Comparison of African and Asian Development Models: For Mutual Understanding of International Development Policies Between Japan and the United Kingdom

Shigeru Ishikawa
Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University

March 2008
Comparison of African and Asian Development Models:
For Mutual Understanding of International Development Policies
Between Japan and the United Kingdom

Shigeru Ishikawa
Professor Emeritus, Hitotsubashi University

1 This paper is based on the author’s article “Comparison of African and East Asian Development Models” published in Proceedings of the Japan Academy, Vol.62, No.1 (September 2007). The author is grateful to Messrs. David Booth, Takashi Kurosaki, Hiroshi Mizuta, Yumio Sakurai, Masaki Shiratori, Toru Yanagihara and two reviewers for their valuable comments given at various stages of research.
Table of Contents

I. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 1

II. Conceptual Preparation - Going beyond Weber ................................................................. 5
   1. General Patterns of Patrimonialism .................................................................................. 5
   2. The Original Patrimonialism of China ............................................................................. 5
   3. Different Views on African Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism ......................... 6
   4. The “Neo” in Neopatrimonialism - Positives and Negatives ........................................ 9

III. Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa .............................................................. 12
   1. Formation of Patrimonialism in West Africa – With its roots in the Atlantic
      Slave Trade ..................................................................................................................... 12
   2. Positive Roles of the “Neo” in Neopatrimonialism ......................................................... 15
   3. Revised International Aid Approach - From Pro-Poor Change to DOC....................... 17
   4. Still-Remaining Mechanism through Which Patrimonialism Hinders Development ... 19
   5. Two Models of Ghana - The Only West African Country Showing Signs of Success .. 21

IV. East Asian Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism, and Subsequent Systemic Transition 24
   1. China - Breakdown of the Foundations of Patrimonialism,
      Development Dictatorship and Subsequent Developments ......................................... 24
      The Turnover Cycle of Chinese Dynasties .................................................................... 24
      Choices Made by the Republic of China - “Neo” Factors ............................................. 25
      Socioeconomic Foundations of Patrimonialism .......................................................... 26
      The Search for a Successor Regime and the Developmentalist Regime .................... 28
      The Significance of the Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji Regime ........................................... 29
      The Chinese Model as a Development Model (Institutional) ........................................ 30
   2. Patrimonialism and Democratic Reform in Thailand ..................................................... 31
      The Sakdine System and Chakri Reforms, Revolution for Constitutional Monarchy..... 31
      The Sarit System and Thai-Style Democracy ............................................................... 32
      Post-Sarit Developments ............................................................................................... 33
      The Thai Model as a Development Model (Institutional) ............................................. 34

V. Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................... 35

Initial Period in Research Planning ....................................................................................... 36

Appendix 1: When and how post-colonial independent states emerged in Africa .................. 38

Appendix 2: Application of the “basic framework (development model)”
      - The special development model of Ghana .................................................................. 40

Appendix 3: Growth of the middle class in Ghana, China and Thailand .............................. 43

Appendix 4: Socioeconomic Structure of Chinese Patrimonialism
      at the End of Qing Dynasty .......................................................................................... 45

Appendix 5: Application of the basic framework (development model)” to China ............... 51

Appendix 6: Patrimonialism in Thailand—Notes on the Sakdine System ............................ 56

References ............................................................................................................................. 59
I. Introduction

Over the past several years, while constructing a new basic methodological framework for international development policies (Ishikawa 2006), I have been working on the topic treated in this paper as an application of that framework. The motivation for his research on this application is a desire to contribute, as a Japanese scholar of development economics, to the resolution of the development problems of sub-Saharan Africa (hereafter “Africa”) which since the 1990s has been seen by the international aid community to be the last frontier of international development aid.

The African development model of this paper’s title is the development hypothesis formulated for countries of that region and found largely in the research of British analysts. The East Asian development model of this paper’s title is the hypothesis formulating the developmental experiences of East Asian countries, including those which have graduated or are in the process of graduating from low income status. This hypothesis is based on research by analysts of Japan which has played an important role in trade and investment in the East Asia region. In this paper, I have limited my analysis of the two models to the institutional aspects of development – leaving for now treatment of growth mechanisms – so that the the scope of discussion is manageable in a single paper.

The Japanese are relative newcomers to development research and assistance focused on Africa. With this in mind, we started the study of African development models by reviewing the existing Western research, British research in particular. When I first embarked on this study, I was surprised at the extent of Western interest and involvement in African studies. I was also struck by the fact that Western researchers incorporated into their African development framework a component that can handle the region’s premodern political systems, often using Max Weber’s concept of “patrimonialism.” In my own research in the past, I had included traditional economic and political institutions among those that constitute the given conditions of a development model. I, too, have employed Weber’s concept of patrimonialism to convey the content of these institutions in empirical studies of China and several other East Asian countries (Ishikawa 1990). However, in the East Asian countries, patrimonialism is now largely a thing of the past, what little remains do not hinder development. By contrast, in contemporary African studies I often encounter cases where major development-hindering factors are unexplainable solely through economic concepts, but readily understood when patrimonialism is an explanatory factor. Gradually, I have become convinced that if development models for these two quite different regions can be constructed using a common concept of patrimonialism, and if within the models the emergence, change and resolution processes of patrimonialism can be mapped, then effective comparisons and mutual understanding of Africa and East Asia may be achieved.

Methodology and working hypotheses

With these thoughts as its background, this paper aims to explore ways to overcome patrimonialism
as a development-hindering factor in Africa. To do this, we must first explain the methodology of the research and clarify a series of working hypotheses.

1. **Research Methodology**

The research methodology is provided by the basic framework of international development policies constructed in Ishikawa (2006).

1. The fundamental structure of the basic framework has two parts: (1) an objective development model for an aid recipient country constructed by neutral researchers; and (2) an external aid system of a particular donor for a recipient country. The latter is comprised of a development model created by the donor country applicable to the specific politics and economy of a recipient country as well as the aid contents with specific modalities, volume and conditionalities, etc. It is a subjective model partially informed by the aforementioned objective model.

2. Political system is one of the key components of the objective model of (1) above. One of its configurations, especially in contemporary Africa, is patrimonialism, Max Weber’s archetypal concept of control, and also neopatrimonialism, a more recently created related concept. In East Asian countries these factors have largely been overcome, with only some residual remaining.

3. The comparison of African and East Asian development models in this study is conducted through comparison of the basic framework from the British perspective and from the Japanese perspective. This applies to the mutual understanding, as well.

2. **Working hypotheses**

Basic Hypothesis: The central issue is whether patrimonialism, as an impediment to development, is overcome in the way that the Japanese advocate, by actively incorporating modernization elements supported by a growing middle class, or in the way that British analysts advocate, through early realization of democracy by strengthening competition among political parties. The Japanese argument constitutes the Basic Hypothesis of this paper. Analysis by the British think tank Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is representative of the British perspective and will be treated as such in the course of this discussion.

Sub-hypotheses: These will be described in two sections: one for Africa and one for East Asia. With regard to Africa, the scope here is limited to West Africa with a special focus on Ghana. With regard to East Asia, the focus is on China and Thailand.

Following are the Africa-related subhypotheses:

Subhypothesis (1): Patrimonialism emerges either through some natural historic process or through an artificial one. Looking at the characteristics of the process by which most West African colonies won their independence, it is evident that in that region patrimonialism emerged artificially. It
emerged in two stages: Stage One was marked by successful indigenous independent movements which had their roots in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. In Stage Two, governments of countries that had become independent sought common ground with existing power centers to compensate for a weak domestic support base.

Subhypothesis (2) - Stage one laid groundwork for the emergence of the middle class. “Recaptives,” intended slaves who were recaptured and returned to Africa by Royal Navy ships patrolling the Gulf of Guinea, pursued hard work, established businesses, engaged in trade and educated their children. This phenomenon in various parts of West Africa encouraged movement toward independence by indigenous people and spurred the creation of a professional middle class, as typified by our focus country, Ghana.

Subhypothesis (3): While any Western institutions or customs adopted by African nations can be characterized as neopatrimonialistic, it is also correct that patrimonialism can be overcome through the structural reforms (i.e., the transition to a market economy), political liberalization and democratization imposed as conditionalities for financial assistance by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and other major donors if the recipient country accepts the reforms with a sense of ownership and implements them effectively.

Subhypothesis (4): Inherent in these hypotheses is the assumption that the poverty reduction strategy underlying aid to African countries will continue to prevail. If this changes substantially, the possibility for patrimonialism to be eliminated will grow. The 2004 shift in policy by the British government from emphasizing pro-poor change to emphasizing drivers-of-change (DOC) in African aid has led it to revise all its diagnoses and prescriptions for aid recipient countries. Until 2004 the prescription for Ghana was solely to ensure that the President had the political will to implement poverty reduction. After 2004, the UK began to seek wider-ranging changes in politics and the economy; one of these was intensified competition among political parties.

Subhypothesis (5): Patrimonialism has not been overcome in Africa. Even in Ghana -- the most advanced country in this regard -- development-hindering effects are clearly at work in areas such as public finance, the civil service and the private sector.

Following are the East Asia -- China and Thailand -- subhypotheses:

Subhypothesis (6): Agricultural reforms in China that contributed to the establishment of the People’s Republic also destroyed socioeconomic foundations and weakened the patrimonialism built on them. The ensuring confusion led to a long period of searching about what kind of system would follow. Initial attempts at democratization, such as efforts to separate the party from politics under the Zhao Ziyang regime, were not accepted, but legitimacy was finally obtained under the development dictatorship authored by Deng Xiaoping. This format, however, created marked
economic disparities within the country among individuals and regions. Thus, after the passing of Deng, the era of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao began with aspirations for yifa zhiguo (governing the state by law) and then hosie shehui (society with peace and harmony). Whether this will encourage democracy depends on whether or not sustained growth will lead to further empowerment of the middle class. Though weakened, Chinese patrimonialism retains a significant residuum in the public finance system and administration.

Subhypothesis (7): In Thailand, components of traditional patrimonialism (the Sakdine system) were destroyed, piece by piece, by the Chakri reforms initiated by the King, himself -- the system’s ruler. Subsequent developments have been similar to those in China, with one exception: The moral authority of the ruler (the King) remains strong in Thailand and he continues to play the role of arbiter in domestic politics.

The Plan of This Paper: The main discussion is divided into three sections.

Section II examines the concepts of Weberian patrimonialism and related neopatrimonialism which is central to this paper’s methodology. Section III looks at patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in West Africa, i.e., Ghana, with analyses following the roadmap indicated by Subhypotheses (1)-(5). Section IV examines how patrimonialism was largely overcome in East Asia, i.e., China and Thailand which are considered successful examples. Subhypotheses (6) and (7) provide the outline for this section. Section V provides concluding remarks, the essence of which are indicated by the Basic Hypothesis.

The flow of analysis can be described as follows: The interim results are reached by comparing some development (institutional) models for overcoming patrimonialism. Two alternative Ghana models are examined in Section III and the China and Thailand models are examined in Section IV. One of the Ghana models is a middle class model derived from Subhypothesis (3), the other is a democratization model derived from Subhypothesis (4). A comparison of these two is touched on in the paper’s conclusion. Both the China model and the Thailand model are middle class models. Each of the four is is derived in its respective chapter and the final chapter examines the relationships among them.

However the analysis unfolds, at the end of this paper, the significance of the Basic Hypothesis and of the concluding remarks will be questioned from the perspective of mutual understanding of international development policies.
II. Conceptual Preparation - Going beyond Weber

Since the subject of this report – a comparison of African and East Asian development models through the prism of patrimonialism -- was inspired by the frequent reference of Weber’s concept by American and European political scientists, conceptual preparations in this section begin by going back to Weber’s original texts. However, even for a concept based on empirical research, no matter how global its reach or how elaborate, the reality which is its subject and which serves as the foundation for understanding is not static. For this reason, and because there is a vast region at which Weber himself did not look closely; namely Africa, in the following paragraphs the author defines several relevant concepts and introduces knowledge and information that has become available only since Weber’s time².

1. General Patterns of Patrimonialism

The general pattern of patrimonialism can be described in terms of relationships among three key actors: ruler, administrative officers and subjects.

(1) The relationship between ruler and administrative officers is established by an offer of government posts and perquisites from the former and an offer of loyalty and administrative services from the latter. In this context, administrative services refer not to supplying public goods but to carrying out measures designed to maintain and strengthen the ruler’s personal rule.

(2) The relationship between ruler and subjects is not constrained by a social contract for the exchange of tax payments for provision of social services, but by the convention that requires the ruler to guarantee to his subjects a minimum living standard level in exchange for their payment of taxes with crops, money or labor.

(3) For such a patrimonial system to exist, its legitimacy must be recognized by the administrative officers and by the subjects. By tradition, legitimacy is derived from trust in the sanctity of an order that has existed since time immemorial. Once this trust has been weakened or lost, patrimonialism faces a crisis of legitimacy.

2. The Original Patrimonialism of China

In contradistinction to the above-mentioned general pattern, patrimonialism in a specific country at a

² The author stresses in advance that to start from the concept of patrimonialism and think about development models is tantamounts, in Weber’s social science methodology, to going along with an approach of economic sociology that inquires about the archetype of rule among people and not an approach of religious sociology that inquires about the people’s ethics toward occupations and jobs (Archetypes of rule includes “rational rule,” “traditional rule” and “charismatic rule,” and patrimonialism is a form of “traditional rule”). The understanding and application of Weber in Japan has in the past leaned overwhelmingly toward a religious sociological approach. This is reflected substantively in papers by 15 social scientists collected in a magazine called Shisou (Iwanami Shoten 1968).
specific time tends to have a special pattern with degrees of variation. Patrimonialism in China was the governing system of successive dynasties prior to the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. Its special pattern was described in detail by Weber himself -- together with Europe under absolute monarchies and ancient Egypt -- as a situation of mature patrimonialism. His descriptions and other sources reveal the following characteristics of China’s patrimonialism:

(1) The bureaucratic system required strong institutional foundations to implement large-scale civil works for flood control, for military purposes and for transporting and storing large amounts of crops collected throughout the country as in-kind taxes. The system also needed institutional mechanisms to prevent certain high ranking officials from monopolizing certain government posts. The large-scale and elaborate civil service examination system (keju) functioned as one such mechanism, although the examination tested only the academic abilities of bureaucrat candidates.

(2) In terms of the number of bureaucrats per unit of area, the Chinese government was extensive rather than intensive and its control reached only down to the county level. Vast rural areas were left to village-by-village self-governance by clans. Retired bureaucrats or candidates who had passed the civil service examination but did not receive posts traditionally held sway in the self-governance of their villages and tended to support an order dominated by landlords and rich farmers.

