
- Population increase
- Relations between urban and rural sectors
- Trade with developed countries (timber, fishery, etc.)
- Inter-generation gap over resource management
- Resource management and/or destruction by the military
- Natural resource exploitation in minorities' areas
- Necessary **stakeholder analysis** on social relations (involving power structure and conflicting interests among agro-export producers, small-scale farmers or fisher folk, central and local government agents, conservation groups and ethnic minorities)
- Trade-offs to be addressed at the policy level, e.g., choosing between short-term and long-term horizons, or balancing conflicting objectives such as conservation, development, equity and peace
- How to conduct stakeholder analysis (access to relevant information and its disclosure and/or non-disclosure)
- Relevance and limits of stakeholder analysis
- How to coordinate among different stakeholders towards positive-sum (rather than zero-sum) solutions
- Policy implications for aid agencies, both multilateral and bilateral (e.g., World Bank, JICA and JBIC)

Relevant issues under the theme 2 could include:

- Mineral resources not as additional factors in conflicts but as part of the structure of global industrial development and conflicts happening in the periphery.
- Industrial countries as part of the conflict-generating global structures
- Zero-sum conditions in countries in conflict between the haves and the have-nots created by mineral resources, and the non-zero-sum conditions in the core regions of industrial development.
- Mineral resources' zero-sum effects of conflicts, as part of complex power/interest competition locally and globally, involving financial speculation, different alliances among ethnic security communities,

multinational corporations and transnational criminal organizations engaged in smuggling of mineral resources, women and children, drugs and arms.

- The needs for creation of positive-sum conditions between ethnic communities based on mutually reinforcing process of socio-ecological reproduction of mutually beneficial resource development systems, involving both renewable and non-renewable resources. This requires structural adjustment of the global economy to take account of local economic/political and ecological-cultural realities.
- All these points lead to an alternative conceptual framework taking into account ethnic conflicts as integral parts of global economic and political systems.
- Policy coherence among ODA, trade, and investment, environment, social structure and culture is essential.

Session 2: Prevention of Conflict Resurgence

There are both short-term and long-term issues to be addressed. The linkage between the two is also important.

1) Short-term issues

- Disarmament (including small arms) and demobilization of soldiers
- Land mine removal
- Health and medical care
- Spiritual healing (including healing for ex-child soldiers)
- Creation of legal and policy systems (law and order)
- Elections
- Involvement of civil society

2) Long-term issues

- Social integration (This should include mitigating or healing measures for “post-traumatic stress syndrome” not only at individual level but at community and ethnic group levels. Reconciliation and co-existence should be promoted, involving every factor and group, e.g., family, ethnic group, culture and religion.)
- Peace education and promotion of a culture of tolerance and peace
- Broad-based development

- Introduction of “conflict prevention lens” and “conflict impact assessment” to make sure that conventional ODA-funded activities would not strengthen factors of potential conflict.
- Good governance
- How to coordinate among different stakeholders towards positive-sum (rather than zero-sum) solutions
- Policy implications for aid agencies, both multilateral and bilateral (e.g., World Bank, JICA and JBIC)
- Involvement of civil society
- Role of Japan, as a non-Western donor

B

Forum

Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding: Natural Resource Management and Conflict Prevention

Program

9:30-9:40 *Opening Remarks*

- Prof. Yozo Yokota, Special Advisor to the Rector, United Nations University
- Amb. Masaki Saito, Executive Director, FASID

9:40-12:30 *Session 1: Conflict Prevention in Natural Resource Management*

Moderator: Dr. Kazuo Takahashi, Director, International Development Research Institute, FASID

9:40-11:00 *Presentations*

- Prof. Jacques Chevalier, Professor and Graduate Coordinator in Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa
- Prof. Larry Fisher, Director, Program on Environment and Community, Center for the Environment, Cornell University
- Mr. Thadeus Yus, Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Tanjungpura University
- Prof. Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Chubu University

11:00-11:20 *Coffee Break*

11:20-12:30 *Comments and Discussion*

- Prof. Yozo Yokota, Special Advisor to the Rector, United Nations University
- Mr. Yoshihiko Kono, Senior Executive Director, Japan Bank for International Cooperation
- Dr. Jin Sato, Associate Professor of the Institute of Environmental Studies, the Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, University of Tokyo

12:30-14:00 Lunch

14:00-16:40 Session 2: Prevention of Conflict Resurgence

Moderator: Prof. Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Chubu University