(3) Consistent with the general pattern of patrimonialism, the state’s finance was nothing but the income and expenditure of the the Imperial Household, i.e., the ruler. Interestingly, as early as the Tang Dynasty there was some evidence of the existence of “national finance” as distinct from “Imperial Household finance” (Cui Jingbo and Wang Ziyang, 1979). This would indicate that even under patrimonial rule, infrastructure investment for flood control and other works benefitting areas larger than self-governing villages might be considered public goods. The rationale for this came from “heaven’s order,” the noblesse oblige of the ruler to protect his subjects’ welfare. When he failed to do so, he would cease to be heaven’s child, the Emperor.

3. Different Views on African Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region which Weber studied little. Influential scholar Le Vine insisted as follows: Weber’s concept of patrimonialism offers nothing particularly useful for Africa. While it may be useful for purposes of organizing research plans, it is not useful for analyses. And up to this point, many new studies have emerged and offered useful knowledge and information.

But the new studies that have emerged reveal great differences in understanding among researchers of the concepts and impacts on development of both patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. Studies aimed at proving that patrimonialism was the root cause of underdevelopment in Africa first
appeared in a series of African development policy research projects by ODI, (Overseas Development Institute 2000, Foster, Fozzard and Cornway 2002)\textsuperscript{3}. Subsequently, various suggestions for dealing with patrimonialism were made in the context of prescriptions for development and poverty reduction; the latest of these prescriptions is the drivers of change (DOC) approach by the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), to be discussed later. But as early as the 1980s academic literature had already appeared which examined African underdevelopment in conjunction with both patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. We look at three representative pieces of this literature:

\textbf{M. Bratton and N. van de Walle (1997)}

His [Weber’s] definition of patrimonialism may provide an accurate description of the political systems of small, isolated communities with rudimentary economies, including African chiefdoms of the pre-colonial era, and the practices of patrimonialism may persist at the local level in a number of different settings. But it does not adequately characterize any of the national political systems existing in our times, even the smallest and poorest of which possess bureaucratic institutions and written laws.

Yet, it is clear that some nations in the developing world, most notably in sub-Saharan Africa, retain in modified form many of the characteristics of patrimonial rule. As a result, political scientists have found it useful to characterize as neopatrimonial those hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions. (p. 62)

\textbf{V. T. Le Vine (1980)}

(Summary) The traditional polity in Africa can be characterized, for a vast majority of countries except those influenced by the Muslim-Arab sultanate (patriarchy), as diffuse patrimonialism. This system has survived through the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. Moreover, it has adapted well to each country’s modern polity. Analytically, it is useful to divide it into two categories: “traditional patrimonialism” which has survived with its identity and autonomy intact as a subsystem; and what can be called “modern neopatrimonialism.” In the latter, patrimonialism is an official or unofficial part of the modern, national order.

In many parts of Africa, traditional patrimonialism has different characteristics depending on the nature of the following factors: (i) the dominant social and religious culture, (ii) restrictions imposed on politics by the traditional constitution, and (iii) the real and mythical circumstances of the formation of the society. With regard to neopatrimonialism, the roots of traditional polity in African nations run very deep, and it is impossible to overcome it completely. However, what is

\textsuperscript{3} For the content and significance of these two documents, see Ishikawa (2005b) p.30 and p.32.
novel about it is that, as opposed to tradition, personalism has become very important domestically, especially due to the introduction of imported political structures, ideologies and behavior patterns. As the diffuse patrimonialism in Africa was flexible, it linked with ease key elements of African political culture to such modern posts as prime minister, president, chairman and general secretary.

J. F. Medard (1991)

(Summary) Medard uses the term “clientelism” to refer to Weber’s typal concept of patrimonialism. According to him, clientelism is found almost everywhere on the African continent in the forms of patron-client relationships and political patronage. While these two are both defined as an exchange relationship between parties whose relative powers are unequal, they have different elements.

The patron-client relationship has an anthropological perspective. It is a personal relationship of subordination between a patron and a client -- two people who have different amounts of resources -- maintained by mutual exchanges of benefits (excluding familial bonds). Political patronage has a political science perspective. It refers to distribution by politicians of official posts or special favors in exchange for electoral support.

Anthropologists have vigorously analyzed patron-client relationships in traditional African societies. Analyses of such interlacustrine kingdoms as Rwanda and Brurundi are examples. They are traditional, clientelist states in which all people -- from the king to farmers -- are integrated vertically and hierarchically by patron-client relationships.

When legitimacy is lost, political patronage becomes a pillar of a developing country. Coercion by itself is not enough. A clever leader will learn how to reconcile his own gain with the redistribution of the same resources, something necessary to obtain political support. Through patronage, a leader can bring potential opponents into his camp and control the mobilization of the ruling class.

(Next, Medard explains neopatrimonialism by comparing it with the structure of the absolute monarchy of France.) Even if Weber saw patrimonialism as a model of traditional rule, traditions were probably not its most important aspect. He said himself that patrimonialism can be linked to a bureaucratic system, as occurred in bureaucratic empires and absolute monarchies of old. Under Louis XIV the absolute monarchy had both a logic of patrimonialism and a logic of bureaucracy, and the latter grew progressively to outpace the former. In the case of emerging nations, the logic of bureaucracy was superimposed on top of the logic of patrimonialism, a process best expressed by the term neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism is not an anachronistic recurrence of history but a modern phenomenon that is related closely with modernization. Neopatrimonial societies have been incorporated into the modern international system. This, more than anything else, is the
point that distinguishes those societies from patrimonial societies (Medard (1991)).

To summarize the foregoing, Bratton et al. believe that the original definition of patrimonialism is pointless and irrelevant, that only neopatrimonialism is meaningful. Le Vine describes a steady state in which a traditional kingdom or sheikdom maintains its inherent form and coexists with a post-colonial state that has the appearance of a modern nation-state. Medard considers important only the actual socioeconomic trend wherein the traditional economy and polity gradually lose legitimacy and are replaced by a competition for political support.

It is clear that there are marked differences in views, or rather, marked differences in the characteristics of the countries selected as research subjects with regard to patrimonialism. The more important aspects of these differing views seem to relate to the effectiveness of neopatrimonialism in promoting development, and by extension the concrete forms of policies these scholars want to convey through the prefix “neo.” Let us look more deeply into this point.

4. The “Neo” in Neopatrimonialism - Positives and Negatives

Emerging Country Pursuit of Modernization - Positive Views

Those who believe that neopatrimonialism has a positive impact on promoting development seem to be in the minority. J. Medard is the leading scholar of this group. Relevant quotes are in the section above. The most important aspect of his argument is that he sees the workings of bureaucracy under neopatrimonialism to be similar to those under authoritarianism.

Presidentialism, Clientelism, etc. - Negative Views

The majority view is that the “neo” part of neopatrimonialism is nothing but a cosmetic modernization and that under neopatrimonialism actual institutions are no better than those under the original patrimonialism. Representative of this view is the “three political institutions of neopatrimonialism” argument by Bratton and van de Walle (1997) which is often referenced. This argument maintains that after the first generations of national leaders in Africa had past, in more than 40 countries at least three political institutions had prevailed and became, albeit unofficially, markers of of African neopatrimonialism:

1. Presidentialism

Presidentialism refers to the systematic concentration of political power in the hands of one individual who resists delegating any but the most trivial decision-making tasks. In Africa, individual dictators emerged from the military or dominant political parties and consolidated their power by seeking total and personal control over official, political structures. Ironically, in post-colonial Africa the number of ministries and the size of governments increased as the power of public institutions relative to that of presidents weakened. It is not unusual to find a cabinet
overseeing 35 to 50 ministries while the ministers have almost no authority. Presedentialism is also antibureaucratic. An emerging, large-scale state mechanism must be backed by a bureaucratic system to become an authoritarian institution, but presidentialism does not permit that.

2. Clientelism

All those with power under neopatrimonial rule derive their authority from the provision of personal benefits to clients. Within the government, personal benefits take the form of public posts, and in society at large, they take the form of public resources distributed through licenses, contracts and projects. In exchange for these material rewards and as a sign of their loyalty to the patron, the clients mobilize political support for and entrust all decisions to their superiors. This occurs at all levels. At the highest level, the political aristocrats obtain, as rewards and perquisites, public positions and control over monopolistic rents and the possibility to create their own clientelist networks. Prompted by systemic clientelism, neopatrimonial rulers encourage the state to intervene in the economy. The fact that political authority derives from selective distributions to state bureaucrats gives added incentive to promote extensive regulation of economic activities. Through this regulation, the incumbent elite gain extensive control over monopolies and economic rents. In short, public resources are turned into personal property so that benefit can be provided to those who pledge allegiance to the president.

3. Political legitimization through the illegitimate use of state resources

Neopatrimonial leaders scarcely distinguish between the public and private coffers, raiding the state treasury at will to meet their own political needs. As a consequence; (1) neopatrimonialism can not realize potential for development; (2) the constant redistribution of state resources for political purposes leads to chronic financial crises and reduced prospects for sustainable economic growth; and (3) this gives rise to an economic mood characterized by uncertainties and risks, deterring investors from long-term investment in Africa. (This situation exists particularly in conjunction with clientelism. Bratton and van de Walle (2007) p 66.)

Political Liberalization, Democratization, Structural Reform and Transition to Market Economy

The author recognizes the diversity that can be subsumed in the “neo” of “neopatrimonialism.” Its specific forms and types, and its impacts on development are as numerous as the variation in contact between newly emerging countries and the new international environment. His view is that we should emphasize the potential that some of these have to be critically important in promoting development. Important factors include, for example, structural and market-oriented economic reforms that international aid agencies press the recipient countries to implement with aid conditionalities. They include demands for political liberalization and democratization. They also include reforms and improvements in domestic institutions and organizations required as conditions
for joining international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. Organizational, institutional and systemic reforms pose risks of failing or creating distortions. While these risks must be assessed carefully, we emphasize that it is possible also to deal properly with these demands and use them as a means to reform and overcome patrimonialism. Some countries (especially in East Asia) have captured these opportunities and achieved development.
III. Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa

The different views among Western political scientists on patrimonialism in African countries revealed in the previous section must somehow be reconciled with and replaced by a unified understanding about the formation of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. It is essential, also, to gain an understanding of the mechanism through which these systems critically hinder development in Africa. These are the objectives of this section.

To achieve these objectives, I first selected a region in Africa that, based on the context of historical development and the availability of research material, seemed to be most suitable for this study. I then traced the formation and development of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism. The selected region is the coastal area of the Gulf of Guinea (i.e. West Africa), which historically was deeply scarred by the tide of trans-Atlantic slave trade undertaken by the great powers of the West. My research has not yet reached the stage where it can include coverage of the coastal area of the Indian Ocean. Nor is the history of colony formation in South Africa, the core of which was the Republic of South Africa, dealt with here, despite the significance of its more sophisticated and material civilization in comparison to that of other regions (Tadashi Okuma (1939)).

1. Formation of Patrimonialism in West Africa – With its roots in the Atlantic Slave Trade

When we turn our attention to West Africa thusly, the formation of patrimonialism can be explained as having occurred in two stages. The first stage began with the beginning of the Atlantic slave trade in the 17th century and ended with the birth of post-colonial independent states led by nationalists. In the second stage, the indigenous governments of these post-colonial states were forced to make compromises with the traditional powers, whom they had opposed prior to independence, in order to augment their support base.

Hard Work of Recaptives as the Central Pillar - The First Stage

The first stage was delineated by the following four elements which originated with the Atlantic slave trade and interacted repeatedly with one another as they unfolded historically until ultimately they converged:

(1) Changes in the slave trade system of England, which played a central role in almost all stages of the Atlantic slave trade, changes in the Africans involved and their nations, and changes in the policies towards the subsequent colonies and protectorates.

(2) Social strata and ideological formulation of the indigenous nationalists who came into being and grew under the strong influence of the aforementioned changes.

(3) The growth of kinship groups formed by indigenous Africans to protect themselves from the slave trade and which subsequently gave support to the nationalist governments.
Unofficial governments, i.e. kingdoms and chiefdoms, which, under the post-colonial regimes, coexisted with official governments while maintaining their traditional systems (Le Vine 1980).

Appendix 1 depicts and explains (2) and (3) of these four elements.

The most important development at the first stage was element (2), which began when England banned the trans-Atlantic slave trade in 1807. The Royal Navy deployed gunboats to patrol the waters off the coast of West Africa from which slave ships set sail. The human cargo in the ships caught, called “recaptives,” were returned to what are today Sierra Leone and Liberia. These rescued captives subsequently studied hard, worked hard, became successful as Creole traders and sent their children to be educated in England. This same pattern was repeated at major West African ports where Creole traders did business, and in this way educated societies were formed. From the beginning of the 20th century through the early post-independence period, leaders often emerged out of these societies. These nationalist leaders tended to reject traditional African political systems and behavior; instead they aspired to build nation states on the European model. They knew their goal would be difficult to achieve, but they prepared in anticipation of the eventual withdrawal of the colonial powers (Davidson 1992).

Compromising with Existing Powers in Pursuit of a Support Base - The Second Stage

In the second stage of patrimonialism formation, independent, indigenous nationalist governments were compelled to transform themselves into patrimonial states in order to strengthen their support base. A typical case of this process is described in the Ghanaian development model in Appendix 2. Here, we will elaborate on three points.

1. **Nkrumah’s Construction of Socialism**

The first prime minister and later president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, carefully avoided any compromise with the existing power structure. Instead, as was attempted in many African countries, he tried to strengthen the fiscal base and create a client class through socialist policies which included the creation of a vast state enterprise sector.

The epitome of Nkrumah’s socialist policies was the Second Five-Year Development Plan of 1959 (abandoned in 1961) and the Seven-Year Development Plan which began in 1961. With net investments of 476 million Ghanain pounds, the objectives were accelerated growth, socialistic reorganization, and reform of the colonial economic framework. Nkrumah’s “achievements” to 1965 are the following:  (A) The entire country of Ghana became an administrative jungle. The number of administrative ministries ballooned to 31 and 53 state-owned enterprises were created, scattered all over the country. A dozen public-private joint venture companies and two dozen government commissions were established covering a wide range of industries including mining, construction,
transportation, public works, manufacturing, agriculture, commerce and other services. (B) The financial performance of the state-owned enterprises was poor, and overall they required constant financial support. Those with monopolies and/or import protection managed to be profitable. (C) The state-owned enterprises were inferior to private companies in terms of labor productivity, unit costs and domestic resource costs for saving foreign capital. (D) The poor performance was caused by sloppy project preparation and corruption. The only exceptions to this were projects managed by the Volta River Authority (VRA). This was due to the fact that VRA was building the power infrastructure regarded by the government to be the foundation for industrialization and the World Bank and other major donors were focusing their assistance and investments here.

Despite these problems, it must be acknowledged that Nkrumah’s imposition of socialism had positive aspects: (A) Employment increased. The total number of employed at the end of 1958 was 292,000 with the private and public sectors each accounting for half. By the end of 1965, it had increased to 396,000, 70% in the public sector. Generally this increase in employment has been attributed to the socialist framework. (B) The number of educated men and women with specialized skills increased substantially after 1957. (C) Although infrastructure construction brought little economic return, the projects themselves remained physical assets. (D) Beginning in this period, international assistance increased.

Nkrumah’s successors inherited these positive aspects as the physical legacy of socialism. As a result, the weight of the state-owned sector in the Ghanaian economy has not decreased to this day (Killick 2004). As of 2003, the central government had 36 ministries overseeing 250 agencies. In 2001, 41 non-financial and 9 financial public corporations remained. Between 1999 and 2001, the expenditure of the entire public sector amounted to more than a half of GDP and its aggregate deficit reached 17% of GDP.

2. The Two Major Parties and Existing Powers

Details of compromises with existing powers made under post-Nkrumah presidents are unknown. However, in the era since the 1980s of two major political parties -- NPP (New Patriotic Party) and NDC (National Democratic Congress) -- these compromises have taken shape within the framework of a two-party system and patrimonialism has functioned with legitimacy. NPP inherited the traditions of Kofi Busia, Ghana’s second prime minister, and its support base has consisted of Europeanized petite bourgeoisie, the Asanterre, and many allied chiefs. By contrast, NDC has populist inclinations and is reputed to represent the have-nots of Ghanaian society. As can be seen in Appendix 2, populism and help to the down-trodden are qualities espoused by many traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms. In addition to these characteristics, according to D. Rimmer (1989), since the 1950s all of Ghana’s administrations and political parties have had ties with certain ethnic groups. There have been no armed conflicts among ethnic groups, however. After the ban on political parties
was lifted in 1969, candidates running for the five political parties which then emerged were predominantly lawyers, businessmen, teachers and wealthy farmers.

3. The Birth of Kleptocracy

Administrations in power between Nkrumah and the elected administrations of Jerry Rawlings (NDC) and John Kufuor (NPP) were either established by military coups or were unstable regimes that existed only for relatively short periods. (Nkrumah was overthrown by coup in 1966, Rawlings was elected in 1992 and succeeded through election by Kufuor in 2001.) Of these, the administration of Ignatius Acheampong (1972-79), which was established by a military coup led by middle-ranking officers, was unusual in that it was a patrimonial administration that lost legitimacy. Especially in the latter half of its tenure, bribery, embezzlement and theft became commonplace. Profiting from the misuse of laws and official authority (“kalabule” in the local language) spread from the highest ranking officials down through all levels of government. In 1976, an organized political opposition movement appeared in which professional groups of lawyers, doctors, college professors, accountants and engineers took part. They stopped providing services en masse and a brain drain of trained people began. Between 1975 and 1985, 14,000 qualified teachers including 3,000 who were college graduates left their teaching positions in Ghana.

2. Positive Roles of the “Neo” in Neopatrimonialism

The Case of Ghana: Stabilization and Structural Adjustment, the 1992 Constitution

In continuation of the previous section, this section takes up the case of Ghana, where in the 1980s an opportunity to move beyond patrimonialism was provided by the World Bank and the IMF. The two organizations played a prominent and positive role by supporting the Economic Recovery Program (ERP: 1983-86) and by offering a Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL: 1987-1993). The ERP was effective in ending economic collapse and high inflation caused by the Acheampong administration. The SAL enabled reconstruction of deteriorated infrastructure, liberalization of markets for inputs and outputs of agricultural products, as well as the abolition of price controls for general goods and caps on interest rates. In conjunction with the introduction of a market-oriented economic order, the SAL effectively put the economy on a growth path. Over the decade following the introduction of the ERP, Ghana’s GDP grew at an annual average rate of 5% and its GDP per capita at 2%. Unfortunately fiscal balance was lost and the positive effects of the ERP and SAL diminished after 1992 when each incumbent in subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections curried favor with voters by increasing wages.

A second factor helping Ghana to reduce patrimonialism, in addition to support from the Bretton Wood organizations, was the constitutional and electoral reform of 1990. The Rawlings administration banned all political parties after its successful coup d’état in December 1981. The
1992 Constitution guaranteeing the right to form political parties caused a reversal of that decision and made possible the 1992 presidential election. Behind the Constitution’s enactment was increasing pressure both from within and from outside the country. Domestically, there were demands from the pro-reform coalition of professionals, students, labor unions and former members of parliament. Internationally, there was a trend of political liberalization sweeping through all of Africa as donors intensified their governance-related demands in the form of aid conditionalities. The 1992 Constitution has been criticized for giving too many powers to the president and for making inter-party competition and parliamentary supervision difficult (Killick (2005)). Nonetheless, it was significant because it prohibited the president from seeking more than two terms (Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Furthermore, the new Constitution reinforced national identity by banning the formation of political parties based on ethnic, religious, regional or occupational divisions. The presidential term limit was instrumental in ushering in the two-party era, discussed above. The stipulation on the national character of political party membership was designed to discourage domestic conflict. (This section owes much to Tsikata (2001).)

Region-Wide Political Liberalization and Democratization

Structural adjustments and market-oriented economic reforms led by the World Bank are among the region-wide positive “neo” factors found in Ghana. The World Bank has provided Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) to developing countries since 1980. It is no easy task to quantify their achievements, but the overwhelming majority of conditionalities placed on adjustment loans (85% of the total loan amount and 82% of loans made to sub-Saharan Africa) demanded supply-side policy changes (1990 Report on Adjustment Lending). Unlike spending cuts, this required liberalization and marketization in every sector and every functional category (Ishikawa (1994), Ishikawa (2006)).

The movement toward political liberalization and democratization progressed in fairly similar steps throughout the region through the intermediary of governance aid with conditionalities from the World Bank and other major donors (Bratton and van de Walle, (1997)). According to van de Walle’s (2001) summary of 47 countries as of 1989, progress occurred in the following stages:

(1) During the pre-reform years between 1988 and 1992, 28 countries experienced public protests against the failures of patrimonial political systems, suggesting that patrimonialism faced legitimacy crises.

(2) The governments of 40 countries responded by adopting measures for political liberalization. This lasted up to February 1992.

(3) Then, in the same 40 countries, democratic elections of various forms were held. Gradually, presidential and parliamentary elections under a multiparty system became the leading goal of the reforms.
At the beginning of democratic reforms in 1989, the distribution of political systems in 45 countries was as follows:

(1) Plebiscitary One-Party System  16 countries  Elections in name only; in reality one-party autocracies
(2) Military Oligarchies  5 countries
(3) Competitive One-Party System  13 countries  One-party autocracies but multiple presidential candidates
(4) Multiparty System  5 countries  Free elections under multiparty systems met the minimum requirement for democracy. But they were incomplete, and leaders of political parties retained patrimonial customs.
(5) Settler oligarchies  2 countries  South Africa, Namibia

According to the distribution recorded in 1994, the number of countries which conducted multiparty elections and met the minimum requirement for democracy had increased to 16. At this time, Ghana was categorized as “a flawed transition,” defined as follows: The incumbent leader yields to pressure from the opposition and allows a competitive election, but he monopolizes electoral resources due to his advantage as the incumbent, interferes in the voting and ultimately wins the election. In 1998, the number of countries conducting multiparty elections had further increased to 40 and today multiparty systems with more or less orderly elections have become the norm in Africa.

However, the existence of presidential and parliamentary elections under a multiparty system does not mean that patrimonialism itself has been reformed or overcome. An evaluation of patrimonialism that continues to function despite these new election systems is especially harsh in Bratton and van de Walle (1997). They find that even if a multiparty system is introduced, this means only that the candidates fight each other ever more fiercely to get more votes by promising voters future material gain.

The implication of this is that the underlying patrimonialism is unshakable. Even when there are multiple parties, the party that loses an election loses everything; nothing is guaranteed to it as an opposition party. Under these circumstances, it is almost impossible to overcome what is a de facto one-party dictatorship. Some may argue that a one-party dictatorship is fine as long as development is achieved, but political scientists emphasize that this was only possible in East Asia, not in Africa. Ghana in the 1990s and after became an exception.

3. **Revised International Aid Approach - From Pro-Poor Change to DOC**

The overall operational framework of DFID, which is in charge of the international development policies of the UK, is provided by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, while the
MDGs specify goals to be achieved, they do not specify how to implement the changes necessary to reach them. This is true, also, with respect to the particular situation of each aid recipient country.

Since 1997, DFID has devoted considerable intellectual resources to analysis of the best methods for promoting achievement of goals. Initially, DFID focused much of its attention on pro-poor change. According to a subsequent definition, this is a mixed strategy consisting of sustainable economic growth, empowerment, access to markets, services and assets, security, and environmental sustainability. Before 2004, when DIFD shifted to emphasize drivers of change (DOC), the existence or absence of pro-poor change was thought to depend on whether the chief of state had the political will to implement poverty reduction measures (Warrener (2004), Ishikawa (2003)).

In time, DFID realized that its pro-poor change approach was not adequate for successful implementation of its international development policies and came to believe that it would have to identify all the changes that are actually occurring in aid recipient countries as well as their causes. In 2003, DFID distributed a survey to its country offices that covered six items: (1) basic country analysis, (2) medium-term dynamics of change, (3) role of external forces, (4) link between change and poverty reduction, (5) operational implications, and (6) DFID’s organizational incentives.

The DOC approach was adopted by DFID in 2004 on the basis of the survey responses as prepared by its country offices with the support of British and local universities, think tanks and consultants. Warrener reports that DOC seems to be organized quite differently for each country. In this paper, we will take a look at the DOC for Ghana (Killick (2004); Booth, Crook, Gyimah-Boadi, Killick and Luckkam (2005)).

1. With regard to the medium-term prospect of Ghana’s future, there are three possible alternative scenarios. (1) Continuation of the moderate progress of the last two decades, meaning 2% per capita GDP growth. This can be accommodated within existing institutions and capabilities, but there would be no breakthrough into Asian-style economic and social progress. (2) Regression to negative growth and political decay, as in the Acheampong-Akufo period. Democracy will break down and the economy will decline. (3) ‘Break the mould,’ - opening the way to achieve 4.5% per capita GDP growth (2000-2015). The DOC shows specifically how to get there.

2. Among the economic drivers of change, the most important are increased international trade and competition, greater competition and efficiency among financial institutions, new foreign direct investment, and more investment by Ghanaian entrepreneurs.

3. Among the political drivers of change, the following four items are the most important:
   (1) intensified competition between political parties.
   (2) the free flow of information accompanied by an increasingly critical mass media and informed public opinion.
(3) an increased role of the diaspora of Ghanaian emigrants in national political as well as economic life.

(4) vigorous growth of a civil society that combines strong social roots and a healthy mix of different forms of interest representation.

4. Among the Ghanaian drivers of change, ODI regards Item 3(1) -- intensified competition between political parties -- as critically important. According to its commentary, in the 1960s and 1970s the competition for access to state power was, for each political party, an all-or-nothing game where the winner would monopolize all state resources as spoils and the losers would have nothing. However, the 1992 Constitution brought some limitations to the wide-ranging privileges afforded to the incumbent president. As a result, competition among political parties has become more balanced, and change of government has become a real possibility. At the same time, the regional privileges of the political parties have decreased.

5. How does ODI’s emphasis on democracy relate to its views of development? In the papers referenced above, the ODI analysts accept that the evidence for a systematic linkage leading from democratization to improved economic performance is weak or nonexistent, and that many of the most successful non-African developmental states have been nondemocratic. (These non-African states are none other than East Asian countries.) ODI states that its argument is based on the belief that in Ghana, state policy autonomy and effectiveness are unlikely to increase without the spur of democratic political competition, and that in certain limited respects competition for votes has already resulted in improvements to the policy process.

4. Still-Remaining Mechanism through Which Patrimonialism Hinders Development

If patrimonialism survives in West Africa despite the positive influence of the “neo” factors, how strongly does it impede move towards development? Some of the best research so far on this subject was conducted by Tony Killick of ODI, an economist who has a long history of studying African economies and especially the Ghanaian economy (T. Killick 2004, 2005). The description of economic institutions of the Ghanaian development model in Appendix 2 owes much to Killick’s knowledge and insight.

The most significant impediment is that under patrimonialism public finance becomes a means for the president to manage his private assets so that clients will not leave him, and its function to finance public polices for development disappears.

Killick (2004) attempted to demonstrate this based on three characteristics of state finances. First, to make the exercise of patronage easier, the entire budget and its constituents are not disclosed to outsiders and budgetary decisions are made behind closed doors. Second, there are significant differences between the formal budget and actual expenditures, rendering the entire process of
budget preparation a mere formality. Third, the most important among budgetary line items are personnel expenses, which are strongly related to clientelism. As concrete evidence, Killick provided the following details:

(1) Much of the vital information for monitoring budgets and controlling expenditures does not exist in forms that are useful to policy makers; even when the information exists, it is extremely difficult to access. There are huge amounts of funds leakage between the central allocation of budgets and the points of service delivery. The World Bank’s pilot tracking survey of FY 2000 expenditures by the Ministries of Education and Health shows that for the Ministry of Education, only 51% of the allocated budget for non-salary expenses was actually delivered to the primary schools surveyed; for salary expenses the ratio was 65%. For junior high schools, the numbers were 48% and 75%, respectively. For the Ministry of Health, the figures were even worse.

(2) There are huge deviations between budget estimates and eventual actual expenditures. Based on available data, the mean deviation, in percentages of budget estimates, was ±42% for the Ministry of Education (2000-03) and ±68% for the Ministry of Health (2001-03). For 16 ministries, data show that the mean deviation between 2001 and 2003 was ±27%.

(3) Looking at the eventual actual expenditures, one finds consistent underestimation of wages and salaries and consistent overestimation of all other items. (in percentages of budget estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wages and salaries</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Capital formation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>+45</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (2000-03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>+76</td>
<td>-48</td>
<td>-67</td>
<td>-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health (2001-03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The bias in this table speaks volumes of the dysfunctional and anti-development character of the budgetary system.

The next issue is the loss of civil service functions. Ghana’s civil service, once reputed to be one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa, is now in utter decline, sharply reducing the government’s ability to implement reforms and new programs. Among the decline’s causes are, as the government’s PRS report points out, unacceptably low wages and dismal working conditions, failure of incentive structures and inadequate human resource management. As a result, capable civil servants have left the country or gone into the private sector. Paradoxically, overall there are too many government employees. Personnel reduction was implemented in the 1980s as part of World Bank-led reforms, but the trend was reversed and the problem of chronic overstaffing reemerged after Rawlings was
elected. This is largely a problem at the lower levels of the skills hierarchy, however, and is geographically limited to Accra. Understaffing is reported at the higher skill levels and in the outer regions.