14:00-15:20 Presentations

- Ms. Susan Marks, Vice President, Search for Common Ground
- Dr. Etsuko Kita, Professor, International Public Health, Japan Red Cross Kyushu International College of Nursing
- Mr. Sukehiro Hasegawa, Director, UNDP Tokyo Office

15:20-15:40 Coffee Break

15:40-16:40 Comments and Discussion

- Prof. Nobuhiko Suto, Member of House of Representative
- Mr. Kinichi Komano, Director, Research and Programming Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, MOFA
- Mr. Satoru Kurosawa Director, Planning and Evaluation Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency
- Prof. Naoki Saito, Professor, Graduate School of Law, Heisei International University

16:40-17:30 General Discussion

Moderator: Dr. Kazuo Takahashi

C

Opening Remarks

Yozo Yokota

Special Advisor to the Rector, United Nations University

On behalf of Dr. Hans van Ginkel, the Rector of the United Nations University, who is unable to attend this forum due to commitments abroad, I wish to extend a warm welcome to all of you to this forum entitled 'Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding: Natural Resources Management and Conflict Prevention,' which is co-sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, the United Nations University, and the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development. Recent studies indicate that many armed conflicts today are closely linked to natural resource management, as the new term 'conflict diamonds' implies. Serious armed conflicts occurred over natural resources such as diamonds and oil. Adequate management of such natural resources is an essential precondition for effective prevention of such armed conflicts. There is also a hope that if such natural resources are properly managed, the income therefrom can be prudently utilized for investment, economic development, or for satisfying social needs, instead of purchasing arms and ammunition. The countries and areas hitherto so bitterly infested by fighting will have a good chance of achieving political stability, economic growth, and better healthcare and education. I hope that the presentations and discussions from this forum will be an effective starting point for the world's efforts to manage natural resources so as not to generate armed conflicts but to prevent or bring an end to them, and further to utilise those natural resources which were fortunately abandoned in many conflict areas of the world for improving the living conditions of the peoples. Once again, I thank you all for participating in this forum and I hope that the forum will result in very successful conclusions. Thank you very much.

Opening Remarks

Masaki Saito

Executive Director, FASID

Thank you for coming to join us in this heat. I am serving as the executive director of FASID, which is co-sponsoring this forum on 'Evolving Concept of Peacebuilding: Natural Resource Management and Conflict Prevention' along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan and the United Nations University.

FASID has been conducting research on the theme of 'conflict and development' with the leadership of Prof. Mushakoji and Dr. Takahashi, Director of FASID's International Development Research Institute. This forum provides an opportunity for FASID to present the outcome of our efforts and therefore I have been taken great interest in this forum.

This keen interest also arises from my own experience. I was given an opportunity to serve as the Japanese Ambassador to Cambodia for three years up until last September, and peacebuilding is exactly what I was working on in Cambodia. Let me talk a little about Cambodia. Cambodia spent most of its time in internal conflict over the past three decades, dubbed the 'lost three decades,' and therefore the country has been devastated. In March of 1970, General Lon Nol, who is pro-American, carried out a coup d'état, expelling Prince Sihanouk, and the Khmer Rouge controlled the country afterwards for about four years. Then in 1977 we saw the invasion of the Vietnamese army, pushing out the Khmer Rouge and remaining in the country for a decade. After these events, the Paris peace accord was reached and elections were held under the UNTAC. Although in July of 1997 there was another round of military conflict between political factions in Phnom Penh, finally Cambodia successfully established a coalition government in November of 1998, following the general election of that year. The Cambodians are now seeing the most peaceful period of the last three decades.

My three-year term as ambassador coincided with the period of peacebuilding in Cambodia. In the first half, I was involved in 'removing the

wreckage' of conflict, and the second half in facilitating a new round of financial assistance from Japan. Cambodia is now struggling with legacies of the conflict. For instance, Cambodia doesn't have enough people capable of working for the reconstruction of the country, because during the time of the Khmer Rouge, some one or two million people, including intellectuals, were reportedly massacred. Improper timber logging during this period is another problem. Forest areas in Cambodia are barely retained with the help of forestry reform programs. Furthermore, Cambodia has been facing the problem of anti-personnel landmines, of which 6 million remain in Cambodia's soil. It only costs a few dollars to produce each landmine, but it requires over 100 dollars to remove.