This problem is not unique to the civil service sector. In a patrimonial society, it is very difficult for competent people to start successful private companies on their own and entrepreneurship is difficult to nurture. Even if it emerges, the entrepreneur will align with one of the two major political parties (NPP or NDC) that can produce a president, become its client and receive its protection. In this kind of environment, new power might emerge in the form of marked growth of the middle class - including lawyers and other professionals, teachers, journalists and wealthy farmers -- but a structure centered on entrepreneurs and businesspersons has never emerged. This is evident in Appendix 3(1).

It has been said that in post-colonial Ghana, the underlying social classes remained the same even as the ruling party changed. Other mechanisms through which patrimonialism hinders development, deserving special mention are increased severity of financial crises after the patrimonial ruler gains control over the central bank’s power to print money, and worsening poverty as a result of strangled industrialization, which in turn is a result of all these problems. Especially in northern Ghana, the disintegration of communities is both the cause and the effect of worsening poverty.

5. Two Models of Ghana - The Only West African Country Showing Signs of Success

From the previous examinations in this section, we can derive two alternative Ghanaian Models. They share the common objective of finding a way to overcome the original patrimonialism. One of them tries to utilize the positive aspects -- both economic and political -- of neopatrimonialism as explored in III-2., while the other tries to utilize the DOC approach which we have seen in III-3. Let us begin by looking at these two models.

Incorporating the positive aspects of “neo” patrimonialism

1. The history of the genesis of patrimonialism in Ghana is largely the same as in other West African independent states along the Gulf of Guinea. It began in 1620 and, as we have seen, unfolded in two stages. In the first stage, the native recaptives from the Atlantic slave trade (which was banned by England and other Western countries in the early 19th century) worked hard, became

---

4 Ghana’s political landscape is currently dominated by rivalry between the two major parties, Busia’s conservative NPP and the populist NDC. The relationship between Busia and the first President Nkrumah (who was in office from 1950 until 1966) is an interesting research topic. Nkrumah was originally a senior member of the Ghana Congress Party (forerunner of today’s New Patriotic Party (NPP)), a political group of westernized petit bourgeoisie, but he broke away and became the leader of the Conventional People’s Party (CPP). The CPP belonged to the same group as the NPP, loosely speaking, but within that group, it represented folksier people with less education and lower social status. Also, Nkrumah himself continued to oppose the traditional politics by chiefs. Busia (1969-72) was the leader of the Patriotic Party (forerunner of today’s NPP), mainstream of the westernized petit bourgeoisie, and he changed to have the traditional royal families, especially the Asantehene and many other chiefs as the support base.
traders who crisscrossed the coastal countries, and eventually spearheaded the nationalist movement which won independence. In the post-independence second stage, they sought to compromise with the traditional powers in various locations in order to augment their support base. The social functions of patrimonialism can be understood as similar to its general pattern as described in (III-1).

2. Ghana implemented the Economic Recovery Program and received structural adjustment loans from the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s. In the 1990s, it accepted aid that had conditionalities related to the adoption of the 1992 Constitution and other measures for political liberalization and democratization; and it fulfilled these conditionalities. Of the “neo” factors of neopatrimonialism, these played the most positive roles, and thanks to them, Ghana became a stable state with a two-party system and has enjoyed a moderately high rate of growth. As a model, the requirement is to incorporate the most positive of the “neo” factors.

3. The impact of fulfilling this requirement will be doubled by further growth of the social middle class, a result to be expected if the current moderate but stable growth is maintained, the existing professional-centered middle class is expanded to include entrepreneurs, the private sector is strengthened, and people are freed from a clientelism that depends on political parties.

4. The Ghanaian model is still basically constrained by patrimonialism, not yet free from its severe, development-hindering mechanisms. Deliverance from patrimonialism will depend on the growth of the middle class. The core of this model lies in III(2), therefore it can be called the SAL-based model.

DOC-Based Ghanaian Model

This model shows the steps to Ghana’s democratization when all the DOC items shown above in 2 through 4 of III-3 are effectively realized. Its core lies in two factors: (1) a deepening of competition among political parties in such a way that the possibility of alternation in power is maintained; and (2) an ability by political parties who come into power to provide clear, long-term, economic benefits to the voting public. For factor (1) to be possible, political parties that win elections cannot monopolize state resources as spoils. Factor (2) is a matter of collective action, the realization of which has been difficult in Ghana even after the implementation of factor (1). For (2) to be possible, accelerated economic growth is necessary; and for that, a shake-out is required of government employees, and also to some extent the hitherto protected central personnel in the essential sectors of the economy. The social impact of this would be immeasurable (Killick (2004), p.25).

To describe the DOC-based model in in terms comparable to the SAL-based model -- as a progression that leads to realization, one would simply connect the two aforementioned core factors to (1) of the SAL-based model. This would seem to indicate that its (3) need not be included because the DOC-based model assumes that democratization can be realized without the support of (3).
Of these two models, the one that depends on the positive “neo” factors (the SAL-based model) issues from the working hypotheses of this paper. The DOC-based model is supported by ODI who bases its support on the experience of Ghana, the essence of which is that state policy autonomy and effectiveness are unlikely to increase without the spur of democratic political competition.

When ODI describes the Ghanaian experience and the DOC model, it often contrasts them with the East Asian experience as one that differs markedly. Leaving aside whether such a comparison is appropriate, Killick states that “the most notable aspect of the comparison with Ghana’s experience is the characteristic of the linkage between democracy and development. In East Asia, the more fierce the competition among political parties, the larger the possibility that the policies lean towards short-term interests and avoid facing difficult, structural problems. In contrast, if the ruling party’s position is stable, and the prime minister and bureaucrats are protected from parliamentary interventions and pressures from the civil society, reforms have better chances. In other words, the East Asian experience tells us that the most successful developing countries with regard to development have been notably undemocratic” (Killick (2004)).
IV. East Asian Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism, and Subsequent Systemic Transition

This paper now turns to two middle income East Asian countries that overcame traditional patrimonialism more than half a century ago for comparison with the African situation. It will examine how patrimonialism was overcome in China and Thailand, the steps involved and what system was the objective in their subsequent nation building.

1. China - Breakdown of the Foundations of Patrimonialism, Development Dictatorship and Subsequent Developments

One of the characteristics of Chinese patrimonialism is its continuous existence since ancient times along the pattern described in Section II and flagged by Weber. Changes do emerge when we look at Chinese patrimonialism from the perspective of oscillations or cycles. Chusei Suzuki’s (1974) renowned research from this perspective, the Chinese Dynastic Revolution model, presents a cycle that begins when the patrimonial ruler (the Emperor) cannot meet his divine obligation to safeguard the peace and wellbeing of his subjects. The condition of his subjects becomes so desperate that they rise up against him. This is the model for Chinese history until the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. The subsequent period of the Republic of China was mostly a dark age marked by strife among military cliques; at the same time, however, it was an age of searching when “neo” factors were proposed one after another in order to escape patrimonialism. The Chinese Communist Party emerged as an extension of one of those factors, Sun Wen’s way of xunzheng (governance by one party). By the time it had established the People’s Republic, patrimonialism was essentially overcome because its socioeconomic foundations had been destroyed.

The Turnover Cycle of Chinese Dynasties

Suzuki’s Dynastic Revolution model encompasses dynasties from Han, Wei and Qin to Yuan, Ming and Qing., not including the peacetimes between revolutions. If these were to be added, we would have a dynasty turnover cycle model. In fact, the times of peace were periods of recovery from the collapse of the previous dynasty. During those periods, the exploitation of subjects by the patrimonial government which would become the basis for the next revolution was on-going but not yet strong enough to overcome the effects of improved living made possible by peace and stability. In the early Qing Dynasty, for example, a period of peace and stability continued for more than a dozen decades after the half century-long disorder at the end of Ming Dynasty was ended in 1638. A notable fact of this period recorded in literature is that the population increased as a result of advances in agricultural technologies. Specifically, crops native to the American continents, such as potatoes, corn and peanuts, were successfully transplanted to the vast hill country of South China. The Chinese population increased from approximately 150 million in 1700 to 300 million in 1794, and 430 million in 1856. In time, however, there were no more unused hills available, the Malthusian law of population kicked in, and farm income reversed course and decreased.
Subsequently, the effects of government exploitation of the citizenry became overwhelming. Suzuki’s Dynastic Revolution model begins here, when the subjects’ hardship approached a critical level.

Faced with a terrible situation, common people sought refuge in religious groups as a vehicle to doubt, reject and rebel against authorities. But the background is not simple. The level of people’s political awareness was very low, and they were not organized. Religion can be a refuge, but essentially its purpose is to provide welfare for individuals in this world and bliss in the next, not to challenge authorities. Nonetheless, it has social and political significance. The terrible destruction of people’s livelihoods and living standards makes them long for a savior who will save the faithful and lead them to an ideal world. The religious groups in the Dynastic Revolution model met this need. Under the slogan *tiansia daluan* (great disorder in the state), they challenged the existing powers, especially dynasties which claimed divine representation, and rebel leaders announced themselves as saviors. Major insurgencies against the Qing Dynasty included the White Lotus Rebellion (*bailian jiao*) and the Taiping Rebellion (Rebellion of Great Peace), and smaller religious insurgencies shared their characteristics. Insurgencies spread and displaced a vast number of people in many places. Both the insurgency groups and government forces which tried to suppress them exhausted themselves militarily and eventually order was restored by the bureaucracy.

**Choices Made by the Republic of China - “Neo” Factors**

The 40 to 50-year period of the Republic of China, from the end of the Qing Dynasty until the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, is not easy to understand because of the chaos created by conflicts, both civil and foreign. It is clear, however, that notable changes occurred with regard to patrimonialism. Research is still incomplete, but the author would note the following three points (Hiroaki Yokoyama (1997), Toru Kubo (1991), Rawski (1989)).

1. The key concern of politicians and important bureaucrats during the era of the Republic which followed the end of Qing Dynasty was nationalism and resistance through political and economic means to threats of colonialism as well as to actual invasions. When they turned to industrial modernization (especially military related industries) as an economic means, they had to rely on state-led creation of companies. They probably were also inclined to participate in patrimonial bureaucratic capital. Induced by FDI within concession zones, government capital was invested in industries, public works, banking and other financial enterprises. But they probably also had a tendency to become clients of rival high-ranking officials (e.g. the Beiyang and Zhejian conglomerates).

2. Hiroaki Yokoyama (1997) states that soon after the establishment of the Republic of China, three political system options were available: the way of Song Jiaoren (parliamentary democracy), the way of Sun Yat-sen (with the three development stages of governance by
military, governance by one party and governance by constitution, in that order, but in reality in
China, governance by constitution was not chosen all at one time), and the way of Yuan Shikai
(return to imperialism). The establishment of the Beijing government was characterized by the
loss of Song Jiaoren’s idealism and the triumph of Yuan Shikai’s counterrevolution, sowing the
seeds of military clique control over the Beijing government.

(3) When the Nationalist government was established by Chiang Kaishek in Nanjing, the regime’s
goal was to realize Sun Chungshan’s governance by one party (a transitional regime during the
period when one-party dictatorship is necessary). The Nationalist government’s financial base in
rural areas was initially weak, and it requested fiscal assistance from the Zhejian conglomerate
first, and then from the Beiyang conglomerate. However, as domestic political and military
unification progressed, and until the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War, remarkable institution
building took place up in terms of currency, foreign exchange, finance, banking, economy and
commerce; all in an effort to build a modern nation state (Ishikawa (2004)). Especially notable
was a government agency which started as the Defense Design Committee in 1931 and was
expanded into the National Resource Committee in 1936. It had many young staff who had
studied abroad to design and implement the construction of heavy industries. Their activities
went beyond the tradition of patrimonial bureaucrats (Wu Xiaolin 2002).

Socioeconomic Foundations of Patrimonialism

Another characteristic of patrimonialism in China is that it is relatively easy to identify the
socioeconomic structures which supported it. When we examine the socioeconomic structure of
China in the final stages of the Qing Dynasty or as the Republic of China, it becomes clear that
Chinese patrimonialism was supported by the interdependence of the following three components,
each of which has been verified by well-known published research:

Component (1): Overall structure of scholastic (exam-based) bureaucratic system - Chung-Li
Chang’s research on the Chinese Gentry and their income

Chung-Li Chang, 1990s president of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, wrote the following two
books when he was at the University of Washington: Chung-Li Chang (1955), *The Chinese Gentry,
Studies on the Role in Nineteenth Century Chinese Society*, University of Washington Press, and
(1962), *The Income of the Chinese Gentry*, University of Washington Press. The patrimonial
bureaucracy of China consisted of incumbent bureaucrats in the central and local governments as
well as out-of-posts bureaucrats called local resident gentry. The incumbents along with the local
resident gentry, who outnumbered them by a factor of 50, constituted the total bureaucracy which
exerted strong influences on the mechanisms of public administration all over the country. One
became a bureaucrat either by passing a complicated and draconian system of examination called
“keju” (Civil Service Examination) or by buying official posts, which latter accounted for one third
of the total. Weber considered this bureaucratic system to be the most important characteristic of patrimonialism in China.

Component (2): Control of agricultural villages as the economic foundation of Chinese patrimonialism -- Yuji Muramatsu’s research on guzhan (landlord bursary rental) in Jiangsu Province

A guzhan was a business agency that collected tenant rents on behalf of a landlord, paid part of them to the government as land tax, and delivered the rest to the landlord after deducting commissions and expenses. The local resident gentry were involved in the operation of the guzhan by virtue of their background of connection with the authority of incumbent bureaucrats. This research was based on the data of the yu-lin-ce (fish scale books), which were management reports of the guzhan, and sheds light on the contributions of the gentry class to the landlord-centered order in rural China (Yuji Muramatsu (1970)).

Component (3): Perpetuation of the bureaucratic system -- Chen Hansheng’s research on zutian in Guangdong Province

Successful incumbent bureaucrats donated assets to their clans in their hometowns, and one of the main forms of this practice was the zutian, or clan rice field. In addition to defraying the costs incurred by ancestral festivals, these donations mainly provided for the education of talented children within the clan to enable them to take the civil service examination (Chen Hang-Seng (1936)).

Appendix 4 gives some detail of the insightful knowledge in each of these three papers. Looking at highlights, we see firstly that patrimonialism in China was constituted by a tripod structure made possible by interdependence among the three elements described above. On that structure rested a stable governance and administrative system managed by a charismatic Emperor manipulating the civilian bureaucrats, or, conversely, bureaucrats manipulating the Emperor. Secondly, we understand that from the viewpoint of ordinary people, this governance and administrative system was extremely unsatisfactory because it inflicted on them the tyranny of local bureaucrats headed by the zhisian (county governor). This dissatisfaction is reflected in nonfiction novels that appeared at the end of the Qing Dynasty, Guanchang Xian Xing Ji (Present Situation of Officialdom) and Lao Can You Ji (The Travels of Laocan) (Li Baojia, 1901-06) and in the commentary by Shiraki Tachibana (Shiraki Tachibana 1936). This was traditional patrimonialism and although it underwent neopatrimonial changes throughout the Minguo Era, the tripod structure foundation remained unchanged until it was finally destroyed by the land reform/agricultural revolution implemented between the end of the Sino-Japanese War and 1952 by the Chinese Communist Party, following the birth of the People’s Republic and the civil war between the Communists and Nationalists.

5 The developments of land reform, or the agricultural village revolution, are analyzed in detail by Kyoko Tanaka.
Traditional patrimonialism in China, unlike that of Thailand to be discussed later, collapsed because of the destruction of its socioeconomic foundations, not because of changes in the components of patrimonialism’s economic functions.

There was, however, another important characteristic of the collapse of Chinese patrimonialism: the fact that, when the People’s government was instituted, it took over from the Nationalist government, which had been the last bastion of patrimonialism, all administrative, military and educational agencies and state enterprises under its jurisdiction, and their personnel, in their entirety. As a result, the patrimonial tendencies present in the personnel remained deeply imbeded within the departments and enterprises under the supervision of the new government. This hindered reform and development of state enterprises and state-run commercial banks. Appendix 5 shows detailed analysis of this development.

**The Search for a Successor Regime and the Developmentalist Regime**

After the destruction of patrimonialism’s foundation, what kind of a system would be desirable? After the establishment of the People’s Republic, Chinese society itself went through, the “planned economy” period (1953-78), the “reform and open” period (1978-1997), the “governing the state by law” period of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji (1997-2004), and has now entered the “peace and harmony” period of Hu Jintao. These period divisions and the historical outlook on which they are based reflect an intense search by the People’s Republic for the optimal system in terms of general

---

6 The fact that the government of the People’s Republic, at its birth, adopted a policy of taking the entire staff from the Nationalist government is recorded in Ishikawa (1960). According to the description of Wu Xiaolin (2002), the National Resource Committee -- the vanguard of industrial policy in the Nationalist government -- had 207 enterprises or business units, 220,000 economic supervisors or technicians, and 150,000 workers throughout the country. When the Nationalist government lost the civil war, the director-leel and other personnel voluntarily switched over. Everyone was transferred to the People's Republic, and contributed greatly to the economic recovery and to the preparation and implementation of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57).

7 Ishikawa (1997) notes that there were three residual tendencies the behavior patterns of the government and the state-owned enterprise sector: department ownership system, unitism and forced contribution. Under the department ownership system, individual line ministries claimed exclusive ownership of enterprises under their jurisdiction. This prevented the incorporation of these enterprises based on ownership by shareholders. Unitism refers to a tendency for individual enterprises, business units and departments to become self-contained communities, including the management of the service departments serving their employees and workers. Forced contribution refers to an administrative upper unit’s arbitrary assignment of contributions to lower units. According to Yasushi Onishi (2004), the People’s Republic of China budget law issued in 1974 stipulates that the budget of each department consists of the budgets of units belonging to that department. He points out that in reality there was, in addition to legally collected charges, a slush fund into which parts of the forced contributions were diverted without official state approval.
governance, but how do they relate to the problem from the perspective of patrimonialism?

We must remember that while patrimonialism itself was destroyed, the problems that patrimonialism were meant to address, the challenges it faced at each stage of the cycle of dynastic history and the breakthroughs it was forced make all remain. Specifically, these are the challenges of flood control implementation, irrigation and other large-scale civil works, and of achieving high growth in order to overcome the Malthusian problems of population and employment. The system chosen by the People’s government to address these problems and meet these challenges was a developmentalist system.

Let us now define the term “developmentalism.” In the author’s view, developmentalism refers to the promotion of development by the entire country legitimized by the support of the populace. Development can be defined generally as improvement in a country’s productive capacity and institutions though the efforts of its own citizens. Developmentalism presupposes that the people agree on the desirability of such efforts and cooperate willingly from their respective positions. There are a number of papers on developmentalism and they are summarized well by Suehiro (1998). The author’s definition, however, is close to Shiraishi (1994), who says that “developmentalism first gained political authenticity as an ideology that legitimizes an authoritarian system by positioning development as the goal of national policy.” The distinction between Shiraishi and the the author is that the author’s definition requires only that the necessity for development be widely accepted by the people, while Shiraishi emphasizes that there is also a necessity to strengthen the government.

The period that meets the author’s developmentalist definition was the reform and open period, the stated goal of which was to improve productive capacity. More precisely it was a period between the official acknowledgement of the supreme leader Deng Xiaoping’s so-called nansun jianghua (talks in the trip to Southern China) at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party (October, 1992) and his death in February, 1997. During the 1980s there had been discussion by General Secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang about abolishing the one-party dictatorship, but this was rejected just as democratic movements were crushed by the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. In the background of democratic movements was the metropolis-centric high growth which paralleled the progress of development and the remarkable growth of students and the middle class.

The Significance of the Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji Regime

While high growth did not end under the Jiang-Zhu Regime which emerged after the passing of Deng Xiaoping, the developmentalist system lost its legitimacy in the face of the severe economic disparities it created, in particular between cities and agricultural villages, between coastal and inland regions, and between households within cities. The author does not believe, however, that the Jiang-Zhu Regime tackled the issue of disparities directly. What it actually tackled was the legalization of the state’s governance and administration systems. This appears to be similar to the
goal of legal rule defined by Weber as an archetype that succeeds traditional rule, including patrimonialism. Following the decision of the 14th Congress, the 14-3 Plenary Session of the Central Committee in 1994 set out comprehensive rules for the market-oriented reform of the Chinese economy. The 15th Congress in September 1997, after the death of Deng, was a full-fledged Party Congress under the Jiang-Zhu Regime and the decision to pursue “governing the state by law” and “construction of a socialist country governed by law by 2010” were its main outcomes. This decision was subjected to deliberations by the National Congress (9-1) in March 1998, at which the decision was taken to implement within the next three years the following reforms: (1) The central government will abandon the planned economy and manage a market economy. The State Planning Commission will be transferred to the State Development Planning Commission. (2) The government will be separated from companies. Line ministries which in the past had had both administrative and business functions will now concentrate only on their administrative functions, to be handled by the State Economic and Trade Commission, and halt their business functions. This plan was implemented.

The 16th Party National Congress (November 2002) accepted the “treatise for three representatives,” produced by General Secretary Jiang Zemin. It stressed the importance of representing the interests of the mass of common people, most significantly by allowing owners of privately operated businesses to join the Communist Party. Some political scientists believe that, with this decision, the Chinese Communist Party became a national party instead of a party of one class. Regardless of the validity of that assessment, the importance that Jiang Zemin himself put on changing the one-party dictatorship governance system has been confirmed (Mouri 2004).

We have yet to carefully examine the progress of the legal reform of the Jiang-Zhu Regime., It is clear, however, that the reform was was not sufficiently effective with regard to the widening economic disparities. Hu Jintao’s goal of society with peace and harmony was submitted after the 16th Party Congress for the purpose of tackling this unresolved problem.

**The Chinese Model as a Development Model (Institutional)**

(1) Chinese patrimonialism has certain characteristics. There was a consistent pattern throughout the traditional dynasties up until the era of Qing Dynasty. It followed a similar pattern of ebb and flow in each dynasty and gave rise to a cycle of dynastic turnover. Furthermore, it was charged with fulfilling such tasks as large-scale, extensive civil works for flood control, irrigation and other purposes.

(2) This patrimonialism was eventually superseded when the socioeconomic foundations on which it rested it were destroyed by land reform and rural revolution instigated by the army of the Chinese Communist Party in the last stages of the civil war with the Nationalists. There remained, however, a need to maintain high growth for the continued construction and
maintenance of national infrastructure which patrimonialism had supported and for resolving the population and employment crises that were part of the dynastic cycle. The search for a type of regime to meet that need was undertaken by the People’s government as part of its larger search for a suitable governance regime. A regime with goals of legalization and democratization was not deemed suitable, instead a regime emerged that would pursue developmentalism -- the Deng Xiaoping regime -- and assume the remaining tasks of patrimonialism. This regime rose to the challenge and brought on high growth.

(3) The basis for the ensuing emergence of the Jiang Zemin-Zhu Rongji regime was a loss of legitimacy by the Deng regime due to the widening economic gaps that accompanied high growth. The Jiang-Zhu faction took a giant step towards the realization of governing the state by law, which itself presupposed a market-oriented economic reform; but they were able to achieve little in terms of reform towards democracy. Furthermore, the problem of disparity worsened, and necessitated a new gap-closing policy, which came from the Hu Jintao administration.

(4) A reconsideration of political liberalization and democratization under the People’s government is more likely to be realized by the normal expansion of the student cohort and the middle class which accompanies progresses in development than by any movement toward reform from within the governing class.

2. Patrimonialism and Democratic Reform in Thailand

The Sakdine System and Chakri Reforms, Revolution for Constitutional Monarchy

Patrimonialism in Thailand is represented by the Sakdine system which began in the 14th Century with the Ayudhya Dynasty and continued through to the Chakri (Bangkok) Dynasty of the 18th century and beyond. Significant legal details of this system were revealed by a French legal counsel for the Chakri Dynasty. The legitimacy of the King does not flow from the heavenly order of Confucianism, but from good deeds performed in former Buddhism incarnations. This system was mostly superseded by broad, modernistic social and administrative reforms (Chakri reforms) initiated by King Rama V (1868-1910), the patrimonial ruler himself, who feared colonization following the Bowring Treaty of 1865. The finishing touch politically was provided by the revolution for constitutional monarchy of 1932, a coup d’état by young military and civil officers who constituted the People’s Party. Following their successful constitutional revolution, the young officers attempted to create and manage state-owned enterprises in a patrimonial-bureaucratic manner in order to establish an economic support base.

The details of the Sakdine system and Chakri reforms relevant to this report are described in Appendix 6. They show that the Sakdine system met the requirements of patrimonialism defined as the relationships among three actors: the ruler, the administrative officers and the subjects. They
further show that Chakri reforms brought about a piece-by-piece breakdown of the components of patrimonialism rather than a general breakdown of patrimonialism’s socioeconomic foundation. With regard to Chakri reforms, it is notable that the conditions that enable development in Hla Myint’s Vent for Surplus Theory -- well-known as a development model from a productivity perspective -- were formed at the same time and in parallel with the implementation of Chakri policies, although we do not discuss this in the present paper.

**The Sarit System and Thai-Style Democracy**

Among the cadre of the People’s Party, the first to make a conspicuous figure was Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram who held the position of Prime Minister for 10 years after the constitutional revolution. However, it was Prime Minister Sarit (1958-63) who in the late 1950s introduced and established the unique Thai-Style Democracy into Thailand’s political system. Sarit banished Prime Minister Phibun in September 1957 in a coup d’état by a rebel group within the military. This coup d’état thoroughly rejected the Western-style, parliamentary democracy which Prime Minister Phibun had tried to introduce in Thailand. Akira Suehiro (1993) believes that the Sarit system created between 1985 and 1963 was a decisive political factor in the formation of post-World War II Thai society. Two aspects can be pointed out: First, the expulsion of the Phin-Phao group leaders who in the 1950s created a large faction within the Army and the police force and who came to control bureaucrat capitalist enterprises was essential, along with the banishment of Phibun, to the establishment of the political foundation of the Sarit System. Next, Sarit defined and propagated three concepts as the core ideology to support the system.

1. The three principles of nation, religion and King, formulated by King Rama IV (1910-25) as the philosophical foundation of national unification, were adopted as the central philosophy of the new system.

2. The aim was to develop the nation based on a developmentalist regime. i.e., premised on developmentalism as in Indonesia and the Philippines in the 1960s.

3. “Politics by father and King,” or “Thai-style democracy” in words of the revolutionary group, was contraposed against “Western-style democracy.” In Thai-style democracy, the leader governs from above through virtue. He reigns as a benevolent father over the people who are to be protected, an expression of Thailand’s unique governance principle.

As a first step in developmentalism (item 2) above), Sarit accepted recommendations from a large-scale economic study commissioned by the World Bank in 1957-58 to draft recommendations for Thailand’s basic economic development strategy. Medium-term economic development plans were prepared and implemented to achieve development efficiently. The National Economic and Development Board and national development banks were created to take charge of the process.
There was input from technocrats who had studied abroad, Direct investment by foreign companies was encouraged; and this investments promoted import substituting industrialization by private companies. Sarit also emphasized the enhancement of primary and higher education as an organic part of economic development.

**Post-Sarit Developments**

Changes in political situations in post-Sarit Thailand are diverse, but few have been either fundamental or rapid. We will discuss two points here as distinctive features related to the political system.

(1) Alternation of short-term regimes: A distinctive feature of other Southeast Asian countries (especially the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) is that since independence, one party has remained in power over long periods of time, unlike Thailand where successive political parties have taken power alternately for short periods of time. Fujiwara (2001) suggests a concept of “government party” to describe the long-term viability of administrations in most Southeast Asian countries. This is defined as “a political party that exclusively uses the resources of administrative structure in terms of organization, personnel and fiscal expenditures, and has become indistinguishable from the administrative structure.” This concept coexists with the usual categories of political system: democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism. In pointing out that the four aforementioned countries in Southeast Asia maintain the government party regime, leaving the party government of Thailand as the sole exception, Fujiwara acknowledges that this situation is not yet fully understood. The author offers his own tentative explanation, that the adoption of the government party system and its characteristically long-term administrations are likely to pose unacceptable threats to Thailand’s prevailing politics by father and King. It must, therefore, be avoided in deference to the King.

(2) Growth of student cohorts, the urban middle class and pro-democracy movements: Advances in economic development and education led to a rapid increase in the number of students. The number of registered university students increased from 110,000 in October 1973 to 860,000 in 1988. At the same time, there was also a marked expansion of the middle class -- professionals, middle managers, highly educated office workers, etc. -- from 350,000 in October 1973 to 1.92 million in 1988. These changes served as the backdrop for antiestablishment student demonstrations in April through May 1992, mainly at Thammasat University, calling for the immediate establishment of a permanent constitution, criticizing the corruption of the military regime, and demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, and also for pro-democracy demonstrations. Some emphasize that of the two movements, the student action expressed an antiestablishment sentiment that the latter did not. This does not serve, however, as a basis for predicting the future.
The Thai Model as a Development Model (Institutional)

The foregoing can be summarized as a development (institutional) model as follows:

(1) Patrimonialism in Thailand (the Sakdine system) was characterized by reforms taken at the initiative of the ruler (the King) himself, known as Chakri reforms. Thai patrimonialism was dismantled component by component, allowing the ruler’s authority over national politics to retain its strength.