We should also pay attention to the issue of small arms. It is said that about half a million small arms remain in the hands of citizens. The Cambodian government is working hard for their collection. The EU and Japan are trying to help Cambodia with the 'Weapons for Development' project, in which they offer development assistance, such as building local schools or local health centers, in return for the guns to be handed over to the Cambodian government. In addition, there are refugee-related problems. We have seen a large number of refugees that fled Cambodia in the last three decades. Some remain abroad and others returned home only to find out the land they used to own is now occupied by somebody else, causing disputes over land ownership. There is also the problem of trauma. For instance, when people hear a big noise, they fear that might be bombing sound. A more serious trauma can be seen, I think, in the Cambodians' pattern of behaviour. It has become their practice to use foreign pressure to solve internal problems, thereby making them international problems. This kind of mentality still exists, and this is hampering the efforts for peacebuilding and reconstruction of the country.

Along with these issues, I would like to let you know about the demobilization of troops as one of the reform programs in Cambodia. A united Cambodian army was finally formed and the government is putting a great deal of effort into demobilizing redundant soldiers and helping them reintegrate into society. First of all, they issued ID cards to each soldier in order to find out the actual number of soldiers. As a result, they found 15,000 so-called 'ghost soldiers'—soldiers whose names were on the payroll but who were not soldiers. These people include widows of soldiers or even families, and the number reached as many as 160,000. Although they did not actually receive any financial

assistance from the government, the army claimed they were paying, which meant somebody was pocketing the excess pay. In such conditions, the government is trying to cut 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers, reducing the military force to 100,000. Because 85% of soldiers are former peasants, many of these demobilized soldiers will be sent back to farm life.

In this regard, police force reduction is more difficult. Many policemen are from cities. This means that unless the government provides jobs for them, they won't be readily reintegrated into society. They could even cause a recurrence of conflict if they are left alone. Therefore the government is struggling hard to prevent such a situation.

Considering these experiences Cambodia is going through, I deeply feel the importance of peacebuilding. How can we prevent conflict or how can we stop ongoing conflicts and offer development assistance in order to bring peace? These are difficult challenges to meet, particularly in the era when we are seeing many conflicts or disputes over natural resources.

Despite the heat outside, it is quite cool here in this conference hall. So I hope you will keep your mind cool and have good exercise for the mind today. Thank you very much.

D

Profile of Panellists (in alphabetical order)



Prof. Jacques CHEVALIER

Prof. Chevalier is Full Professor and Graduate Coordinator in Anthropology at Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. He completed his doctoral studies at Edinburgh University, Scotland in 1976. Since then he has published numerous books on Latin American anthropology, slash-and-burn economics and ecology, peasant societies, symbolic analysis, ethnomedicine and ethnoagriculture. He spent several years coordinating an applied research project in sustainable development amongst the Nahuas and Popolucas of southern Veracruz, Mexico. One of his recent publications include a book chapter on NR conflict management from an anthropological perspective (in *Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management*, edited by Daniel Buckles, International Development Research Center (IDRC) and World Bank Institute, 1999). Professor Chevalier is currently undertaking a project supported by IDRC designed to generate and test an interactive, user-friendly learning tool (CD-ROM) in stakeholder analysis as applied to conflicts over natural resources, using current experiences and examples from various regions of the world (see <http://www.carleton.ca/~jchevali/STAKEH.html>).



Prof. Larry FISHER

Prof. Fisher is the Director of the Program on Environment and Community, Center for the Environment, Cornell University, and a Senior Extension Associate for the Cornell International Institute for Food, Agriculture and Development (CIIFAD). He coordinates a range of environmental and community development programs related to watershed, forest, and protected areas management, both in the northeastern United States and internationally, in Southeast Asia and Central

America. Before coming to Cornell University, he worked on agriculture and agroforestry extension, social forestry, and conservation management programs in Southeast Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China). Prof. Fisher holds a B.A. in Social Sciences (University of California, Irvine), a Masters in International Agriculture and Rural Development (Cornell University), and a Ph.D. in Natural Resources (Cornell University).



Dr. Sukehiro HASEGAWA

Dr. Hasegawa is Director of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Tokyo Office. He completed a B.A. in Political Science at University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan in 1966, a M.A. in Public International Administration at Graduate School of Public Administration, International Christian University, Tokyo in 1968, and a Ph.D. in International Relations at Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri in 1974. He has held various posts at the United Nations including Deputy Assistant Administrator and Deputy Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific, UNDP, New York, Director, Policy and Planning, United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOMII), and Deputy Executive Coordinator, United Nations Volunteers Programme, Geneva. Among his publications are *Japanese Foreign Aid: Policy and Practice* (1975) and “An Analysis of Optimal Institutional Arrangements within The United Nations Development Programme in Support of Tokyo International Conference on African Development” (UNDP, 1999).