(2) The People’s Party, which took power in the revolution for constitutional monarchy in 1932, did not have a fiscal foundation. It tried to establish one by creating state-owned enterprises. However, the creation of these companies was based on the formation of personal factions by powerful members of the party who engaged in infighting.

(3) General Sarit, who took over the post of the Prime Minister by a military coup in 1957, settled this infighting and played a decisive role in establishing the pattern of politics and economics prevalent in post-war Thailand. Prime Minister Sarit defined, propagated and legitimized concepts such as (1) development of the nation and the state by developmentalism; and (2) politics by father and King (or “Thai-style democracy” in the words of the revolutionary group) in which the King is a benevolent father, protecting the people who are led by him.

(4) In post-Sarit Thailand, power has been assumed largely by a succession of short-lived administrations because a long-term administration, such as those realized by the formation of a government party, is to be avoided as it infringes on the principles of politics by father and King.

(5) In the course of developmentalism introduced by Sarit, there have been marked advancements in economic development and education which have led to rapid increases in the number of students and in the size of the middle class. These groups clashed with authorities in demanding movement away from purges of successive military administrations and towards a democratic political system. Often the King’s intervention was effective in easing the tension.

(6) The future of Thailand’s political system depends largely on the growth of the middle class in the context of further economic development.
V. Concluding Remarks

This paper represents an empirical study for the purpose of mutual comparison and shared understanding of African and East Asian development models (institutional), with British and Japanese international development approaches in the background. Geographically, we limited the scope of our study of Africa to West Africa, especially Ghana, and our study of East Asia to China and Thailand. Our findings are as follows.

(1) We believe that the basic hypothesis has been proven valid. Our basic hypothesis asked which of the following two ways leads more certainly to overcoming patrimonialism: -- (1) active incorporation of the “neo” (modernization) factors and support for it by a growing middle class; or (2) early realization of democracy by deepening balanced competition among political parties. The answer supports (1), which is our (Japan’s) position rather than (2), which is ODI’s (Britain’s) position. The analysis was conducted by constructing two models for Ghana, reflecting the two positions, with results that support (1). The argument that supporting the middle class is important is confirmed by the development models of China and Thailand. The deepening of competition among political parties is only partially achieved even in Ghana, and it is not yet achieved in the other countries.

(2) The basic framework of Ishikawa (2006) was useful for constructing the African development model (institutional) based on British international development policies and the East Asian development model (institutional) based on Japanese international development policies, at least in creating the donor’s foreign aid system which is one of the components. This component in turn consists of two main components: the donor’s development model (subjective model) and contents of aid. In the African development model, the DOC model corresponds to the subjective model, and in the East Asian model the correspondence is with the active incorporation of “neo” factors with support from the middle class (I have once expressed the active incorporation of the “neo” factors using the term “adaptation,” and ascribed the developmental successes of leading East Asian developing countries at that time like South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia to their skillful “adaptation” (Ishikawa (1991)).

(3) The term “developmentalism model,” or the “East Asian experience” which is said to have provided it the soil to grow (ODI (2002), also came often into this study. This model emerges because society gives legitimacy to efforts for rapid development. It is characterized by the emergence of developmental dictatorships and relative easiness to implement long-term and basic innovation in structures and policies. ODI interprets this as a cultural characteristic of East Asia, and therefore its transplantation to Africa is not possible. However, when we look at the experience of China, we see that the adoption of the developmentalism model was limited to a certain period of the Deng Xiaoping era as a necessary contrivance to deal with the structural
characteristics of the Chinese economy (i.e., the necessity of large scale infrastructure investments, population problems, etc.) that were still unresolved after the basic difference of patrimonialism. One the other hand, the implementation of the developmentalism model in Asian countries had the positive effect of creating new growth which stimulated advancement in education, increased the number of students, and brought quantitative and qualitative improvement to the middle class. The overall consequence of this is, as our basic hypothesis indicates, a realization of democracy in the East Asian way.

Finally, we turn to the subtitle of this paper: mutual learning between the African development model based on the British international development approach and the East Asian development model with close ties to the Japanese international development approach. The presentation of the argument of the African model -- democracy, balanced competition among political parties -- and the argument of the East Asian model -- incorporation of positive “neo” factors supported by the growth of the middle class -- were not meant to be mutually exclusive. We can find space for compromise between the two, allowing both sides to learn something of value from the other, accept the findings and enhance the flexibility of its policy system structure. For example, the African model can incorporate “neo” factors through adaptation and support for the middle class, and the East Asian model can incorporate a deepening of balanced competition among policies. For a similar attempt, see Ishikawa (2005a).

The author suggests that at the policy formulation phase it is preferable to reference the African and the East Asian development models of this paper by replacing them respectively with the DOC-based and the SAL-based Ghana models. This is because the African model is constructed by arranging various possibilities normatively, to be brought about by policies, while the East Asian model is constituted simply of a summing up of past relevant experiences.

**Initial Period in Research Planning**

Before concluding this paper, the author would touch on an issue that many readers may have remarked. That is, in distinction from the many studies of contemporary African issues conducted by Europeans, including the British, and Americans, that begin with the post-World War II period, this paper begins by going back much further, to the period of the Atlantic slave trade or of its banning by England (1806). The author uses a phrase “initial period in research planning” as a technical term. If we use this term, the question that emerges from this distinction is this: Does a researcher have complete discretion to set the initial period in a particular research plan, or is that discretion constrained by the characteristics of the plan? (Initial conditions are past conditions that existed at the initial period.) The answer is that in the past this has depended on the individual inclination of
the researcher or his/her cultural environment. There are cases, however, in which the selection of
the “initial period” will exert a significant difference on the results of the analysis. Two comments
are useful.

1. David Booth says that most of the British researchers of his generation feel guilt about past
colonial policies (younger Britons are different). This does not affect their analyses, however,
because for analytical purposes they set the initial period to be after WWII, eliminating events
related to the slave trade. From here, the argument of Chabel et al. (1999) can be referenced: The
time when we Westerners had to expiate our ancestors’ colonial crimes is long past. We must
conduct constructive, joint researches and contribute to a better understanding of Africa.

2. At the other extreme is France, which requires by law that initial period of research on
underdeveloped regions include all of the black slave trade in which France was involved. That law
-- the Taubira Law of 2001 -- also requires that researchers accept that the black slave trade
constituted a crime against humanity, and that school and research programs in history and
humanities actively cover slavery and the slave trade. These provisions are strict: Any opinion that
attempts to discount the criminality of the slave trade -- even slightly -- can be prosecuted as a crime
under the Taubira Law. The stance of the French Parliament’s has not been consistent, though, and
by a law enacted in December 2005 now also requires that school programs recognize the positive
role of France in the history of North Africa. The series of riots by young Arab immigrants to France
from North Africa, among other regions, has revealed clearly that the government’s policies towards
former colonies are not working. Excellent studies and news reports regarding these so-called
historic memory laws and the other involvement of laws in history are available (Yoichi Higuchi
(2007), Asahi Shimbun (January 23, 2007)).
Appendix 1: When and how post-colonial independent states emerged in Africa.

Notes:
1 The main text explains the history of the formation of patrimonialism in Africa with four lines of events all of which are related to the Atlantic slave trade. This figure shows two of them ((2) and (3)). The ultimate convergence took place somewhat after post-colonial indigenous governments were established. Except for those noted otherwise, information for this figure was derived mainly from Michael Barratt Brown (1997) and Basil Davidson (1992).

2 The African population was estimated to be 54 million as of 1850. The number of those who had been abducted as slaves, mainly to America and the Caribbean, up to that time is estimated to be 23 million. According to an estimate by the captain of the Royal Navy's H.B.S. Bonnet (1849), 103,000 had been captured by the Navy and sent back ("recaptives") in the previous 26 years, and 1.795 million had ultimately landed on the American continents.

3 Sierra Leone became a British crown colony in 1870 and a base for Navy warships that patrolled the waters off West Africa. Before then, blacks who had fought the War of American Independence as British soldiers and had lived in London (the black poor) immigrated to the Freetown area after 1787 (Paul Richard (1996)). However, after
the Freetown area was designated as the destination for the liberated recaptives, the population of the recaptives came to dwarf that of the black poor. The recaptives hailed from various places in West Africa but they did not necessarily want to return as they and hated the traditional political systems of their homeland. Recaptives from the Yorba and Ibo nations in Nigeria were exceptions to this; they purposefully went home and tried to contribute to modernization. Liberia was designated by the American Colonization Society as the destination of American slaves liberated after the Civil War. Liberia is said already to have received 12,000 black returnees between 1822 and 1861 (Morten Boas 2001). Liberia does not seem to have received a significant portion of the recaptives who were sent back by the Royal Navy, however.

4 The number of those recaptured by the Royal Navy reached 70,000 in Sierra Leone between 1806 and 1864. They were called Creolers, and many of them were merchants called Creole traders who traded with the imperial countries and various places in West Africa. Their descendants and associates constituted the educated society of West Africa. However, the Creole traders themselves disappeared by the end of the 19th century. There are various theories as to why they disappeared, but the aforementioned Richard (1996) explains as follows: By the 1890s England’s colonial rule had reached interior regions where the Mende and other peoples lived. There, a proposal by the authorities to levy a house tax triggered protest which spread and became a rebellion in 1898. The anger was directed at missionaries who were seen as agents of the colonial authorities and also at Creole traders. The reason for anger toward the latter was social unrest in the communities where logging and rubber tapping activities had increased. The Mende warrior attacks were so fierce that the British authorities had to mobilize. In the end, the rebellion was repressed, and 96 people including the Mende tribal chiefs were executed.

5 Until the mid-19th century, there was no racial discrimination among the civil services of the British colonies, and it is said that almost all senior government posts, including those of governors-general and chief justices, were occupied by Africans and people from the Caribbean. However, as independence of the colonies loomed, increasingly bureaucrats were sent from England. Training of Africans ceased in order to effect a smooth transition of power. In the case of Sierra Leone, in 1892 more than half of senior officials were African, but in 1912 only one out of six were.

6 In the case of Ghana, the Gold Coast and Ashanti were colonized by the British in 1850. After the 1920s, the colonial policy was focused on using the authority of the Chiefdoms, and therefore on supporting and strengthening their power. Emboldened by this support the Chiefties became arrogant and offended educated young adults. After World War II, 60,000 veterans joined the civil societies. In February 1948, in the city of Accra, the government fired on the veterans who were marching for veterans associations. Ensuing riots led to the arrests of Nkrumah and Danquah, among others. The Commission of Enquiry for this incident recommended the establishment of a committee to draft a new constitution. As a result the Coussey Committee was formed and submitted its report in 1949. It recommended the establishment of a semi-responsible government, the idea of which stood against the insistence by Nkrumah and others for “self-government now.” Nkrumah called for a general strike in January 1950, and was arrested and sentenced to three years in prison. Based on the recommendations of the Coussey Committee, elections for self-rule were held in three stages -- February 1951, June 1954 and July 1956 -- Nkrumah prevailed in each one. The third election was considered to be an election for independence. The foregoing is based on Rimmer (1989).
Appendix 2: Application of the “basic framework (development model)” - The special development model of Ghana

1. History of systems and institutions (data)

| Political system (formal system) | ・Patrimonialism that began when the leader of an independence movement became official head of state.  
Nkrumah (1957-66) -- industrialization by state enterprises and food production by state farms  
・Military coup d’état (1966) National Liberation Council (NLC)  
・Conservative Busia administration (69-72) (PP: later NPP) followed by a military coup d’état  
・Acheampong administration (72-78) emerges, patrimonial governance flourishes (NRC)  
Corruption and kleptocracy by senior officials  
・Transition to civilian rule; President Limann (79-81)  
・Military coup d’état by Captain Rawlings (81-)  
・Populist NDC regime which won the multiparty presidential election; General Rawlings’ regime (1986-2000); Presidential powers strengthened in 1992, re-election, move towards patrimonialism.  
・Peaceful transition to the NPP government through a general election under the constitution banning the third term: President Kufuor (2000-)  
・Presidential powers strengthened in 1992, signs of patrimonialism strengthening.  
・Traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms which had existed before the colonial rule were incorporated into the British colonial system of indirect rule. Even today, they exercise de facto administrative authorities, controlling junior chiefs, deputy chiefs and residents, and managing conventional land ownership rights. (Example: The “Asanterre” who rules the 2 million Akan people in Southern Ghana)  
Some areas in the northern regions only had decentralized kinship societies. In these areas, the British appointed the chiefs in the colonial era. |

| (informal system) |  
Traditional kingdoms and chiefdoms which had existed before the colonial rule were incorporated into the British colonial system of indirect rule. Even today, they exercise de facto administrative authorities, controlling junior chiefs, deputy chiefs and residents, and managing conventional land ownership rights. (Example: The “Asanterre” who rules the 2 million Akan people in Southern Ghana)  
Some areas in the northern regions only had decentralized kinship societies. In these areas, the British appointed the chiefs in the colonial era. |
| Economic Institutions | • In many cases, these traditional political groups had ties with specific administrations or parties. Today, about half of the political groups are allied with NPP, and the other half with NDC. For example, in the Kingdom of Dagbon in northeastern Ghana, two clans that have the right to the throne (Abdu and Andani) took turns to assume the title of King. After the 1960s, each clan allied with NPP and NDC, respectively. After the establishment of the Kufuor administration in 2000, the clans came into conflict with one another, and in April 2002, King Andani was brutally murdered. Since then, Ghana has been under a declared state of emergency. |
| Public Finance Institutions | • The national treasury has effectively turned into the President’s private cashbox for maintaining his patron-client relationships instead of for managing funds to supply public goods. With reference to the three important criteria of the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management (PEM): (i) Fiscal Discipline: There are no restrictions for balancing revenues and expenditures, and the budget is no more than a ritual; (ii) Optimal Allocation of Expenditures: The item-by-item style budget lacks coordination among ministries in terms of policies, planning and budget planning. Information on donor assistance is not reported to the government; (iii) Incentive System for Budget Execution Agencies: Incentives do not work because the real wages are repressed, and talented people leave the government. |
| State Enterprises | • Many inefficient enterprises were created as a residual effect of the Nkrumah administration’s policy of industrialization through establishing state enterprises. The aggregate deficit of the five largest noncommercial public enterprises amounted to 9% of GDP (1999-2001). |
| Private Sector | • The private sector grew substantially as an effect of export substitution from the traditional export industries (cocoa, gold, logs), but major companies have become clients of the two dominant political parties. |
| Donor Assistance | • In 1983, the Rawlings administration accepted the World Bank’s economic recovery plan designed to stabilize the economy, and in 1987 it accepted the Bank and IMF’s structural adjustment plan. • Today, Ghana is one of the most ODA-dependent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. ODA accounted for 77.2% of gross capital formation in 1997 and 50.7% in 2002. The Kufuor administration requested debt cancellation through the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. |
For over a decade following independence, the economy grew well, due in part to past accumulations. But from 1975 to 1983, the effects of patrimonial public finance and global recession caused the growth rate per capita to turn negative. From 1983 to 2001, the government stabilized the economy under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, and was able to maintain a 5% growth rate. Still, GDP per capita has only recently recovered to the level of 1960 and uncertainties remain regarding the political and social system.

Patrimonialism brought on a vicious cycle: An accumulation of domestic and external debts created a heavy interest payment burden, which in turn caused high inflation. To break this cycle, the Kufuor administration took steps to benefit from the Enhanced HIPC debt reduction initiative. With regard to domestic debt (which stood at 29% of GNP at the end of 2000), the government’s aim is to reduce it by half in the near future so that interest payments can be reduced and the crowding-out effect on credit to the private sector can be removed.

Growth in the 1980s was driven by exports, but traditional items (cocoa beans, gold, logs) still accounted for 80% of the total. Production of cocoa beans decreased from a peak of 400,000 tons in 1975 to 160,000 tons due to failure of the Market Board’s state purchase-producer price policy. (In 1984-85, the price was reduced to 30% of the export price). Cocoa production has recovered somewhat since then, but a significant increase is unlikely because of the disappearance of virgin forests in the southern rain forest areas and because of competition with food production. Promotion of nontraditional export industries reliant on foreign direct investments and small to medium enterprises is urgently needed.

The poverty rate, as defined by the government, was reduced gradually from 50% in 1992 to 39.5% in 1999 (44.8% by international standards). However, there are significant regional disparities and poverty in rural villages in the savannas of the Northern Regions is severe. Significant shortages of basic foods throughout the year or during parts of the year are prevalent and the survival strategy has shifted to migrant labor. This, however, has weakened local communities, causing the traditional system of mutual aid to break down.
Appendix 3: Growth of the middle class in Ghana, China and Thailand

(1) Distribution of members of the Ghanaian parliament by former occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and lecturers</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>49*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public servants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs/Business persons</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note*: Of 49%, 16% were lawyers.


(2) Distribution of 10 social classes in China (by Lu Xueyun)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State and social management class</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private entrepreneurs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technocrats</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative workers</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual proprietors</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial service workers</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial workers</td>
<td>19.83</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>67.41</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, out of work, partially unemployed</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Institute of Sociology “Research Report on Social Classes of Modern China” 2002 (Ed. Lu Xueyun)

### Distribution of Thai cabinet members by former occupation (1932-88)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Ratio (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Military &amp; police</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bureaucrats</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Businesspersons</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other civilians</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Military and bureaucrats (1+2) | 707 | 86.7 | 24 | 20.0 | 42 | 82.4 | 126 | 47.2 | 6 | 13.3 |
| Civilians (2+3+4)               | 473 | 58.0 | 105 | 87.5 | 38 | 74.5 | 200 | 74.9 | 40 | 88.9 |

Appendix 4: Socioeconomic Structure of Chinese Patrimonialism at the End of Qing Dynasty

1. Chung—Li Chang’s research on the Chinese Gentry and their income

(1) In the 1880s, the total number of bureaucrats or “gentry” as defined here was estimated to be about 1.5 million, including 23,000 incumbent bureaucrats, of which 2,600 were in the imperial household and central government, as well as local resident bureaucrats (the local resident gentry). The percentage of family members of all bureaucrats in the estimated total population of 380 million was 1.9%.

(2) In order to become an incumbent bureaucrat, one had to pass the regular civil service examination (Keju) and obtain the degree of Jinshi or Juren, or the credential of Shengyuan, and then be certified as a Gongsheng. There was also an irregular way of becoming a Jiansheng, by buying an official post.

(3) Shengyuan means “student of the government,” and the degree could be obtained after taking several stages of examinations including one for Tongsheng. When one became a Shengyuan, he could then become one of the local gentry. Examinations for Juren and Jinshi were difficult, requiring recitation and application of the Four Books and Five Classics of Confucianism. It normally took many years to pass them.

(4) The regular income of incumbent bureaucrats was quite small, but extra income through bribery could be as much as 20 times greater.

(5) The estimated total income of the gentry was 670 million tael, accounting for 24% of the estimated GNP. By comparison, the government revenue of 160 million tael was 5.7% of GNP. (The equivalent percentages estimated in 1933 by Liu Tachung and Wu Baosan were both 3%).
### GNP and income of the Gentry by industry in China in the 1880s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial sector</th>
<th>(1) GNP</th>
<th>(2) Gentry income</th>
<th>(3) Weight of Gentry income, (2)/(1) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,672,456</td>
<td>220,000(33)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>47,800</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>125,800</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>113,600(17)</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>74,645</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential housing</td>
<td>164,000</td>
<td>30,000(4)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government service</td>
<td>164,000</td>
<td>121,000(18)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional services,</td>
<td>241,313</td>
<td>190,625(28)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gentry services, and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other services,</td>
<td>11,258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International transactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,781,272</td>
<td>675,225(100)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: Negligible

2. **Yuji Muramatsu’s research on Guzhan in Jiangsu Province**

(1) *Guzhan* was a landlord management organization commonly seen in the Jian Nan region. Under this arrangement, one of the gentry with some kind of a bureaucratic background would be commissioned by other landlords to manage their lands. He would manage them together with his own lands and leased areas, collecting tenant rents on a commission basis and paying the taxes. It was a large-scale business, sometimes covering several thousand *mou* of agricultural land.

(2) Muramatsu studied the management of many *guzhans* and underlying institutions through extensive research, including private documents (mainly tenant ledgers or fish scale books). He studied in particular the interlocking relationship between landlords and the state authority, and the forced payments of tenant rents by invoking official authority on the basis of this relationship; i.e., unpaid rents could result in arrest, detention and even death.

(3) One of Muramatsu’s findings related to institutions which determined the relationships among
the government, landlords and tenants in agricultural villages in the Tongzhi, Guanghsu and early Minguo eras (up to the 1910s). He found that while they were unchanged, there were changes in the distribution among them of agricultural expenditures appearing on the balance of payments of the Guzhans. Time series data between 1893 and 1928 obtained for a typical Guzhan is summarized in the table below. Although Muramatsu withheld judgment, he suggested that the changes in numbers may have foreshadowed the historic changes in the landlord system and its relationship with the state authority that occurred towards the mid-20th century.

### Distribution of Guzhan tenant rent gross income

A typical organization under the management of yu-chin-zhan of the Wu clan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Guzhan's gross income</th>
<th>Tenant rents (shi)</th>
<th>Currency equivalent</th>
<th>Tax payments</th>
<th>Zhan expenses, administrative expenses</th>
<th>Net income of landlord organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1893 (Guanghsu 19)</td>
<td>44.38</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912 (Minguo 1)</td>
<td>37.83</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923 (Minguo 12)</td>
<td>49.53</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928 (Minguo 17)</td>
<td>43.03</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual average</td>
<td>41.91</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The currency unit was changed in the first year of the Minguo Era from a bronze-based coin to a silver yuan-based one.

3. Chen Hansheng’s research on clan-owned rice fields in China’s Guangdong Province

(1) This paper by a well-known prewar Chinese economist is an important piece of literature that allows us to glimpse the political, social and economic roles played by clan-owned rice fields in Guangdong Province where they held the largest share of agricultural land.

(2) With regard to clan-owned rice fields, which was a main focus of the of the research, direct surveys were conducted for 17 of the province’s 63 counties. Research for the remaining 46 countries was based on communication with 294 villages. The results indicate that, of the total
area of all agricultural lands in the province (reportedly 42 million mou but 52.35 million mou according to the official statistics in 2002; 16 mou equals one hectare), 35% (1,470 mou) was under collective clans ownership. Table (1) shows the share of clan-owned rice fields by county in parts of the Dongjiang Basin and Zhujiang Delta where the shares are relatively large. Fanyu County (in the lower Zhujiang Delta), where the most extensive surveys were conducted in 10 villages, has approximately 50%. The clan-owned rice fields have various common names such as ji tian, zhan tian, taigon tian, and changchan tian. As the names suggest, income from these fields was used for ancestral worship as well as social and charity work for clan members. A local magazine in Meixian County suggests that one of their main purposes was educational, to provide benefits to clan families who sent their child to an academy and travel expenses for students who went to the capital for Jinshi examinations.

(3) Other than clan-owned rice fields, there were collectively owned lands in Guangdong Province with such names as xue tian, miao tian and hui tian. Purposes of the xue tian included worshipping Confucius, supporting poor students, and maintaining public schools. The miao tian was owned by temples. The hui tian was used to pay for merchants’ social activities, and its income was often also used for educational purposes. The roles of these collectively owned lands were less important than those of clan-owned rice fields, and the area was said to be small, especially in the cases of xue tian and miao tian.

(4) In addition to these collectively owned lands, there were lands owned by individual landlords who were inferior both economically and politically. In terms of family units, these represented 2.8% of the total in 10 villages in Fanyu County. In terms of land area, they represented 21.8% in two of the 10. These lands were leased to tenants. Table (2) shows by class the numbers of farming households and cultivated areas of all cultivated lands, including these and lands owned by farmers. The classes of rich farmer, medium farmer and poor farmer were categorized on the basis of livelihood. The medium farmer is defined as one that can maintain an average family on the income from the cultivated land; the poor farmer is one that has difficulty maintaining an average family; and the rich farmer is one that maintains a higher living standard than the medium-size farmer and who can hire one or more full-time agricultural laborers or more seasonal laborers than can the the medium-size farmer. What becomes clear on looking at the two tables constituting Table (2) is that, in any class category based on livelihood, dependency on leased lands accounted for more than half of the cultivated land; there were even farmers without land and pure tenant farmers. In general, the area of cultivated land per household was extremely small.

(5) Below is a summary of Chen Hansheng’s descriptions with regard to the management of clan-owned rice fields which likely had an impact on the social and political relationships in
agricultural villages in Guangdong Province.

A. In Guangdong Province, normally one village was occupied by a clan that shared the same family name. In general, four or more out of five farmers in Guangdong Province lived within the same clan.

B. A clan had a chief, leaders and councilmen who were chosen from among the elders, but those with the real powers were the clan manager (the chamberlain) and the chief finance officer. Within the clan, these were said to be rich and useful as well as educated and wise. In fact, they were often the ones who had passed the civil service examination in their youth or graduated from certain provincial schools and many of them were retired bureaucrats. Ancestral worship was performed by all members. The main responsibilities of those with power related to finance, such as managing income from the clan’s assets (especially tenant rents and loan interests) and expenditures (tax payments, temple expenses, subsidies for members’ education). They not only handled taxes on lands owned by the clan, but also collected land taxes from individual in the village on behalf of the provincial government. In addition, administrators arbitrated clan conflicts. Furthermore, positions of community chief, village chief and their subordinate officers, established under the self-rule system for agricultural villages, were largely occupied by people recommended by powerful members of a powerful clan.

C. Cases of misconduct by those with power are also described in detail. When paying land taxes on clan-owned rice fields, those with power sometimes underpaid on the land that they personally owned. When clan-owned rice fields are leased, clan members had priority, but in reality, driven by land starvation, bidding was rife with corruption. There were cases where local wealthy merchants and powerful gentlemen leased thousands, and sometimes tens of thousands of mou of land, only to sublease it to earn tenant rent income.

Table (1): Share of clan-owned land in total cultivated area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chaoan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wuhua</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pingyuan</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heping</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heyuan</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huilai</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiaoling</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table (2): 10 village survey in Fanyu County, 1988

1. Number of households by class and breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer Class</th>
<th>Number of Farmer Households</th>
<th>Landowning Farmer</th>
<th>Tenant Farmer</th>
<th>(Landless Farmer)</th>
<th>Average number of mou of cultivated land per household</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich Farmer</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Farmer</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Farmer</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>(326)</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Laborer</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>(480)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Number of mou of cultivated land owned and leased by farmers by class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmer Class</th>
<th>Cultivated Land number of mou</th>
<th>Owned Land number of mou</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Leased, other number of mou</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rich Farmer</td>
<td>2,733.0</td>
<td>1,115.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>1,617.5</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Farmer</td>
<td>2,267.0</td>
<td>673.0</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>1,594.3</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor Farmer</td>
<td>3,055.7</td>
<td>525.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>2,530.7</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,056.0</td>
<td>2,313.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>5,742.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 5: Application of the basic framework (development model)” to China

1. Development stages and transitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political system (to the Qing Dynasty)</th>
<th>· Except for rural areas in remote regions, and regions inside and outside of the imperial district, the entire country is ruled by the Emperor with the help of the distinctive exam-based bureaucratic system. In rural areas, the basic unit is the clan village. Local resident bureaucrats (the gentry) integrate with the landlord-centered order to assert their influence. They pay or otherwise provide land taxes and compulsory labor to the central government to support its finances. After the Taiping Rebellion, government-supervised and government-operated, and government-supervised and commercially-operated modern companies emerged.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(The era of Nationalist government)</td>
<td>· Chinese style patrimonialism system prevailed in the Qing Dynasty era. The Nationalist government, however, tried to abolish unequal treaties and regain its sovereignty. It attempted to adopt the institutions of a modern state by establishing a fiscal system, tariff policies, currency reform and a central bank. It abolished the Keju system and encouraged the growth of a technocratic bureaucracy; the National Resource Committee, engaged in the construction of heavy industries, was typical. Nonetheless, it is said that the leaders of the Nationalist Party exercised patrimonial control over state enterprises, in effect, a system of bureaucratic capitalism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The era of the People’s Republic of China)</td>
<td>· The civil war between the Nationalists and Communists before the establishment of the People’s Republic of China featured a strategy of urban siege networks based on the expansion of liberalized zones. This strategy, together with land reform, destroyed patrimonialism because the power shift destroyed completely the old order of the rural areas which had served as patrimonialism’s incubation base. However, the policy of the government of the People’s Republic was to take over from the Nationalist government the entire personnel of all administrative, military and educational agencies and all state enterprises and state projects. In the case of the National Resource Committee, everyone, including the Director, voluntarily converted to the new government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Economic Institutions in General (The Era of the People’s Republic)

The department ownership system of state enterprises under the jurisdictions of line ministries of the People’s Republic, the localism of local governments, and the behavior pattern of units are considered to be residua of patrimonialism.

- By a decision made at the 2002 Communist Party Congress and confirmed by the 2004 National Congress through a constitutional amendment, the People’s Republic transformed itself from a nation of one-party-one class rule to rule by a national party, known as the three representations principle. By this time, China had completed a market-oriented economic reform, and in 2001 joined the WTO.