Prof. Etsuko KITA

Prof. Kita is Professor at the Japanese Red Cross Kyushu International College of Nursing. Having graduated from Nara Medical University, she served as a clinician at Osaka National Hospital and Nara Medical University Hospital, and then worked with the Bureau of International Cooperation, International Medical Center of Japan. She has held various posts at international organizations, including United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and World Health Organization (WHO), in the field of medical emergency relief. Prior to the present post, she worked as Health Coordinator at the International Affairs Department, the Japanese Red Cross Society.



Mr. Kinichi KOMANO

Mr. Komano is Director of Research and Programming Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Japan. After working as First Secretary at the Embassy of Japan in Iran and the Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Geneva, he also served as Director of the OECD Tokyo Center, and Counselor to the Embassy of Japan in India. He has held his present position since 1999. His specialties are Middle Eastern issues (Iran) and Official Development Assistance (ODA).



Mr. Yoshihiko KONO

Mr. Kono is Senior Executive Director, Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC). He received a B.A. in Economics from Kyoto University in 1968 and a Diplôme d'Etudes Supérieures Spécialisées from Institut d'Etude du Développement Economique et Social, Université de Paris I (Développement Agricole) in 1977. He joined the former Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) in 1968 and worked as Chief Representative in the Seoul, Paris and Bangkok Offices of OECF, and as Head of Aid Policy Review Division, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), OECD. He has been in his current position since April 2001.



Mr. Satoru KUROSAWA

Mr. Kurosawa is Director of Global Issues Division, Planning and Evaluation Department, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). He obtained his MSc in Analytical Chemistry from University of Tokyo in 1980 and M.A. in International Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University in 1994. He worked at Planning Division of JICA, UNDP Headquarters, Embassy of Japan in Bolivia, Aid Policy Division of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc. From 1996, Mr. Kurosawa was involved in project formulation studies for post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, Palestine, Angola, and Mozambique. As Director of Global Issues Division, JICA, he is responsible for policy formulation of such global issues as peacebuilding, environment, gender/WID, poverty, population, and HIV/AIDS.



Ms. Susan Collin MARKS

Ms. Marks is executive vice president of Search for Common Ground, a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit nongovernmental organization working in conflict resolution internationally, with offices in the Middle East, Balkans, Africa, Europe and the former Soviet Union. She is a South African who worked as a conflict resolution practitioner and peacemaker under the auspices of the National Peace Accord during South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy. In 1992, she founded the quarterly publication on community and political conflict resolution, *Track Two*. In 1994, she was awarded a Jennings Randolph Peace Fellowship to the United States Institute of Peace. She is co-founder and board chair of The Coexistence Initiative, executive board member of Women in International Security, and Senior Associate of the International Conflict Resolution Program at Columbia University. She speaks, teaches, writes, facilitates, and supports conflict resolution programs internationally. Her recent book on the South African peace process, *Watching the Wind: Conflict Resolution During South Africa's Transition to Democracy*, was published in the United States and South Africa in 2000.



Prof. Kinhide MUSHAKOJI

Prof. Mushakoji is Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Chubu University. He was educated at Gakushuin University in 1953 and the Institut des Sciences Politiques at the University of Paris. He was Director of the Institute of International Relations at Sophia University and has been Visiting Professor at Princeton University and Northwestern University. He was Senior Specialist at the East-West Center in Hawaii and Consultant to the Committee on Society, Development and Peace in Geneva, and the Vice-Rector of the Regional and Global Studies Division of the United Nations University. Prior to the present post, he served as Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Meiji Gakuin University and Faculty of Global and Inter-cultural Studies, Ferris University. His publications include *Kokuren no Saisei to Chikyū Minsyū Syūgi* [the Rebirth of UN and Global Democracy] (1995) and *Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue* (1998).



Prof. Naoki SAITO

Prof. Saito is Professor at the Graduate School of Law, Heisei International University. He received his B.A. and M.A. in Law from Keio University, and Ph.D. in International Studies from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Miami. He specializes in international organizations, security studies, conflict prevention, and contemporary world history. His publications include *Senryaku Bouei Kousou* [Strategic Defense Initiatives] (1992), *Senryaku Heiki Sakugen Koushou* [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] (1994), and *Kokusai Kikou ron* [International Organizations] (1998).