- There was a rough division into three periods: the reconstruction period (with the implementation of new democracy reforms), the planned period, and the reform and open period. Different institutional changes took place in each of these periods.

- The planned period was politically a one-party dictatorship that was administratively multilayered as follows:
  1. A pure planned sector covered by the comprehensive goods balance table method and integrated state finance.
  2. A controlled sector covered only by integrated state finance.
  3. A self-support sector covered only by the people’s commune system. The finances of townships and villages were autonomous and outside the framework of state finances. There was forced purchase of food and cotton.

- With regard to the reform and open period (1978-present), there was first the deconstruction of people’s communes and the creation of special economic zones. Abolition of planning occurred, not as a big bang, but gradually: The decision to make market economy the goal was taken in 1984; and after study its scenario was finally clarified in 1993. There was some residua of patrimonialism, but good performance in development was achieved: i.e., stability and growth, poverty reduction, industrialization.

- In the planned period there was a consolidation of revenues and expenditures, as most of the finances of state-owned enterprises and local governments were integrated into the finances of the central government. In the reform and open period, they were rapidly decentralized. The method was to shift investment in enterprises to state-owned commercial banks (bo yai dai, 1984) and shift profit rendering to taxes (li gai shui, 1983, 1984). The main approach for local taxation was the implementation and enhancement by the central government of
| Financial enterprises | the fiscal contract system (*fon du chi fan*, 1980, 1985, 1988). Rapid decentralization was a necessary step for market-oriented economic reform in the long run, but in the short run, it generated the residua of patrimonialism.  

- Re-consolidation of local government revenues was realized by the separate tax system of 1995. Eventually, this put financial pressures on the finances of townships and villages at the local government level (provinces, counties) and created what is called the three agricultural problems.  

- During the planned period, a soviet-style monobank system was implemented. This directly linked the activities of the state People’s Bank of China to planning and public finance.  

- During the reform and open period, there was dual layerization, the separation of the central bank from state-owned commercial banks in 1983-84. In addition, specialization was implemented for four major banks including the Industrial & Commercial Bank of China. However, this did not provide for independence of currency and financial policy making, in the first case, or implementation of financial intermediation, in the second. Especially, the residua of patrimonialism worked on lending operations of state-owned commercial banks and caused them to hold massive amounts of bad loans.  

| State enterprises | State-owned industrial enterprises evolved in stages: At the beginning of the planned period (1957) they accounted for 80% of total industrial output and were placed under the direct control of the government (*gong chang zhi*). When the reform and open period began, they went through a period of expansion and enhancement of management autonomy while still under the *gong chang zhi* (1978). They then moved towards incorporation, seeking the separation of state ownership from management authority (1993 Company Law). The subsequent changes were complex. One was the liquidation or privatization of small companies with poor financial performance (*fang*) and the reform and reorganization of large companies with good performance as state-owned companies (*zhua*) (1997). Another change was the retention of ownership of assets of the remaining state-owned companies by the newly established, State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commissions at the state and local level (2002). However, it is unclear whether these incremental shifts will actually achieve the official transitional goal because many of the aforementioned residua of patrimonialism still function as persistent resistance factors against state-owned enterprise reform. It must be remembered that state-owned enterprises were responsible for the promotion of technological innovations and industrial policy in |
Agriculture, township and village companies, private companies

China throughout the planned period and the reform and open period, and that they contributed to the employment of excess labor. (The institutional factors that made this possible have not been studied extensively.) It seems that, since the 1990s, state-owned enterprises have gone through a shakeout due to various reforms and have become fewer and more efficient. According to data from 2001 of all state-owned enterprises (whose share in total industrial output shrank to 18.1%), those incurring losses accounted for 51.2%. On average, the sales/profit ratio was 6.3%, the net profit ratio was 3.7%, and the debt/equity ratio was 158% (213% for the entire industrial sector). These numbers suggest that, despite the good performance of TFP (total factor productivity), their financial performance is still weak.

- In the 1980s, in conjunction with the program to develop township and village companies there was progress in the industrialization of agricultural villages based on former people’s communes (she-dui companie) and involving the handicraft industry and small-scale merchants in the same local area. This was a positive response by the self-support sector of the planned period to breakthroughs in agricultural technology and production as a result of their liberation from the constraints of the commune system. It increased demand as a result of the improved economic conditions of farming households and the support they received from their local communities. The groundwork for the breakthroughs in agricultural technology was laid during the time of the communes by projects for flood control, irrigation and cultivation of high-yielding varieties. Demand for the products of township and village companies was particularly strong in the 1980s when niches existed due to insufficient supply from state-owned enterprise with the result that the total output of township and village industrial companies soon surpassed that of state-owned enterprises. After the niches disappeared and market competition intensified, township and village companies entered an adjustment period followed disintegration at both extremes. Those companies that survived took various forms of business enterprise: joint-stock company, joint-stock limited company and corporate group. They were privatized or turned into group companies. As of 2001, their industrial output was substantially larger than that of state-owned enterprises. These companies under the administrative jurisdiction of township and village governments have also been restricted by the residua of patrimonialism, but they created an effective model that supported the market-oriented industrialization of China’s transitional economy.

- China never received structural adjustment loans or poverty reduction strategy loans with conditionalities from the World Bank or IMF. China joined those organizations in 1980, but
### Donor assistance

Both the Bank and the IMF determined that China’s development was a special case with unique initial conditions and they refrained from intervening except for necessary advice on macroeconomic and structural issues. Notable bilateral assistance included the first and second loans from the Export-Import Bank and the first and second Yen Loans from Japan for coal and oil development, as well as project assistance for the construction of transportation routes and auxiliary facilities to move the coal and oil to port for export. Those projects were conceived and designed on the initiative of China, itself.

- During the planned period, the growth rate showed an average level (NDMP) of 6.2% between 1956 and 1966 and 4.9% between 1966 and 1976 despite the cataclysms caused by the policies of Mao Zedong such as the great leap forward and the cultural revolution. During the reform and open period, to the present time, the economic growth rate reached as high as about 9% of GDP and in 2000 China joined the ranks of lower middle income developing countries. The mode of economic change evolved from one of cataclysm caused by artificial policy interventions to a stop-and-go mode where an increase in aggregate demand due to an overheated economy was suppressed by administrative means and then, after 1991, to a market economy mode where it is possible to achieve a soft landing through monetary and fiscal policies.

- The decisive factor during the reform and open period was that the approach of decentralizing policy over all economic areas in the first 15 years (fanguan rangli) produced agricultural breakthroughs → improved economic conditions of farmers → increased industrialization of agricultural villages → created the modern, private sector. Linked to this was the success of the foreign capital import policy which initially took the form of special economic zones. This led to increased production and export by FDI throughout the period. Contrary to expectations, the delegation of authority to state-owned enterprise at that time facilitated the erosion of state-owned assets by insiders.

- The symbol of the decentralization policy was the introduction of separate tax systems. The result of the parallel improvement in economic management was reflected in the aforementioned growth performance, but risk factors remain. One is related to the effects of the residua of patrimonialism. In the process of fiscal decentralization, the burden was passed down to lower levels in the descending order of provinces, city/county, and finally township commissariat/village, which ultimate brought the burden down to the common farmer. This was a new phenomenon in agricultural production and it caused the three agricultural problem situation. The new phenomenon was that increases in food production after the 1980s rose dramatically due to demand saturation, necessitating the adoption of producer protection policies.
Appendix 6: Patrimonialism in Thailand—Notes on the Sakdine System

The Sakdine system up to the 1932 Constitutional Revolution:

The Sakdine system is a system of governance legally established in Thailand in 1455 during the Ayudhya dynasty (1376-1767). It lasted until the 1932 Constitutional Revolution under the Chakri (Rattanakosin) Dynasty of the eighth King of Bangkok (1782-present). The system has been studied by Robert Lingat, a Frenchman who served as a legal advisor to the Thai government between 1924 and 1940, and Chatthip Nartsupha, Professor of Economics at Chulalongkorn University, among others. Their research was introduced in Japan by Koichi Nonaka and Akira Suehiro, who were researchers at the Institute of Developing Economies. (Chatthip Nartsupha, edited and translated by Nonaka and Suehiro, Thai Sonraku Keizaishi (Economic History of Thai Villages), Imura Bunka Jigyousha, 1987.)

In the Sakdine system, the King was an absolute monarch and the sole owner of all the land in the country. There was a bureaucratic class of administrative officers and ostensibly land was distributed among them in accordance with their official ranks. “Sakdine,” according to Lingat, was the term given to the size of this distributed land. The common people lived in self-sufficient communities but were obligated to pay taxes and provide compulsory labor in return for occupying the land. There were no lords. This system has the general characteristics of patrimonialism described in this report and the term “patrimonial” often appears in the literature referred to below. The following is a summary of the Sakdine system based on the book edited and translated by Nonaka and Suehiro.

(1) The King and the realm: In the early Ayudhya era, there were three major principles to the land system. (1) The King was the sole owner of the land. This was a significant prerogative because there was a custom by which use of land could be divided and exchanged among the people. This custom later disappeared, however, becoming nothing more than a basis for tax collection and compulsory labor. (2) People were prohibited from buying and selling land. In Bangkok’s Chakri (Rattanakosin) Dynasty this ban remained for unused wasteland but ceased to be enforced with regard to farmland. (3) People’s rights to land were weak. When a person occupied the land only, without cultivating it, the rights would be lost. Subsequently, ownership and occupancy were separated.

(2) Finances of the royal household: Beginning in the Ayudhya era, the most important source of revenue for the royal treasury was the land tax. The land tax on rice paddies plowed by cows and rain-fed paddy fields continued until the Bangkok era. Initially collected against rice yields, this tax later was levied according to the area of owned or cultivated land. In addition, labor was commandeered to produce rice for contribution to the state. The term of labor was 6 months per year during the Ayudhya era, shortened to 4 months in the Bangkok era, and subsequently to 3 months.

(3) Civilian and military officials were accorded paddy fields of a certain size based on their rank, title and government post. Whether they actually received the land is unclear. Lingat, among others,
argues that this may have been simply a means for recognizing official rank

(4) The communities in which the subjects lived had strong internal bonds and were by nature at odds with the state, a conflict clearly manifested in the system of commandeered labor. Village self-rule was managed by elders’ councils which arbitrated to resolve conflicts. Although there were slaves in Thai society, they were debt or war slaves, few in number and treated as members of the family.

Chakri Reforms of King Rama V

King Rama V (King Chulalongkorn; 1868-1910) of the Chakri Dynasty is reported to have been an intelligent monarch, comparable to Japan’s Emperor Meiji. He implemented a series of modernizing reforms with the intent of avoiding colonization, as happened to neighboring countries, as a result of the Bowring Treaty which he signed in 1865 under pressure from England. In fact, he is said to have modeled his reforms on the British colonial administrations of Burma and Malay. Chayan and Ukrist (1987) list what they regard to be the four major reforms: (1) To cement his power within the country, he annexed northern, northeastern and southern Thailand which until then had been semi-independent, tributary states. (2) He modernized the bureaucracy by completely revamping the existing four central government ministries (kroms). The most important functions -- maintenance of territorial integrity, national defense, diplomacy, finance, transportation, education and training, and the judiciary -- were reorganized into newly created ministries. The Interior Ministry was the first to be reorganized, and it served as midwife to the others. These new ministries extended their jurisdiction throughout the country and replaced ruling aristocrats with salaried bureaucrats. Rama V’s reforms created a strong bureaucratic state ruled over by King and royal family. The bureaucratic machinery, with the Interior Ministry at its core, effectively drew in surpluses (taxes, forest leases, mining royalties) from the rural provinces. (3) There was also education reform; however, this was elite education for the purpose of grooming the children of the royal family, the nobility and high-ranking officials to become bureaucrats. Expensive tuitions were required to keep out the children of commoners. (4) The forth major reform was implementation of conscription (1888 Military Law, revised in 1905).

In terms of substance, Lingat and Chattip give importance to King Rama V’s reforms that liberalized factors of production and product markets, including the issuance of land title certificates with maps in connection with land transaction liberalization, the adoption of the Torrens Title System, the emancipation of slaves (which began in 1874), and the adoption of money payments for taxes and in place of commandeered labor (1901 Commandeered Labor Payment Law, etc.). Indeed, shortly after the conclusion of the Bowring Treaty, uncultivated land in the Chao Phraya Delta began to be worked to meet growing demand from British trading companies for exportable rice. A network of canals was excavated in the Delta with capital provided by the royal household and royal families. The canals were essential for distributing water evenly throughout the area for farming and for transporting people, materials and harvested rice. A massive movement of farmers, including freed slaves, took place. From that time, the
population of the Delta, the cultivation acreage, and the value of rice exports grew continually at an annual rate of 3% until World War I. Behind all of these changes was the institutional modernization of the Chakri Reforms.

1932 Constitutional (Monarchy) Revolution

King Rama V’s modernization policies left behind the challenges of political reform. During the reign of King Rama VIII after the death of Rama V a group of young Army and Navy officers and civilian officials organized a coup d’état. The group called itself the People’s Party, a common people’s group. It declared the following: (1) The Council of War and, the Privy Council will be dissolved and control of the military will be transferred from the absolute monarch to a commander-in-chief. (2) The government will have full powers to govern the country without prior approval from the King. (3) The People’s Party will assume administrative authority (until 1946). Ministerial and departmental bureaucrats will be replaced by members of the People’s Party. Even members of the royal family who held important government positions were removed or went into exile.

The foregoing is an account of the emergence and passage of patrimonialism in Thailand with respect to the Sakdine system. However, patrimonialism itself continued, but in a different form. The People’s Party took over the government, but it was unable to raise sufficient funds to support itself or to maintain the state finances. It was forced to resort to the creation of state enterprises, leading to the creation of too many state enterprises and the formation of governmental cliques. It may be that a long-term solution for patrimonialism is not possible without the formation of the industries and social classes appropriate for a modern political system. In the 1930s, these did not exist.
References

Amano, Motonosuke (1940) *Shina Nougyou Keizairon (jou) (The Agricultural Economy of China (Volume 1)),* Kaizousha.


Li, Baojia (1901-06) *Guanchang xian xing ji (Present Situation of Officialdom)* (Translated by Iriya, Yoshitaka and Ishikawa, Kensaku, Heibonsha, 1968).


Okuma, Tadashi (1939) *Ahurika Bunkatsushi (The History of Division of Africa)*, Iwanami Shoten.


——— (1971) Translated by Kimata, Tokuo Jukyou To Doukyou (Confucianism and Taoism), Soubunsha.


The International Development Research Institute (IDRI) of the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) arranges and conducts research aimed at improving the quality of development programs and policies. This Discussion Paper series is intended to clarify and promote discussion on issues related to international development assistance.

All papers in this series can be downloaded from FASID/IDRI website, http://dakis.fasid.or.jp/