Dr. Jin SATO

Dr. SATO is Associate Professor of the Institute of Environmental Studies at the Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, the University of Tokyo. He obtained a B.A. in Anthropology and a M.A. in International Relations from The University of Tokyo, a Master in Public Policy from Harvard University, and a Ph.D. in International Studies from The University of Tokyo. He spent two years in Thailand as a research scholar at the Regional Community Forestry Training Center (1995-97) and a year as a post-doctoral fellow at the Agrarian Studies Program of Yale University (1998-99). His recent publications include “Karen and the Land in Between,” (*Displacement, Forced Settlement and Conservation*, Berghahn Press, forthcoming), “Locational Deprivation in Comparative Perspective: Questioning Environmentally Sound and Unsound Sitings,” (*Journal of Social Sciences*, The University of Tokyo, 2000), and “People in Between: Conservation and Conversion of Forest Lands in Thailand,” (*Development and Change* vol. 31, No.1, 2000).



Prof. Nobuhiko SUTO

Prof. Suto is Member of House of Representatives and Professor at Tokai University. He completed his doctoral course at Keio University in 1979, after obtaining a M.A. and a B.A. in Economics from Keio University in 1975 and 1969, respectively. He worked for C.Itoh & Co. Ltd., and as Visiting Scholar at CISSM, University

of Maryland, and has also been Chairman and Representative of various NGO/CSOs including InterBand and ARC (Africa Reconciliation Committee). Among his publications are *Kyodai Risuku Jidai no Kiki Kanri* [Crisis Management in Mega-risk Era] (1990), *Sekai no Terorizumu to Nihon no Anzen* [Threat of International Terrorism and the Security of Japan] (1991), *Reisen-go Sekai ni Okeru Jichitai* [Local Government in Post Cold War Era] (1996), and *Kokusai Senkyo Kanshi to NGO* [International Election Monitoring and NGO] (2000).



Dr. Kazuo TAKAHASHI

Dr. Takahashi is Director at the International Development Research Institute, Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID), and a Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo, and now at Graduate Institute for Policy Studies. Having been educated at International Christian University (B.A. and M.A.) and completed his Ph. D. at Columbia University, he worked at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. His publications include *Reconstruction of a New Global Order—Beyond Crisis Management* (1992), and *Gekidou no Sekai to Tojyoukoku: Funsou to Kaihatsu* [The World in Turbulence: Conflict and Development] (2000).



Prof. Yozo YOKOTA

Prof. Yokota is Professor of Law at the Faculty of Law, Chuo University, and Special Advisor to Rector, United Nations University. He received his LL.D. and LL.M. from the Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of Tokyo, and B.A. in International Relations from International Christian University, Tokyo. After working as Legal Counsel in the World Bank and as a member of the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights and Commissioner of the International Commission of Jurists, he has held his current positions. His publications include *International Society and Law—Conditions for Peace and Development*, *Legal Structure of International Organization*, *Theory and Practice of International Organization*, *Preventive Diplomacy*, and *Internal Conflicts in Africa and Preventive Diplomacy*.

**Mr. Thadeus YUS**

Mr. Yus is a lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the Tanjungpura University, a state University at Pontianak, West Kalimantan, where he teaches courses on environmental law, basic international law, legal research methods, forestry law and spatial law. Starting in September 1999 he joined a EU-funded forestry project, the South and Central Kalimantan Production Forest Project (SCKPFP), as a long-term technical assistant and legal advisor to the project. Within the project he has been working on rural development issues associated with villages within and surrounding a EU pilot concession area. He is conducting a survey on customary law of local people living within the project sites, and reviewing forestry laws and government regulations related to forestry affairs. In terms of customary law he also manages conflicts that arise between the local communities and concessionaires. Having graduated from Faculty of Law of the Tanjungpura University in 1985 (Bachelor of Law) he studied at School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University (1990; MPA). He then returned to his alma mater as a lecturer in 1991. He has worked as a consultant in several foreign-funded projects in West Kalimantan such as Social Forestry Development Project, Kalimantan Upland Farming System, and Bukit Baka-Bukit Raya National Parks. Most of his work in such projects was to deal with customary laws and practices of the local inhabitants.